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# JPRS Report

# Near East & South Asia

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# Near East & South Asia

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## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Egyptian Envoy on Palestinian, Israeli Talks Prospects

91AA0146A Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 12 Dec 90  
pp 10-11

[Interview of Egyptian Ambassador to Israel, Muhammad Basyuni, by Hadiyah al-Sharbini; date and place not specified; first three paragraphs are AKHIR SA'AH introduction]

[Text] The continued focus of international and Arab attention on the Gulf crisis has led to the indefinite postponement of peace efforts to solve the Palestinian problem, which is considered the essence of the Middle East conflict. However, given the continuing events in the occupied territories, international society has again devoted a share of its attention to the Palestinian problem, lest this problem come to a head while the countries of the world are preoccupied with finding a quick solution to the Gulf crisis. The best indication of this is the UN Security Council resolution that calls for the holding of an international peace conference on the Middle East to strengthen opportunities for peace and stability in the region. Based on these developments, many important questions have arisen:

What is the future of the Middle East peace process? What are the opportunities for solving the Palestinian problem, which is changing the essence of the conflict in the region? How can the Middle East problem be accorded treatment similar to that accorded by international society to the Gulf conflict? How can the causes of tension in the occupied territories be eliminated? What about the [proposal for an] international conference, which the Israeli government has rejected consistently? What is the future of the Palestinian uprising?

Regarding these questions, an interview was conducted with the Egyptian Ambassador to Israel, Muhammad Basyuni, who was making a quick visit to Egypt to submit, as is customary from time to time, a report on conditions in Israel and the occupied territories to Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, the deputy prime minister and the foreign minister.

The interview with Ambassador Basyuni began with the following question regarding conditions in the occupied territories:

[Sharbini] There have been frequent incidents of tension and violence in the occupied territories recently in response to the ineffective policies pursued by the Israeli occupation forces there. There have also been several incidents on the Israeli-Jordanian border, and there was an incident on the Israeli-Egyptian border recently. In your view, your excellency, how is it possible to eliminate these causes of tension and violence?

[Basyuni] I must first state that Egypt condemns any type of violence and terrorism, regardless of its source, be it

Palestinian, Israeli, or any other nationality. The point I wish to underscore here is that we sometimes speak of violence and terrorism, but not of its causes. In order to stop terrorism, we must first eliminate its causes. In other words, we must begin to move toward solving the Palestinian problem, which is considered the essence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and thus give the Palestinian people hope of finding a just, lasting solution to this problem. By achieving peace, we can stop every form and type of terrorism and violence, regardless of its source.

Recently, there have been frequent incidents on the Israeli-Jordanian border, and there was an incident on the Egyptian-Israeli border. Here, I would like to say that there are victims of peace just as there are victims of wars. However, if we note that the victims of peace are much fewer than those of wars, it is consequently necessary to achieve a just, lasting peace, so that the peoples of the entire region can enjoy stability and security.

On that basis, I want to clarify a very important point, namely that when Egypt signed the peace agreement with Israel, the goal was not to achieve a separate peace. Rather, it was a step on the road to achieving a lasting, comprehensive, just peace. Such a peace, if it is achieved, would be a strong peace, because a comprehensive, just, strong peace is one that achieves security and stability for all peoples of the region.

Israel has declared that it is extremely sensitive about its security. However, in my estimation, only peace can achieve security for the Israeli people. Force cannot achieve peace. Force achieves a fait accompli, but it does not achieve peace and security. Therefore, peace must be achieved, so that the Israeli people can also enjoy security. In this respect, it is not possible to hold onto the territories and discuss peace, because these two principles are mutually exclusive. The key to a solution, as I have always said, is "land in exchange for peace." This is the basis of any solution. If we look at Resolution No. 242, we find that it is based on the principle of not permitting the occupation of another's lands by force!

### The Difference Between the Two Problems

[Sharbini] The Gulf crisis resulting from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has captured the world's attention. What is the extent of that crisis' negative or positive effect of on the Palestinian problem?

[Basyuni] Linkage between the two problems complicates solving either of them, because the first problem, the Gulf problem, is considered an Arab-Arab problem and the second problem, the Palestinian problem, is an Arab-Israeli problem. Therefore, if we attempt to link them, a solution to either of them will become impeded.

Current efforts thus center on finding a quick solution to the Gulf crisis. This does not preclude the start of preparations to solve the Palestinian problem in order to preserve the momentum of this problem. By preparations, I do not mean that joint meetings should be held

between the relevant parties. However, each party, on its own, can prepare to solve the problem. The pertinent alliances must also refrain from issuing statements that do not help pave the way for a solution of this problem (meaning the statements of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir).

[Sharbini] However, it is constantly said that the current Israeli government is the most extremist Israeli government in a long time, and there are fears that the Shamir government's continual rejection of any peace plans or proposals will destroy any opportunities for peace in the region. Could you comment on that, especially inasmuch as you maintain ongoing contacts with members of the Israeli Government?

[Basyuni] I want to stress that the matter of the Israeli Government is an internal matter, which the Israeli people itself will settle. However, the important thing here is that the Israeli Government respond to the calls for peace that have been made, regardless of whether this government is right-wing or left-wing. I am personally optimistic that, after the Gulf crisis has been resolved, we will, God willing, move to solve the Palestinian problem. I believe that the Gulf crisis has given a greater role to international society as represented by the Security Council. International society must also play a greater role in solving the Palestinian problem, because there cannot be two criteria for solving two problems in the same region.

#### **An International Conference: Why?**

[Sharbini] The idea of holding an international peace conference on the Middle East has been proposed again by international society. However, Israel always rejects such proposals, just as it previously rejected the Baker plan and other proposals aimed at holding an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and peace negotiations. What is the fate of the peace process and the opportunities for a solution in light of Israel's continued rejection?

[Basyuni] None of the methods proposed for solving the Palestinian problem and settling the Middle East problem peacefully, comprehensively, and justly are a goal in and of themselves. Rather, the goal has always been how to achieve a just solution to the Palestinian problem. When we speak of an international peace conference on the Middle East, we are not speaking of a conference that imposes solutions. Rather, we advocate the convocation of an international conference for three important reasons:

1. To encourage the relevant parties to sit at the negotiating table.
2. If the relevant parties reach an impasse during their discussions, an international conference could help them find a solution, without imposing that solution on them.

3. If the relevant parties are able to reach an agreement among themselves, the major countries (the five permanent Security Council members) could make efforts to provide the necessary guarantees for these agreements.

On the other hand, when we speak of the importance of conducting an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, I maintain that such a dialogue is not incompatible with the idea of holding an international conference. Rather, it can be regarded as a step on the road to achieving this conference. We must not forget that the countries that are party to the conflict have previously agreed to Security Council Resolution No. 338, which calls for holding negotiations between the relevant parties under appropriate international auspices, which means holding an international conference.

The basis for convening a conference would be Security Council Resolution 242, which pertains to not permitting the occupation of another's land by force. In my opinion, the most difficult stage is the initial stage. If a dialogue process begins for the sake of peace, no one can impede it.

#### **The Uprising Will Not Be Quelled By Force**

[Sharbini] Some say that members of the Israeli opposition, particularly members of the Labor Party, enjoy flexibility in responding to peace proposals. However, given the increase in extremism in Israel, is the Israeli opposition still able to communicate its tone to Israeli society?

[Basyuni] If we look at the Israeli [political] map, we find that there are two primary camps, equal in power, the right and the left. However, the religious parties in Israel are now considered the "tongue of the scales." In my opinion, if these religious parties believe that a true opportunity and a true partner for peace exist, they will respond to calls for peace.

As I mentioned earlier, Egypt does not interfere in the internal affairs of any state. Rather, we deal with governments alone. Therefore, we deal with the Israeli government as a whole.

[Sharbini] What is the fate of the Palestinian uprising, which is facing its most critical stage following the Israeli Government's resolve to confront and end the uprising by force?

[Basyuni] The Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories does not stem from a desire to incite unrest or engage in violent acts. Rather, it expresses a national sentiment that aims to find a just solution to the Palestinian problem and to become rid of the Israeli occupation. Therefore, in my estimation, the uprising cannot be ended through the use of force, because violence begets only violence. Instead, the creation of hope for the Palestinians in a just solution to their problem and the start of peace negotiations, which is to say the convocation of an international conference or the beginning of an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue—all of that would lead to a

calming of the situation. The use of force will lead only to greater tension and violence.

### The Settlements Are A True Obstacle

[Sharbini] The problem of Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories has escalated with the increase in the number of the Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union and the Israeli Government's desire to settle them in the occupied territories. How is Egypt's opposition to this policy of the Israeli Government conveyed?

[Basyuni] We have always maintained that our position is completely clear on the settlements issue, and we have always had the same position. It has never changed, neither before or during the Camp David discussions, nor after the signing of the peace accords with Israel. Egypt strongly opposes Israeli settlement in the occupied territories, because this activity is considered a true obstacle in the way of achieving peace.

When we speak of human rights and one's right to immigrate wherever he wishes, we believe that no one can be given a right at the expense of another's right. Hence, the emergence of our strong opposition to the settlement of Soviet Jews in occupied territories.

[Sharbini] What about the Tel Aviv government's position on President Mubarak's initiative to eliminate weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East region, knowing that Israel has from time to time stressed the importance of eliminating chemical weapons from the region, and that Israel possesses all types of mass destruction weapons?

[Basyuni] Egypt calls for the elimination of all mass destruction weapons from the Middle East region, including chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. The Middle East region must be devoid of all mass destruction weapons.

Finally, I am optimistic about the ability to achieve a comprehensive, lasting, and just peace. Let wars be merely a memory of generations. Let peace based on truth and justice be the present and the future.

### Stock Market Official on Impact of Crisis

91AE0209A London SAWT AL-KUWAIT AL-DUWALI  
in Arabic 27 Dec 90 p 4

[Article by Jasib al-Shuhari: "The Occupation Devastated the Kuwaiti Economy and Hurt All the Arab Countries"]

[Excerpt] Dr. Sa'faq al-Rukaybi, secretary-general of the Arab Federation of Stock Exchanges and president of the Kuwaiti exchange, underscored that the Iraqi invasion has severely degraded economic performance in the State of Kuwait and that its repercussions will be felt for years to come. He told SAWT AL-KUWAIT in an exclusive interview that the Iraqi invasion pilfered and destroyed many commercial systems essential to daily

transactions, thereby [adversely] affecting the Kuwaiti economy as a whole. The text of the interview follows: [passage omitted]

[Al-Shuhari] How big is the [Kuwait] exchange? How many companies are listed and what are their aggregate capital and number of shares?

[Al-Rukaybi] Fifty-two companies—44 Kuwaiti and eight Arab—were listed on the exchange on the day of the Iraqi invasion. Their nominal capital amounted to about a billion Kuwaiti dinars. They had a total of some 11 billion shares with a market value of some 3.3 billion dinars by the end of 1989.

[Al-Shuhari] Compared to a few years earlier, what was the average volume on the exchange before the incidents?

[Al-Rukaybi] Trading on the exchange has been historically quiet during the summer, especially in July and August when many traders are abroad. Volume prior to the incidents was normal, at a daily average of 1.5 million dinars, until 20 Jul when offers increased and bids decreased in reaction to the onset of tension generated by Iraq.

[Al-Shuhari] What is the current status of the exchange?

[Al-Rukaybi] The exchange, like all other institutions in the state, is currently suspended. It may be said that the Kuwait exchange was the first of the financial institutions to be sabotaged by the Iraqi regime in Kuwait because it was a guiding light for countries of the third world and a leading institution in the Arab region.

[Al-Shuhari] What is to become of listed financial instruments and their holders?

[Al-Rukaybi] The Iraqi occupiers altered the economic system prevailing in the state prior to the invasion when a free economy was the norm. The market, in view of the destruction delivered by the Iraqi regime to our country, finds no point in doing its job especially in the absence of adequate information on the extent of losses of listed company assets. Kuwaiti citizens at this juncture consider that their loss of country overshadows the loss of anything else, be it stocks or investments.

[Al-Shuhari] How extensive are losses resulting from suspended trading on the exchange?

[Al-Rukaybi] Losses resulting from suspended trading on the exchange can not be estimated or quantified because the exchange was a mirror that reflected economic performance in the state. What can be determined, however, are the losses resulting from forfeiting the value of listed instruments and the loss of the exchange's systems and equipment. Nevertheless, this economic crisis, like others before it, shall pass no matter how extensive the material losses inflicted by the Iraqi invasion.

[Al-Shuhari] How was the Arab Federation of Stock Exchanges conceived?



[Al-Rukaybi] The Arab Federation of Stock Exchanges was created as an Arab agency of the League of Arab States. Its objective is to boost Arab economic performance by integrating the exchanges in order to coordinate and harmonize Arab economic systems and laws.

[Al-Shuhari] What can the Federation do to save the Kuwaiti stock exchange?

[Al-Rukaybi] What happened in Kuwait was unprecedented without a doubt. We never before heard of a country that occupied another then demolished its national character, dislocated its people, and purloined their belongings. The issue, therefore, is not to save the Kuwait exchange but to save the State of Kuwait from the clutches of the Iraqi occupier. When the state has been saved and the legitimate authority restored, the exchange will play a role in reconstruction and in refinancing the projects pilfered by Iraqi occupation.

[Al-Shuhari] How extensive are the losses suffered by Arab stock exchanges as a consequence of Gulf incidents?

[Al-Rukaybi] There is no doubt that Gulf incidents have devastated the Kuwaiti economy as it was entering a new stage of consolidation and prosperity following the recession brought about in the eighties by the Suq al-Manakh crisis then by the Iraq-Iran war and soft oil prices. Unfortunately, the Iraqi regime attacked and destroyed everything without allowing the Kuwaiti economy to catch its breath. Naturally, this will affect all Arab economies since they were directly tied to the Kuwaiti economy either through remittances by Arab workers in Kuwait, Kuwaiti investments in those countries, Arab exports to Kuwait, or grants by the State of Kuwait to aid sister Arab countries. The termination of such activity will therefore impact negatively on all Arab economies. Arab financial markets have [already] suffered slowdowns in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### PFLP Leader Habash on Mideast Conflict

91P20180A Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish  
4 Feb 91 p 9

[Interview with PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] leader George Habash in Damascus; date not given]

[Text] Damascus—In one of those ordinary basements found in Damascus buildings, George Habash publishes his statements supporting Iraq and calls for Palestinians, wherever they may be, to go and fight against the Americans and their allies. He does it with the paradoxical permission of the Syrian Government.

[LA VANGUARDIA] At the beginning of the third week of this terrible war against Iraq, how would you define the role of the Palestine Nationalist Movement in the conflict?

[Habash] When there is no doubt that Israel is participating in the war, we will aid Iraq directly by encouraging the "intifadah" in the occupied territories and by having our men ready for combat in the event that Israel invades Lebanon or Jordan. Imagine that we are at the beginning of the struggle.

[LA VANGUARDIA] But, in spite of all these statements, Iraq is alone on the battlefield. How long can the Iraqi soldiers withstand the allied military pressure?

[Habash] I don't agree that Iraq is alone. I have already told you that the Palestinians and the Lebanese are prepared in the north, on what might be the other front of the war. There are two completely opposite concepts of this war: that of the United States and that of Iraq. The Americans thought that in a few hours, a few days at most, they would end the battle through air technology. The Iraqis have conceived of a long-term war, another Vietnam. They can last a long time.

[LA VANGUARDIA] Many people think that, by embracing the Iraqi cause, the Palestine movement is facing a serious political risk that can compromise its future.

[Habash] You know that the PLO has tried to rely on the United States and on President Mubarak, with regard to peacemaking policy, in the hope of finding a strategy. But, over time, nothing has been accomplished. That is why this option was decided upon. There was no other choice.

[LA VANGUARDIA] What are the plans of the United States in the Middle East? What are the so-called new security agreements the leaders in the White House often allude to?

[Habash] The United States wants to establish a new world order and intends to direct it. To continue its hegemony, it must control the oilfields on the Arabian Peninsula, where 66 percent of the world's reserves are located. Once these oilfields have been seized, the United States will call the shots as far as Japan, the Soviet Union, and the European nations are concerned. To carry out these plans it will have to count on Israel, Turkey—goodness knows if Iran, whose role in this conflict is still not clear, will side with them—the reactionary Arab regimes like Egypt, and the oil monarchies.

[LA VANGUARDIA] It is possible to imagine what the consequences of an Iraqi military victory would be. Can you foresee what would happen in the Arab countries in the event of a defeat?

[Habash] I'm speaking to you as a Palestinian, not as a political leader. I think that Iraq and the Arabs have already won the war. This three-week resistance to the attacks by the impressive international military force, fostered by the United States, is a victory. As a leader of the PLO, I hope that Iraq will be victorious to the end, in spite of the inequality of the forces they are facing, because Iraq is fighting in the name of Arabs, Islam, the

Third World, and all who do not wish to subject themselves to the international hegemony of the United States. As far as Palestinians are concerned, if we lose, we will encourage the "intifadah" or popular uprising, and we will once again take up the fight.

[LA VANGUARDIA] Everyone is talking about the profound changes that are going to take place in the Middle East. Can you explain what these might be?

[Habash] There is speculation about many "scenarios," about many new geopolitical maps of the region. There are those who affirm that Iraq will be divided, that Jordan will become the Palestinian state, that another state will be created for the Kurds. But first we have to see how the war will end—with an Iraqi victory, even if relative, or with a negotiated agreement. Whatever the new "scenario," the PLO cannot be ignored. We will continue the struggle until we get our state, not in Lebanon or in Jordan, but in Palestine. There will be no peace until the Palestinian issue, which has crystallized in the war and which is at the heart of the problem in the Middle East, is resolved.

## EQYPT

### Islamic Leaders Say War During Holy Months Valid

91AA0219A Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic  
23 Jan 91 p 47

[Article by Hasan 'Allam: "Combat in Holy Months: Permissible or Proscribed; Muslim Ulema Have Clear Viewpoint on Important Issue; Shaykh of al-Azhar: Saddam Has not Responded to Peace Appeal and It Is Permissible to Fight Him"]

[Excerpt] Despite the ban on war in this month which is one of the holy months (Rajab, Dhu al-Qi'dah, Dhu al-Hijjah, and Muharram), his eminence the grand imam and shaykh of al-Azhar, the minister of justice, and a number of prominent Muslim ulema have asserted that the ongoing war between the international alliance forces and Iraq is an inevitable "defensive," not "offensive," war. Iraq has occupied Kuwait and laid open its property and its honor. The expected and normal thing which Islam supports is to turn back a usurping tyrant with advice and guidance first. But Saddam did not heed this advice and plugged his ears to all peace appeals for more than five months (since 2 August 1990). He threatened to use weapons of mass destruction, such as chemicals and poisonous gases. Thus, the current war against Iraq's ruler is a legitimate war to remove the perpetrated injustice and to restore rights to their owners, especially since it is a "preventive" war to protect the two holy mosques. If Saddam were left undeterred, his ambitions would go beyond this!

Now, let us move to the opinions of prominent Muslim ulema.

To begin, His Eminence Grand Imam Shaykh Jad-al-Haqq 'Ali Jad-al-Haqq (shaykh of al-Azhar) has stressed the need for war to liberate Kuwait in this phase:

It is well known that Iraq has occupied Kuwait, a peaceable country, laid open its property and its wealth, and rejected all appeals from the world to withdraw. So how can the obstinacy of Iraq's ruler be answered?

The ulema's opinion on this issue is clear, and it is summed up in the idea that in this situation contrition cannot be accepted until the "injustices" are lifted. The injustices can be lifted only with withdrawal, of course!

Considering that Iraqi President Saddam Husayn has rejected all initiatives for withdrawal and has disregarded the peace appeals from numerous parties, especially from the Arab League, the Islamic Conference Organization, the United Nations, and numerous Muslim rulers, the expected and normal step which Islam's opinion supports is first to turn back the tyrant with advice and guidance. Considering that Iraq refused to heed such advice for more than five months (since 2 August 1990), it is permissible to fight it. War is legitimate in this case.

As for combat in the holy months and for the response to those who have reiterated that it is prohibited to fight Iraq during this month of Rajab, his eminence the grand imam has fully clarified the matter and has settled the "argument" concerning this important issue:

It is true that war is "basically" proscribed in the holy months (Rajab, Dhu al-Qi'dah, Dhu al-Hijjah, and Muharram). But if there is a "need" for defense and for eliminating injustice from those who have done an injustice (as is the case currently), then war to eliminate an inflicted injustice, to remove the usurper, and to restore rights to their owners is permitted. It is especially permitted if the war is (preventive) and intended to protect the two holy mosques.

### It Is A Legitimate Right to Fight Iraq

Awqaf Minister Dr. Muhammad 'Ali Mahjub says:

We are facing one of the most serious issues known to modern history. It is the issue of a people who have been displaced, whose lands have been usurped, and whose children live as refugees who want to return to their country. The usurper continues his usurpation of their lands after having assaulted their property and their lives. This being the case, the party assaulted has the right to fight the aggressor and to oust him from his land so that right may be restored. This is permitted by the Shari'ah and approved by divine and "positive" laws!

It is true that the rule is that there should be absolutely no war in the holy months, unless it is necessary to repel an existing aggression when repelling with war becomes inevitable and when war is moved from the sphere of the "prohibited." What is prohibited is to launch aggression against others for no reason. The existing condition is



totally different because an aggression has already been committed. The international alliance forces are considered to have been "compelled" to move in order to lift the aggression committed against them and to remove the usurper from their territories in enactment of the venerable verse: "If one of them transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then fight ye (all) against the one that transgresses." [Koran, 49:9]

What is prohibited is for anybody to launch war unjustifiably in the holy months. But in our case here, there is nothing that dictates that one remain silent on the usurping aggressor who has usurped the land and expelled its people. Rather, it has become a religious duty to fight him.

Dr. Ahmad 'Umar Hashim, vice president of al-Azhar University and a People's Assembly member, clarifies the issue in greater detail, saying:

This ongoing war that has been launched by the forces of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the other allied forces against Iraq is a "defensive," not "offensive," war. It is a war to restore a right and not an aggression against anybody because Iraq is the party that launched the aggression against Kuwait and began to harass the Gulf states when it amassed its forces on the Saudi border and when it plundered Kuwait's wealth and kicked out its people unjustifiably. Before the catastrophe fell and before war broke out, sincere successive appeals were made to the Iraqi regime to withdraw its forces, to restore Kuwait's legitimate government, and to restore rights to their owners.

The Iraqi regime could have responded to those appeals which began with the appeal from Egypt, led by the sincere President Muhammad Husni Mubarak, in the first summit. Numerous appeals, conferences, and initiatives followed for the sake of a peaceful solution. From the Islamic perspective of the issue, those initiatives represented the (first phase) or (reconciliation phase) which God, may He be exalted, meant with His words: "If two parties among the believers fall into a quarrel, make ye peace between them." [Koran, 49:9] In that phase, Egypt and other countries did all that man can do to obviate a situation. But the Iraqi regime persisted in its arrogance. So one had to move to the second phase, i.e., to the second solution intended by the venerable verse: "But if one of them transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then fight ye (all) the one that transgresses until it complies with the command of God." [Koran, 49:9]

#### Saddam's Rejection of Peace

The second phase (the war phase) was dictated because Iraq transgressed beyond bounds and because it failed to respond to the call for reconciliation and peace. Rights had to be restored, and the country had to be returned to its people. Hence, this defensive battle in which the forces are fighting a defensive war to restore a country

whose wealth and land have been unjustifiably plundered and whose people have been displaced. Considering that the Iraqi regime did not respond to peace, there had to be intervention with force. So it is a defensive, not offensive, war. It is a battle to regain a usurped right and not a battle for aggression or for colonization. [passage omitted]

#### Necessity Permits What Is Proscribed

Counselor 'Abd-al-'Ati al-Shafi'i, Appeals Court president, member of the Higher Council for Islamic Affairs, and Specialized National Councils member, has the following view of what is currently occurring in the arena:

The rule is that war in the holy months is a big sin and a major offense because God, may He be exalted, has said: "The number of months in the sight of God is twelve (in a year); so ordained by Him the day He created the heavens and the earth. Of them, four are sacred. That is the straight usage, so wrong not yourselves." [Koran, 9:36]

God, may He be exalted, has also said: "They ask thee concerning fighting in the Prohibited Month. Say: 'Fighting therein is a grave (offense). But graver is it in the sight of God to prevent access to the path of God, to deny Him, to prevent access to the Sacred Mosque and drive out its members.' Tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter." [Koran, 2:217]

But the fundamental rule says that (necessities permit the prohibited). One necessity that permits the prohibited is to suppress aggression, to deter oppression, and to heal the rift. But if a nation is at its wit's end, if it becomes divided, if one part of the nation gets to care little for another part, if the nation's effort is incapable of correcting that which is crooked in the nation, if the danger intensifies, if the flames of sedition, which is worse than murder, spread, and if fighting becomes inevitable, then the (necessity) which permits the (prohibited) materializes, even if the prohibited wrenches the hearts and even if there is not enough space to describe its horrors. Killing is the most hateful of the hateful but "it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you." [Koran, 2:216]

"Cauterization" might be the ultimate treatment now that the Arab nation has been fragmented, that it has been afflicted with catastrophes and grief, disgraced, and visited by destruction and devastation and one of its oppressive, renegade, and ungrateful rulers (Saddam Husayn) has taken it to hell by climbing over his brother's fence, by terrorizing his brother's kinfolk and family, by destroying the peaceable home on those who live in it, by spreading corruption in the land, by knowing no kindness and no good sense, and by completely plugging his ears to all peace appeals!

If he is told to fear God, he takes pride in "sin" and he persists in his arrogance, corruption, and oppression,

thus making it impossible but to fight him until he regains his senses, ends his tyranny, and restores right to its owners.

Herein lies the necessity that permits the prohibited. Despite this and in spite of all these horrors, we hope and wish that the bloodshed will be ended and that the divine order will be obeyed in enactment of God's words, may God be exalted:

"O ye who believe, enter into Islam whole-heartedly and follow not the footsteps of the Evil One for he is to you an avowed enemy." [Koran, 2:168]

We beseech God, may He be praised, to inspire among the world leaders one who calls for a cease-fire and for self-restraint by all parties in the hope that the "fugitive" will respond to the voice of peace, that the ghost of war will disappear, and that security will be achieved for the region's peoples after Saddam regains his senses, withdraws his armies from Kuwait, and heeds the world's appeal!

**Muslim Brotherhood Leader on Persian Gulf War**  
91P20179A Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish  
3 Feb 91 p 10

[Interview with Muslim Brotherhood Leader Ma'mun Al-Hudaybi; place and date not given]

[Text] Cairo (special correspondent)—The Muslim Brotherhood, the pioneer fundamentalist movement of the Mideast was formed in Egypt in 1923 [as published]. Its activists, responsible for a series of riots and attacks starting in the 1970's—among which was the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981 for having signed a peace treaty with Israel—have maintained a low profile since the beginning of the crisis on 2 August. Unlike their counterparts in Algiers, Rabat, Tripoli, or Amman, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is not openly demonstrating against the foreign military intervention in Saudi Arabia.

The Brotherhood's present spiritual leader is Ma'mun Al-Hudaybi, a man who will talk to you without an Arabic translator, a demand made by other Islamic leaders who refuse to speak any Western languages, even though they may know them.

[LA VANGUARDIA] How do you explain the lack of demonstrations here against the Persian Gulf war when Egypt has more than 40,000 soldiers in Saudi Arabia aligned with the allied forces? Why is everything so calm?

[Al-Hudaybi] No, it isn't that the situation is calm. We continue in a state of no right of action since the death of Sadat. If we go out into the streets, the police fire upon us. Everything is perfectly controlled. As for public opinion, it is very confused. Hundreds of thousands of

Egyptian workers were mistreated in Iraq. Some were even assassinated during the 1989-90 period. The people hate Saddam Husayn.

[LA VANGUARDIA] What do you have to say about the Muslim Brotherhood with regard to the war?

[Al-Hudaybi] We have been against the invasion of Kuwait since 2 August, we have asked Saddam Husayn to withdraw, and we will continue to do that. But we also oppose the intervention of foreign troops in this crisis and in the area. They have not come to liberate Kuwait nor to establish peace. They have come for their own benefit, to get their hands on the oil wells. They would not sacrifice one single soldier for our faith.

[LA VANGUARDIA] What do you think the mission of the Egyptian troops will be when the ground war begins?

[Al-Hudaybi] Mubarak said that he had sent them to defend Saudi Arabia, but the situation has changed. Now there are more than half a million soldiers from the West there. They are destroying Iraq, and we don't want our soldiers to take part in this. We don't want to kill our own people who are still living in Iraq. Bombs do not distinguish between Iraqis and Egyptians. Because of this, we asked the president to withdraw his troops. It would be the way to adopt a moderate posture which might permit us to play the role of arbitrators in reaching a peaceful solution. Moreover, this is not a war to liberate Kuwait. Half a million Iraqis inside the Emirate are going to face a similar force with a lot of weapons, tanks, and bombs.... What will be left of Kuwait? Nothing. Not people, not oil, nothing. They only want to destroy Iraq.

[LA VANGUARDIA] What will the Muslim Brotherhood do if Egyptian soldiers become involved in the conflict in two or three weeks.

[Al-Hudaybi] We can only express our opinion and ask our president not to permit this, but we cannot do anything else. We aren't going to fight or cause trouble for the government. A posture betraying our soldiers would not be acceptable. President Mubarak would be the accountable one, and we can only ask him to withdraw the troops. Should Egyptians die in Iraq, I can't imagine the reaction that would ensue. In the end, only the president is responsible.

[LA VANGUARDIA] In your opinion, what would have been an acceptable solution to avoid the war?

[Al-Hudaybi] A way out could have been when the Saudi Arabian defense minister said last November that the crisis was an Arab problem and that it could be resolved among Arabs, because it was not the first time that one country had annexed a part of another. If it hadn't been for the United States, Riyadh would have then interceded. But Bush wanted war at all costs. He, like Israel, wants the complete destruction of Iraq.

[LA VANGUARDIA] What do you think the Middle East will be like, if Iraq loses the war?

[Al-Hudaybi] I hope a solution can be reached before the worst happens. How will Iraq be defeated? Will it be defeated after a nuclear attack; after chemical weapons have been used; after Israel enters the war? If all this happens, it will be very different. Israel will have more weapons, money, as many immigrants as it wants, and moreover, Iraq will have disappeared militarily.

[LA VANGUARDIA] Do you think Israel could have engaged in secret subterfuge to bring about the war?

[Al-Hudaybi] I think that Israel is on the same side as North America. The United States is always seeking to benefit Israel. The two cannot be viewed separately, nor can their interests. Look at what happened with the joint U.S.-Soviet statement presented by James Baker and the Soviet foreign minister on a possible overall solution to the Middle East. Israel objected and right away President Bush said nothing would be done without first consulting them.

[LA VANGUARDIA] What is the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization in this crisis?

[Al-Hudaybi] The PLO represents the Palestinians, and it has no other way to express itself except through that channel. Until now, the Palestinians have been given no other options and, for this reason, the PLO has had no alternative but to align itself with Iraq, which has raised the banner of Palestinian rights.

### **Growing Political Role Perceived for Abu-Ghazalah**

91AA0133A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
5 Dec 90 p 5

[Text] Cairo—When two years ago it was decided to "replace" the defense minister, certain well-informed sources said then that it would, for some time, be confusing to evaluate this decision as far as Marshal Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Abu-Ghazalah is concerned, before anybody knows if this decision was really a promotion for him to the post of assistant to the president of the republic.

The manner in which the decision was made suggested several contradictory things in this regard. The decision made no reference to discharge from the post of defense minister; it merely referred to a normal replacement in the post of minister of defense, with no other references made. But certainly the speculations it aroused were justified in view of what the area is accustomed to in such circumstances.

In fact, what has since happened reveals several facts, one of which is that the mechanism of the political regime in Egypt is more complicated than one can imagine, and that the regime is administered in such a way as to render any rash attempt to judge decisions a kind of a risk.

The task Abu-Ghazalah undertook the day after he assumed the post of presidential assistant was not merely a short-term step implementing the decision.

Rather, it was the beginning of a new role, although it is a role that is not understood in view of the ambiguity involving the meaning of assistant to the president. In one of his analyses, a leading Arab writer described Abu-Ghazalah as an adviser to President Mubarak for military affairs. This is supposed to mean adviser on national security affairs, a position which has been vacant since the mid-seventies when Hafiz Isma'il occupied it during the October war.

Late President Anwar al-Sadat did not wish to strengthen this position or continue to enhance it inside the presidency for reasons not quite understood. The position seemed redundant and unnecessary at the time. Prior to that the holder of this position played a role similar to that of the man for special or difficult missions that are especially important for future state policy.

Perhaps the most important mission Hafiz Isma'il undertook at that time was his talks with Henry Kissinger which laid new grounds for the Egyptian-U.S. relations that have since become an established line in Egyptian policy.

Abu-Ghazalah's assumption of the post of assistant to the president then coincided with the use of a certain common expression in academic circles in describing the "presidency," namely the "institution." This term began to be widely used, and the presidency found no harm in continuing to use it, since it means that the presidency has a definitive structure within the Egyptian political system and that it plays an important role in controlling overall Egyptian policies, and probably other more significant roles.

Subsequently, Abu-Ghazalah remained in the shadows for a short time, after which he again began playing a role that proved to many observers that their analyses of Egyptian politics were off the mark and that things should be viewed in a manner other than measuring the ups and downs. Rather, things should be viewed within the context of the idea of the role and of the fact that various other extremely important roles exist, with these requiring a kind of intensive action in order to bring them under control.

Abu-Ghazalah was assigned this role in order to oversee the question of looking into the future of the public sector in Egypt, with all the complexities of this matter with regard to Egypt's economic future. Abu-Ghazalah had previously been involved in some aspects of this matter.

Some time later Abu-Ghazalah reemerged. He played an extremely important role when he headed an emergency team which quickly went to Washington when some U.S. congressmen began obstructing President Bush's proposal to Congress to relieve Egypt of military debts and interest on them, which total \$7.1 billion.

In fact transforming the proposal into a decision faced many difficulties. Abu-Ghazalah's trip to Washington, accompanied by former Egyptian ambassador to Washington, Ashraf Marwan, and the extensive meetings that were held there with congressmen—which exceeded all expectations—in order to convince them to approve the proposal, have certainly contributed substantially to things going the way Egypt envisioned them.

Abu-Ghazalah's statements in Washington about the Gulf crisis have once again set off speculations. He has returned with experience that is undoubtedly immense in how to deal with the U.S. Congress, especially in the coming stage in which Egyptian-U.S. relations will, after the Gulf crisis, become come to a halt [satatawaqqaf—as published]. Those relations will go through many situations of this kind.

It was also said that earlier Abu-Ghazalah played an effective role in another important military matter, namely granting Egypt the American M-60 tanks that were being withdrawn from the European theater of operations at shipment cost. The tendency inside Congress was to block the proposal and to try to exclude Egypt from the countries benefitting from this decision [to give tanks at shipment cost]. This grant would contribute to modernizing and strengthening the Egyptian army's armor.

An observer said in this regard that we should not once again indulge in speculations or fall into the trap of interpreting each situation separately. Abu-Ghazalah is playing an important role in dealing with missions believed to be difficult. This much can be said; anything else depends on circumstances.

Other observers note that this is the first time the position of assistant to the president in Egypt has clearly become important and played an active role, not just an honorary role, which goes to confirm the increasingly consolidating character of the executive authority in Mubarak's Egypt.

## **Writers Express Views on Higher Dollar Exchange Rate**

### **Reasons, Suggested Solutions**

91AA0140A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic  
13 Dec 90 p 5

[Article by Najla' Dhikri: "The Gulf Crisis, the Return of Egyptians from Iraq and Kuwait, and the Drop in Tourist Revenue Are Behind the Problem"]

[Text] Recently the exchange rate of the dollar outside of the currency exchange market rose. Its rate changed in rapid, illogical jumps. It has been changing from one day to the next, and there has even been more than one rate for the dollar in a single day. Although the rate rose in the currency exchange market, it did not keep pace with the rise of the rate outside of the market. Economists' opinions about the causes of this rise vary greatly. The

fingers of suspicion have been pointed principally at speculation on the price of the dollar in Port Said. The money changers in Port Said announced that they would cease their activities in selling and buying dollars for one month, and the security agencies have been energetic in arresting black market dealers in foreign currency in the various regions of Egypt. In the past few days the rate of the dollar has begun to retreat, but the question remains: what were the causes of the rise in rates and what are the measures needed to control the exchange rate of the dollar?

With regard to the causes of the increase in the exchange rate of the dollar, Dr. Hasan 'Abbas Zaki, former finance minister and current president of the money changers' company, says: "We can say that there are short-term causes that led to these unexpected oscillations. The first of these causes is the Gulf crisis and the return of a large number of the Egyptians who stopped sending new remittances in foreign currency because they had lost their jobs. They also saved for the future by keeping the dollar deposits that they had because of the rise in the interest rate on the dollar and the rise in the value of the dollar relative to the Egyptian pound.

"Also, the direct causes are the current negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and the rumors that these negotiations are considered the last for arriving at a final agreement between the two sides. A rise in the exchange rate of the dollar with respect to the Egyptian pound, in one form or another, ordinarily follows an agreement.

"Moreover, the exchange rate of the dollar in the market rose during one week from 270 to 285. Ordinarily a jump like that would take many months. Consequently, people thought that the government had begun to bring the rate of the dollar close to a new exchange rate, and that led the rate on the black market to flare up.

"Also, the month of December usually is the time when the merchants draw up their budgets. This is when they want to pay the debts in their accounts with the banks, so that their budgets will not be exposed. This coincides with the banks' drawing up their own budgets. Hence there is pressure on the merchants to pay up the value of their import accounts with foreign currency, and this leads the merchants to mortgage their merchandise and change their cash value from local currency into foreign currency, so that they can pay off their debts to the banks. This increases the pressure on the market and the demand for the dollar.

"As for the cumulative causes, the long-term causes, they are the problems with the national economic structure, which require decisive solutions, especially with regard to facilitating investment. Because any delay or impediments faced by the investor means a loss of time which we, as Egyptians, have to pay for. There are other, indirect, causes, such as the elections, the Gulf crisis and the worry about how it might develop, and after that

concerns about the economic problem and the generally sluggish economic situation. All of this formed a background for what happened.

"With regard to Port Said and the rise of the exchange rate there, Port Said is not to be blamed. The recent increase of police activities in the fight against foreign currency exchange operations, whether on the black market or by means of transferring accounts in the banks, constituted a powerful incentive for the merchants to go to Port Said to exchange Egyptian currency for whatever foreign currency they needed in the only market through which this could be done in a normal way. This spurt in demand led to an increase in the rate."

Dr. Hasan 'Abbas Zaki continued by emphasizing that the police measures harm the trade in foreign currency and that, if those people who have accounts are prevented from changing their accounts into dollars, the rate will rise.

Concerning the solution that the governor of Port Said has arrived at, by agreeing with the brokers that there will be no trading in dollars in Port Said, Dr. 'Abbas Zaki said that this will not lead to either short-term or long-term solutions because this is an artificial reduction in price, not a fundamental solution of the problem. The solutions which he proposes consist of allowing currency exchange operations by means of bank accounts to continue without police interference. These operations are perfectly legal, and hunting down the holders of these accounts will cause them to go abroad and will deprive the Egyptian banks of the accounts.

"Another solution would be to initiate economic reform measures without waiting for the conclusion of talks with the IMF, especially since these talks have lasted for a year and a half and we do not know when they will be concluded. The practical solution would be to begin with the remedy without waiting for the talks. There must be some movement toward a solution of the problems, and any postponement of these solutions will make matters more complicated."

Muhammad Farid, president of the Arab-African Bank, traces the causes of the oscillation in the exchange rates of the dollar to two principal factors: the Gulf crisis and the return of Egyptians who were working in Iraq and Kuwait, who have consequently lost their foreign currency remittances; second, a drop in the numbers of tourists, a shrinkage in revenues from tourism because of the crisis in the region, and a rise in the price of airline tickets. The response to this has been a demand for dollars in the internal market of Egypt which has not dropped.

The currency exchange market attempted to deal with the situation by raising the exchange rate to 288, but this did not compensate for the shortfall in the supply of foreign currency that occurred.

### Role of Money-Changers

91AA0140B Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic  
13 Dec 90 p 5

[Editorial by 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Aql: "The Money-Changers of Port Said and the Matter of the Dollar"]

[Text] The exchange rate of the dollar has jumped recently a number of times in succession, but only God knows why. The ostensible causes, the ones that we usually find, such as a shortfall in the supply for the currency exchange market or speculation in the dollar outside of this market, have always been present. So the question is: what is the cause of this huge rise in the exchange rate of the dollar?

Some dealers in currency have been arrested. Will that lead to a fall in the exchange rate of the dollar? The answer definitely is no, since the rate will fall only if the supply increases. Resorting to arrests is a short-term measure designed to hunt down currency dealers. Operating a currency exchange market is a scientific, long-term measure that will put an end to the trading in currency on the black market.

We applauded the government of Dr. 'Atif Sidqi for its bold decision to create the currency exchange market some years ago. The exchange rate of the dollar became somewhat more stable for a relatively long period, and the government pledged at that time that the scope of the market would gradually expand to cover all aspects of supply and demand. Thus the question of black market trading would end.

It is perplexing, then, that the money changers in Port Said have decided independently—that is, by themselves—to stop trading in dollars, on the pretext of demonstrating that they are not a cause of the rise in the exchange rate of the dollar. The strange thing is that the announcement about their decision was marked by a great deal of confusion. Some said that the governor of Port Said governorate took part in this decision of theirs, despite the fact that the law creating the free-trade zone does not grant to anyone, not to any individual official, the right to make such a decision—to stop trading for a month. Only the administrative committee of the zone has this right. Furthermore, according to the provisions of the law, the minister of finance cannot approve of such a decision.

So, what is the matter? Are the money changers in Port Said sacrificing their profits for a month because of their loving devotion to the Egyptian pound? It is claimed that they will make their earnings by trading in other currencies, yet we know that more than 90 percent of import business is conducted in dollars.

Where are the businessmen and merchants of Port Said going to get dollars for continuing commercial and industrial activity? Could it be that the removal of a certain number of goods from the lists of restricted goods has caused a demand for the dollar? If this is the case, let

us look into the requests for opening up imports. As far as we know, the local consumers' market is stagnant. Has the effort by some workers to settle their accounts with the banks at the end of the year put pressure on the dollar? But the answer to that is, that this happens every year, yet we never witnessed these jumps in past years. They were only slight rises that did not take long to disappear.

One thing we can all agree on: the lack of remittances and revenues from tourism resulting from the Gulf crisis has without doubt effected the supplies of the currency market. But its effect on the increase in the exchange rate of the dollar, taken with the compensation that Egypt has received and the increase in the price of petroleum, has been limited.

### **Security Official on Illegal Weapons Trade, Seizure**

*91AA0145A Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 12 Dec 90 pp 18-19*

[Article by Muna al-Khawli]

[Text] In Egypt, there is a dangerous and forbidden trade and a secret weapons market operating unsupervised in violation of the law! This is especially the case in areas of Upper Egypt, where the prevalent custom of seeking revenge has created a market for smuggled and unlicensed weapons!

More than 130,000 weapons have been seized in ten years alone, and automatic guns have entered this secret market!

We thus find ourselves facing some extremely important questions: Where do these weapons come from? How is the purchase of these weapons financed? What penalties does the law stipulate regarding the circulation of unlicensed weapons? Who may obtain a permit to carry a weapon according to the law? What control is there over the purchase of weapons and ammunition? How are weapons stolen from military agencies? What is the story behind the smuggling of weapons left over from Egypt's previous wars? How can we protect society from these weapons getting into the hands of terrorist groups?

AKHIR SA'AH interviewed legal experts and police officials regarding this serious problem of a secret weapons market in Egypt.

Statistics kept by General Security stress that the number of unknown (unlicensed) weapons is increasing every year. In the last decade, police forces seized more than 130,000 weapons, including cannons, automatic guns, rifles, shotguns, and pistols.

In 1987, 8,592 weapons were seized. In 1988, the number increased to 12,592, and it was even higher in 1989.

Major General Nabil 'Uthman, the General Security director states: There have been several incidents in

which unlicensed weapons have been seized. These incidents do not represent such a high percentage as to make us feel that the circulation of unlicensed weapons is symptomatic. Regarding the seizure of a certain number of weapons from individuals and groups that are not licensed to carry weapons, there are indications that such cases are few, and they do not amount to more than isolated incidents.

### **Weapons and Revenge**

He adds that there are many unlicensed weapons in the governorates of Upper Egypt (al-Minya, Asyut, Sawhaj, and Qina). These governorates are regarded as the greatest consumers and markets for weapons, inasmuch as the blameworthy custom of revenge is prevalent in them. Because of the geographical nature of these areas, which are mostly mountainous, and because it is fixed in the minds of some in these areas that carrying weapons elevates their status, and that they would lose this status if they were deprived of these weapons, these people desire to carry weapons with them.

[Al-Khawli] However, how is this large black market in weapons financed? What are the sources of financing for these types of weapons?

Maj. Gen. Nabil 'Uthman states: The basic source of supply is smuggling from abroad. Weapons left over from wars waged by Egypt are also acquired, and there is a domestic industry that produces several types of primitive weapons, far from police eyes, in small workshops. These workshops manufacture unfit weapons that are nonetheless accepted by some consumers in the secret weapons market.

Finally, some weapons are stolen from the army and the police or are lost by persons licensed to bear them.

### **Weapons Market Controls**

[Al-Khawli] How are these weapons controlled and how are unlicensed weapons in Egypt being eliminated?

Maj. Gen. Nabil 'Uthman stresses that investigative operations pertaining to these weapons are carried out constantly. Persons possessing [unlicensed] weapons and the types of weapons they possess are investigated, and places where weapons are concealed are identified. Investigatory raids are then directed against such persons after a warrant is obtained from the judicial agencies, and the weapons in their possession are seized. Regarding domestic weapons-manufacturing workshops, the necessary legal measures are taken to conduct search and seizure operations regarding weapons manufactured without a permit.

At the same time, licensed weapons stores are carefully investigated periodically to ascertain their compliance with the Weapons and Ammunition Law, which prohibits the sale of any weapon or ammunition, except to persons who are licensed to carry a weapon or who have a [weapon] purchase permit from the center, or a section



subordinate to it, on which the type of weapon whose purchase is sought for licensure is recorded. The dealer records in his ledgers the name and number of the receipt holder and the [serial] number of the unit sold to him. In this way, it is possible to examine how a dealer has disposed of a quantity of weapons imported by him, and to ascertain whether a dealer offers only those weapons which he is permitted to offer!

All perpetrators of crimes and incidents of any type do not perpetrate them with licensed weapons. Rather, they mostly resort to unlicensed weapons.

### Upper Egypt and Weapons!

[Al-Khawli] How many weapons have been seized in the current year, especially automatic weapons? What are the most dangerous governorates regarding the possession of such weapons?

Colonel Tawfiq Jalal, the director of statistics in the General Security Administration states: Based on the administration's files, 17,730 weapons of different types were seized in 1989. Half of them were seized in the governorates of Upper Egypt, namely Sawhaj, followed by al-Minya, Asyut, Qina, and Aswan. Most of the weapons are domestically produced with rifled barrels. Seized cannons and automatic guns total no more than 6 percent of all weapons seized. Automatic weapons are considered the most violent type of weapon.

The number of weapons seized during the [first] ten months of the current year totals 549 weapons, including 102 cannons, 525 automatic rifles, 4,922 domestically produced shotguns, 739 rifles, and 2,261 pistols.

The diversity of the seized weapons indicates something special, according to Col. Tawfiq Jalal, because each weapon has its own user. A domestically produced shotgun, despite its primitiveness and the danger it poses to its user, is marketable among persons who have a specific criminal plan or wish to protect themselves in one way or another.

Rifles also have their own consumers, because their rifled barrels make them more powerful.

Automatic weapons and guns are extremely dangerous owing to the large size of the bullet they fire. These weapons, which are offensive weapons used in wars, have been used in most assassinations in Egypt.

He adds that 1978 witnessed the seizure of over 22,000 weapons, the highest figure ever. Increases in acts of revenge, security disruptions in several governorates in Upper Egypt, and the increase in premeditated murders and robberies by force are linked to the increase in unlicensed weapons in the possession of dangerous persons and persons with criminal or bad behavior records.

[Al-Khawli] However, what happens to the seized weapons?

Maj. Gen. Nabil 'Uthman, the director of the General Security Administration, states: If a seized weapon is of the same type used by police personnel, it is added to the police force. If that is not the case, the weapon is sold in a public auction, which can be attended only by persons licensed to sell weapons or ordinary persons licensed to carry weapons.

[Al-Khawli] Can security efforts alone counter the spread of these dangerous weapons?

Maj. Gen. Nabil 'Uthman responds that the security agency cannot fulfill its role without cooperation from other state agencies that have easy access to citizens, especially media agencies, in order to increase citizens' awareness of the danger of carrying and possessing an unlicensed weapon.

Successful security efforts require citizens to collaborate and cooperate with the police agency by informing it of persons who possess these weapons, because when weapons are used for terrorism or self-assertion, innocent people are ultimately killed.

### Who Can Bear A Weapon?

A solid citizen wishing to carry a weapon must not risk bearing unlicensed weapons and expose himself to a penalty. However, a solid citizen may easily apply to obtain a weapons permit and bear a licensed weapon as long as his objective is to defend himself, his property, another person, or another person's property.

[Al-Khawli] However, who has the right to bear a weapon in Egypt?

Major General Nabil Fayid, the general director of licenses of the General Security Administration states: Any citizen with a good record who has not previously been sentenced in a case involving a violation of honor, who is medically fit, and, most importantly, who has a justified reason, is entitled to carry a weapon.

Persons prohibited from carrying a weapon include anyone sentenced previously for a crime against a person or property or a drug offense, anyone previously involved in gunfire exchanges, and anyone lacking justification for a permit to bear and use a weapon.

Therefore, obtaining a weapons permit under all of these controls, which the law provides for, is beyond [anyone who would engage in] terrorist operations or threats to security, especially insofar as automatic weapons are not licensable under the Weapons and Ammunition Law.

### The Law and the Sale of Weapons

What is the law's position on the bearing, discharge, and sale of weapons? Does the penalty for bearing a weapon deter someone who is tempted to bear these weapons and terrorize peaceful people?

Dr. Fawziyah 'Abd-al-Sattar, a professor of criminal law states: A person carrying a licensed weapon poses no

danger, because he is subject to the authorities' supervision, and because weapons permits are granted only to certain individuals who fulfill certain conditions.

The danger lies basically in the bearing, possession, or discharge of unlicensed weapons. The law confronts the danger of such acts by stipulating:

1. That the possession or discharge of smoothbore weapons without a permit is punishable by imprisonment and a fine of 500 Egyptian pounds.
2. That the possession or discharge of a pistol or rifle of any type without a permit is punishable by temporary hard labor. The same penalty is stipulated for anyone possessing or discharging cannons or machine guns.
3. That the possession or discharge of a weapon having a rifled barrel, a cannon, or a machine gun by a person who poses a special danger, is a vagabond, is suspicious, or has been sentenced for certain crimes and placed under police supervision, is punishable by a life sentence of hard labor.

Regarding these penalties, it is important to note that they deter under ordinary circumstances; however, the frequency of the possession of weapons without a permit, for which the minimum sentence is [only] three years, threatens an increase in terrorism. We therefore believe that intervention is needed to increase the penalty. Such an increase should entail amending imprisonment to temporary hard labor, and temporary hard labor to a life sentence of hard labor.

In addition, the legislature has confronted firearms dealers with a penalty that is much lighter than the penalty which it has stipulated for the possession of weapons, which is imprisonment of no more than three years and a fine of no more than 300 Egyptian pounds. We believe that the fine is very insignificant. [Moreover,] the penalty of imprisonment can be suspended. This should give great pause to legislators. It is incomprehensible that someone who sells, manufactures, or imports firearms should receive a modest penalty that is much less severe than that imposed on someone who possesses or discharges a weapon without a permit. It is unreasonable, legislatively, for this stipulation to continue. This penalty continues to exist in legislation at a time when weapons dealers are proliferating in a way that threatens general security.

#### Writer States Reasons for Lower Prices of Cotton

91AA0191A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic  
17 Dec 90 pp 46-48

[Article by Yusuf Hanna]

[Text] Egyptian cotton export prices for the new 1990/91 season were announced in late November, in the absence of even initial information on the yield. The area planted with cotton differs according to the estimates of a

number of cotton agencies. Some indicate 994,787 feddans, while others estimate 992,580 feddans. Nor is there a consensus on the size of the yield. The agriculture minister announced that it increased from last season's yield of 5.7 million kantars [1 kantar = 44.93 kg] to about 6.7 million kantars this season. However, some cotton agencies put the figure at 5.85 million kantars, others raise it to 6 million kantars, and still others reduce it to the size of last season's yield, considered one of the worse in Egypt in several decades. Because of that poor yield, export companies have been able to export only 125,916 bales of cotton, although commitments were made to export 137,071 bales. The shortfall caused a delay, until December, in the shipment of sales from the 1989/90 season, totalling 10,262 cotton bales, which are from the new season's yield, to enable the Cotton Authority to deliver that amount to domestic spinning mills. Domestic spinning mills also took delivery of close to 1.15 million kantars of American cotton imports.

Cotton agencies are thus working to expand the use by domestic spinning mills of raw American cotton to free Egyptian cotton for export and thus take advantage of the price difference between imported and Egyptian cotton. In the 1988/89 season, Egypt imported 613,000 kantars of American cotton worth \$49 million, and we exported 1,195 million kantars worth \$141.9 million, i.e., there was a difference of \$92.9 million. For the new season, Egypt has contracted to import 180,000 bales of American cotton, weighing about 900,000 kantars and worth about \$91.7 million, for the needs of domestic spinning mills. Eighty thousand bales have been delivered, and the balance will arrive in January and February 1991. In trying to use a minimum amount of Egyptian cotton, domestic spinning mills are also trying to raise the level of their cotton imports. Last August, Egypt imported 11,000 kantars of Sudanese cotton produced by the Joint Egyptian-Sudanese Company. That cotton was used by an investment company engaged in thread spinning.

#### The New Crop

As expected, the new yield is not much larger than last seasons's yield. Planting was carried out sufficiently early, irrigation was carried out as usual, and the weather was suitable during the initial stages. However, in the final stages, when high temperatures are needed, temperatures were moderate, which caused a delay in the start of cotton carding. The Agriculture Ministry has encouraged farmers to grow cotton by raising the price to 50 Egyptian pounds per kantar for all varieties to induce farmers to grow cotton, canceling [the price of] 30 Egyptian pounds, for the delivery of cotton ahead of schedule, because it became evident that farmers gather cotton before maturity to take advantage of the sum.

The volume of the new yield declined [in] some governorates in Lower Egypt, especially in al-Daqahliyah and in al-Sharqiyah, by 18 percent, due to weather conditions and some plant epidemic that struck the crop. Therefore, export companies estimate the yield at about 1 million

kantars, compared to 5.7 million kantars last season. The ministry designated all cotton of the Jizah 45 and Jizah 76 varieties for export. The yield of the Jizah 70, 75, and 77 varieties exceeds export needs.

### Domestic Spinning Mills

The needs of domestic public sector and investment sector spinning mills continue to increase yearly. However, the yield has not increased at the same rate, and is moreover declining year after year. Egypt is therefore compelled to import American cotton to meet the demands of domestic spinning mills. In the 1989/90 season, domestic spinning mills took delivery of 4.99 million kantars of Egyptian cotton (compared to 5.07 million kantars in the 1988/89 season) and 1.15 million kantars of imported American cotton, worth \$115 million (compared to 613,000 kantars worth \$49 million in the previous season).

In the new season, it is estimated that domestic public-sector and investment sector spinning mills will need about 4.7 million kantars and 450,000 kantars respectively of Egyptian cotton, in addition to more than 1 million kantars of American cotton. Therefore, the balance for export is about 850,000 kantars, i.e., close to 105,000 bales of cotton.

### Exports

If we subtract about 11,000 bales, which were not exported from [the yield] of the 1989/90 season due to the shortfall in the yield, but which were exported from the new season's yield, the balance for export is 95,000 bales. If we further subtract about 32,000 bales, which were contracted for export to Russia before the harvest began, the amount for export to the free-currency and equivalent-deal countries drops to 63,500 bales. The subtraction of another approximately 2,000 bales for export to North Korea means that, according to estimates of the yield [of the new season], the quantity available for export in exchange for free currency will not exceed 62,000 bales.

Egypt's cotton export commitments pertaining to the finished season amount to 81,530 bales in exchange or free currency, 22,200 bales through equivalent deals, and 33,241 bales under bilateral agreements. America imported one bale of Jizah 70, compared to nothing of [the previous season's] yield. The biggest importer is Japan, with 28,047, compared to 52,093 during the previous season. It is followed by Russia with 1,200 bales in both seasons, then Czechoslovakia with 20,000 bales in both seasons, and Italy with 9,067 bales, compared to 22,285 bales [in the previous season]. Germany's imports dropped to 1,224 bales, compared to 7,761 bales in the previous season.

It is worth noting that Japan's imports of Egyptian cotton [passage missing from original] to 100,000 bales in previous years.

### Prices

Compared to last season's cotton prices, cotton export prices for the new season were reduced [by] 10 cents/pound for Jizah 76, 13 cents for Jizah 70 and 77, and 15 cents for Jizah 80. This was done to maintain the confidence of spinners abroad and to inhibit cotton producing states from expanding the production of alternative varieties, given the sudden international economic changes (especially in central European states, which have obtained purchasing latitude through payment facilities provided by countries that compete with Egypt) and the drop in world cotton prices, especially those of competing cotton. Provision was made to reduce the price to promote Egyptian cotton exports, which bring in free currency, and to meet [foreign] spinners' demands, while fulfilling the demands of domestic spinning mills by providing them with the necessary foreign cotton substitutes. Egypt also offered the Dandarah variety (which has not been exported since the 1985 season) for export this season at reasonable prices to entice spinners to purchase it.

This season, the Central Egyptian Bank is requiring that exports to England, Germany, Japan, France, and Switzerland be in exchange for the currencies of those countries, and that exports to all other countries be in exchange for the U.S. dollar, whereas the U.S. dollar had previously been an acceptable means of payment for exports to all countries of the world.

Prof. Ahmad Husni 'Abd-al-Latif, the board chairman of the Cairo Cotton Company, observes that about 420,000 bales of the American Pima cotton variety were exported to Europe and the Far East during the past year, instead of Egyptian cotton. Thus, Egyptian cotton could neither meet the requirements of domestic spinning mills, nor supply export demands. This season, although neither the yield's size nor the quantity for export are great, we deemed it appropriate to sell at world prices to satisfy spinners, fulfill needs, and regain the market share of Egyptian cotton, which has declined greatly in recent years.

Therefore, prices were lowered by 15 cents for Jizah 75, which is close to the American Pima variety. However, the price of Jizah 45 was kept at last season's level, because it is long-staple high-grade cotton lacking a competitor. Regarding other varieties, we have attempted to adjust their prices to world prices to recover markets that we lost due to the entry of the Pima variety into those markets at half the price of Egyptian cotton. Last season, Pima cotton was sold for about 115 cents, Jizah 75 for 85 cents, and Jizah 70 for about \$2.50. We had to return to the world price of Egyptian cotton, regardless of whether Egyptian cotton is in short supply or high demand, to try to regain the spinners who had turned away from our cotton, because we could not supply their needs due to the short supply of Egyptian cotton designated for export in the previous year, and because our prices were high.

Prof. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Latif indicates that Eastern European countries (Romania, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia) were among the big buyers of Egyptian cotton. As for now, the difficult situation has led these countries to reexamine world prices. Therefore, our prices were lowered compared to last season, so that we can sell them cotton at a suitable price, which is still higher than world prices because of the many advantages of Egyptian cotton.

In a comprehensive review of cotton, the board chairman of the Cairo Cotton Company stated that this year's yield is within the limits of 6 million kantars. He added that the quantity designated for export is not expected to exceed last season's export quantity for the above-mentioned reasons. We will import about 1 million kantars of American cotton to cover the needs of domestic spinning mills in the public and investment sectors, which will consume 5.15 million kantars of Egyptian cotton and 1 million kantars of American [cotton]. The amount of imported cotton could be increased if the demand during the year increases due to a crop deficit or an increase in exports.

Prof. Ahmad Husni 'Abd-al-Latif adds that the most important feature of this year, which the Agriculture Ministry began correctly, is the assistance given to farmers to prepare the land for cotton growing. An expansion of this assistance could easily increase the cotton yield. As the proverb says: "fallow land that is not chilled will not freeze." In other words, if the seed is not planted during the cold period, i.e., in March, it will not yield a harvest. Therefore, planting cotton in April and May does not yield a crop. I believe that the Agriculture Ministry will continue to prepare the land for the planting of cotton at the appropriate time, because it pays the farmer to plant early, because that definitely increases the yield. This is the first step toward regaining productivity of 8.7 million kantars, especially after it has become clear that the incentives to plant early or to deliver the crop early were not advantageous.

Accountant 'Adil Lahitah, the board chairman of the Alexandria Trade Company has another opinion regarding the yield, prices, exports, and imports this season.

The semi-official area sown with cotton is about 992,000 feddans. The initial estimated yield of that area, according to reports of the cotton companies' branches, is about 6 million kantars, of which the spinning mills consume 5.15 million kantars, and the balance, about 85,000 kantars, is for export. In other words, the amount available for export, which is 135,000 to 140,000 bales equals the amount available for export last season. Of this amount, we have actually made commitments to export about 50,000 bales. The balance, about 80,000 bales, will be sold based on the state of the world market.

#### Imports

If the yield falls short of the expected 6 million kantars, we must increase imports to make up the difference. We

have reached an agreement on the importation of 50,000 bales of American cotton, i.e., about 225,000 kantars. This year's imports total 1.025 million kantars of American cotton. This large increase is deemed a safety reserve for the coming season.

#### Exports

Ordinarily, a group of export companies travels to probe spinners' views on prices and the amounts they need. Such an opportunity was not available this year. Therefore, the final data regarding their needs was not entirely clear.

This season, we did not change the price of Jizah 45, and we lowered the price of other varieties by 10 to 20 cents. We saw fit to export the Dandarah variety, immature [fijj] grade roubouh [8.25 liters], at a price of approximately \$1.50 to attract spinners.

#### Prices

We had to distinguish between high-grade long-staple and long-staple varieties. There was a trend toward lowering [the price of] high-grade long-staple. After probing [spinners'] views, we did not change the prices of high-grade long-staple cotton, because it has no competitor. Regarding Jizah 75, there was a reasonable, acceptable drop, which was correct, because most of the world markets' needs were being covered by American Pima and Russian, Sudanese, and Israeli cotton similar to Jizah 75.

When setting prices, we must determine the causative factors of price increases and decreases. Factors causing a drop in prices have been predominant. They include the recession in the world market, the fact that many spinners have turned to competing cotton to cover their needs, and, most importantly, the change in the economic system of Eastern European countries. We expect Eastern European buyers to be weak and few this season, until their situation crystallizes, which will definitely affect the quantity of Egyptian cotton sold to them this season.

Regarding factors that cause price increases, the world position of cotton is excellent. The reserves are 26.5 million bales instead of 32.6 million bales. In other words, the reserve is small, and the Egyptian yield did not exceed expectations. The index on [the opening day of] this season was 82.65 cents compared to 82.24 cents on the opening day of last season, whereas American cotton sold last season for about 112 cents, compared to about 140 cents or 143 cents at present. In other words, its price rose by a large percentage.

The New York closing price last year was 70.05 cents compared to 74.97 cents this year. Foreign currency plays an important role in marketing. If we had maintained last season's prices, some states would have enjoyed a big discount—the pound sterling, 25.8 [percent]; the German mark, 17.5 [percent]; the French, franc 18.5 [percent]; the Swiss franc, 22.1 [percent]; and

the Japanese yen, 10.9 [percent]—in the sense that these countries would have benefitted from these large [discount] percentages, even if there had been no change in prices.

The price of synthetic fibers increased in Japan by 24.8, in England by 17.81, in Germany by 9.9, and in Italy by 2.1. The price of spun thread dropped only in America, to 11.6. The world price of spun cotton thread Number 20 and 30 was 119.07 and increased this year to 121.71. Japanese spun cotton thread was 171 and increased to 195. Only Japanese spun cotton thread 40 dropped, from 235 to 211 this year.

The matter does not pertain to the causative factors of price increases and decreases. Rather, our prices in past years were high, and had to be reduced. Therefore, this season, it was agreed to make them competitive. It is very difficult to reduce prices all at once. The agreement to reduce prices was reached with the understanding that the reduction would be gradual. We hope that, during the next two years, our prices will come within the range of international prices, as they did in previous years.

#### Export Expectations

I am not optimistic regarding the amount of exports this season despite the reduction in prices, because, the matter, as I said, is not one of prices alone, but of weak demand, inasmuch as many countries have covered their needs with competing cotton, there is a world recession, and the transition of the Eastern European countries will prevent them from buying the amounts they purchased previously. I expect that we will sell about 100,000 bales. There is also the [Egyptian Central Bank's] determination of currencies that are acceptable means of payment for sales to various markets. We have customarily sold in exchange for the purchasing country's currency or the dollar. The Egyptian Central Bank has determined that sales this season will be in exchange for the currency of the purchasing country, which could reduce sales somewhat.

Before determining the expected sales volume, it became clear that we will be selling 32,000 bales to Russia and 5,000 to Bulgaria, and that 11,000 bales [grown this season] will be transferred [to cover commitments] from last season. In other words, about 50,000 bales have been sold, or almost 36 percent of all cotton available for export. This has been among the important factors that encourage us not to reduce [cotton production] much, also taking into account that Japan and Romania each intend to buy about 20,000 bales. Thus, we expect to export 100,000 bales, and hopefully more.

The Egyptian cotton exports situation will not become clear until mid-December, almost two weeks after the announcement of export prices. In the interim, the importing countries will have reviewed their estimated needs and actual contracts on competing cotton. Therefore, the export companies are intensifying their efforts with their representatives and agents to increase sales. Perhaps it will be possible.

## IRAQ

### Editorial Claims 'Traitors Fear Linkage Solution'

JN0712115490 Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic  
5 Dec 90 p 3

[Editorial: "The Inevitable Punishment"]

[Text] The little traitors who are entrenching themselves in the ranks of the Zionists and U.S. imperialists have expressed real fear of a solution through which the Arab nation may score a new historic victory that enables it to regain its rights in Palestine, restore its stolen wealth, and continue its march toward development and unity.

The statements by the traitor regimes of Fahd and Husni over the past two days, and the moves of these agents together with other hypocritical parties involved in the conspiracy, prove beyond doubt that these traitors are more eager than Bush and the Zionist entity to maintain the Zionist occupation of Palestine, the Golan Heights, and southern Lebanon.

Their meetings and statements clearly reflect the extent of their alarm at this historic showdown, of which triumphant Iraq and the Arab masses around it have provided all the factors of success and victory.

They do not want the Arab nation to win this encounter, and they are alarmed at the growing call for a just and true application of world legitimacy in Palestine and the other occupied territories. They even went further than the Zionists and imperialists in their enmity toward the Arab nation, its inalienable rights, and its legitimate ambitions in liberation, development, and unity.

The group of traitors—Fahd, Husni, and the like—feel that the showdown, whether it ends in war or peace, will mark their end. They are right. But they should know that their just punishment at the hands of the Arab masses is certainly coming, and that they will inevitably pay for their high treason and crime against Arabism and the goals of the rising Arab nation.

In the crucial battle, there will be no toleration of those who entrenched themselves with the Zionists and imperialists and pushed them to carry out aggression and invasion and threaten the entire pan-Arab destiny.

### Journalists Targets of 'Suppression' in West

JN0501164191 Baghdad INA in English 1332 GMT  
5 Jan 91

[Text] Baghdad, Jan 5, INA—The English Language daily "THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER" today said that Britain on Thursday expelled Iraq's press counsellor in London. Before that, Iraqi journalists in the United States, France, and some other allied Western countries were the main target of suppression and mass expulsions.

For many, targetting Iraqi journalists in the West came as a total surprise. Officials of Western "democracies"

have always been preaching to us, the peoples of the Third World countries, that the media enjoy full freedom and respect in the West. They have been preaching to us on the merits of their "democratic" systems of government and on how every person and individual institution enjoys the right to free functioning and expression.

The daily added that we have been repeatedly "taught" that in the press any viewpoint irrespective of the source. [sentence as received] We have been constantly hearing that the constitution of every individual "democratic" country considers individual liberty and freedom of expression as sacred rights which could not, and should not, be violated. And naively enough, many of us fell in the trap of the history's biggest bluff. At least, the Western bluff, however, came out uncovered, thanks to the effects of the Gulf crisis.

The daily further said that while Iraq, the "undemocratic" Third World country, is hosting hundreds, and maybe thousands, of Western "democracy" [sentence as received] has allowed a single Iraqi journalist in to report for his organisation. Scores of visa applications by Iraqi journalists and TV teams have been forwarded to Western countries' embassies in Baghdad, without receiving any positive answer so far. Iraqi journalists are obviously denied the right their Western colleagues are enjoying in Iraq.

The U.S., Britain, and some Western governments are attempting feverishly to turn some media organizations into state organs, attempts strongly opposed by Western journalists. Scores of Western reporters or whole media establishments have been victims of governments' black-mail on various illegal grounds. Thus journalists in the West are engaged in almost daily confrontations with state officials who want to dictate their policies on both reporters and their newspapers.

The Iraqi daily further added that it is quite doubtful that the Western governments can deprive their media of facts about the Gulf issue by expelling Iraqi press counsellors who used to give their Western colleague journalists every help needed. Such facilities remain available for Western journalists whether there are Iraqi press counsellors in their respective capitals or not.

Apparently, the West's press freedom is no more than a mirage, cleverly woven throughout decades to give the impression of a factual status. Expulsion of Iraqi journalists may well indicate that the U.S and some of its Western allies are keen to impose a total blackout on facts about the Gulf issue. It appears of vital importance for such governments to steer their public opinion towards accepting the policies they impose [as received].

It pointed out that the United States, Britain, and their allies have made of their own "neutral" and "free" media blinkered drummers seeing no more than the tip of their noses. Western governments, at the same time, appear to be as careful not to let the other party's views infiltrate into their respective countries.

Whatever the causes behind such hostile and uncivilized attitudes by Britain, the U.S., and their allies, one can safely assume that crises are not always bad. One of the merits of a crisis is that they sometimes float into sight the naked truth, a thing that may not be possible under normal conditions, it concluded.

### **Europeans Allegedly Built Saddam's Bunker**

91P20089Z Rome RAI Uno Television Network  
in Italian 2000 GMT 22 Jan 91

["Text" of Report on Saddam Husayn's bunker by unknown RAI Uno Television Network journalist]

[Text] Where is Saddam Husayn now? The Iraqi president, according to many sources, is shut up in a strongly fortified bunker in Baghdad. And it is from there that he follows, along with his men, all the operations of war. It [the bunker] should be located underground, exactly below where the presidential palace, now destroyed by allied bombings, stood. The bunker, built by German companies, is 18 meters deep and extends over a surface of 1,800 square meters. The walls are almost two meters thick, and impenetrable steel doors are spaced throughout the access hallways. The refuge can withstand temperatures up to 300 degrees [centigrade]. It is subdivided on several floors underground, next to his own private residence, and consists of living rooms and other comforts of both Western and Muslim style. It has rooms meant for storage, dormitories, kitchens, and offices. There is also a small power station and water containers with filtering systems.

Another curious thing: there is also one Italian among the four persons who know everything about the bunker, because he participated in its construction.

### **Columnist Claims West Ignorant of Iraqi Enemy**

91P40153A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew  
29 Jan 91 p 10

[Text] The United States and Great Britain may "need" a few more acts of insanity by Saddam Husayn, such as burning oil fields or using chemical weapons, to understand that the time has come to change the goals of the war: no longer to remove the Iraqi army from Kuwait, but to liquidate Saddam Husayn, personally.

The history of the 20th century proves that the Anglo-Saxon mind, be it British or American, imbibes democratic concepts, hundreds of years old, and "fair play," along with its mother's milk. It takes a long time to understand the personal makeup of absolute tyrants after the mold of Hitler, Stalin, Ceaucescu, and Saddam Husayn, which does not fit in with the clauses of the Magna Carta and the U.S. Declaration of Independence.

Churchill was the first person in Great Britain, prior to World War II, who understood that Germany had to be totally defeated along with the elimination of Nazi power, and the one who stood at its head, Adolph Hitler.



Because of this, he was even ready to conclude an ad hoc treaty with the devil, Joseph Stalin. But for how many years was Churchill the only opposition voice crying in the wilderness? And how many Britishers believed in appeasing "Herr Hitler?"

It seems also in the Gulf crisis that the Americans still do not understand who is opposing them. What did the Americans think? That the Iraqi army would be expelled from Kuwait, that the Kuwaiti princes would return to their pedestals? And then what? Will Saddam sit, defeated, in his palace in Baghdad, with his tail between his legs, saying: "Excuse me, I made a mistake," and will he return the Scuds to their launch tubes?

Perhaps now—after attacking Israel and Saudi Arabia with Scuds, after releasing a huge oil slick, and perhaps also after firing chemical weapons at Israel or Saudi Arabia—the White House will understand that it must change its war goals and act to eliminate Saddam Husayn. Not the Republican Guard, not the Iraqi army in Kuwait—but to go with strength and determination after the head of the Iraqi ruler, into the depths of his bunker.

### Decoy Weapons Used

91P40140A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
30 Jan 90 p 6

[Text] Since the invasion of Kuwait and the initial deployment of troops supporting Operation "Desert Shield," Iraq has attempted to mislead allied forces by deploying plastic tanks and other equipment in some areas, along with a few batteries of missiles which resemble real military equipment, in size and shape. Iraq's goal is to give misleading information to attacking allied planes.

The military operations command of the supporting forces in the Gulf says that the Iraqi attempts at deception have been known since the beginning of the war, thus enabling planes on bombing operations to find their targets accurately, and Saddam's attempts to change the course of the battle have not succeeded.

Mario Musilli, the owner of a company based in Turin, Italy, which specializes in the production of these types of plastic tanks and planes, confessed that he sold some of his products to Iraq, in addition to other countries with which he has had dealings. Musilli confirmed that his records indicate that he has not sold any replicas of the Scud missiles, the majority of which were destroyed by the allied forces.

### ISRAEL

#### Ze'ev Schiff Analyzes Israeli Role in Gulf War

TA0802135A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Feb 91

[Article by military and security affairs correspondent Ze'ev Schiff]

[Text] The present battle in Iraq is the most political war which Israel has encountered. Every war has political

meaning and objectives, as well as results which are translated into new political reality. The Sinai Campaign in 1956 ended not only with the opening of the Straits of Tiran to naval traffic to and from Israel, it also signaled the dying palpitations of two imperial powers, England and France, and their withdrawal from the region. The Six Day War altered the balance between Israel and the Arab states, as well as the map of Israel. In the Yom Kippur War, we did not understand al-Sadat's strategic objectives when he crossed the Suez Canal, thus forcing Washington to enter the political game, beginning a process which ended with the Camp David Accords and a change in Egypt's standing on the international map. In the Lebanese war, we hastened the destruction of Lebanon and we assisted Syria in taking control of this country. The PLO was defeated militarily, but its international standing was strengthened. In the Gulf war, as stated above, we are encountering our most political war thus far.

Israel has no control over the events in this war. Although it is playing a passive role, it is paying a price in damage and casualties, an economic and social price, and no one knows how things will further develop. This is a war directed first of all at the interior, which is naturally more vulnerable.

It is not Israel's military strength which will dictate the results of this war and how the Middle East will appear afterwards. The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] cannot realize its capabilities, and it will not be the one to influence the balance of power after the war. Although Israel is being threatened with non-conventional weapons, it is more dependent on Washington for a response. If the government orders the IDF to operate, it is liable to disrupt the war being waged against Saddam Husayn and hinder an important objective—the destruction of the Iraqi war machine. Israel has the ability to respond and strike a pre-emptive blow in certain areas, but this capability is limited by political considerations. It can punish Iraq in the most damaging way, but this may result in a premature ceasefire and help Saddam Husayn. And if Israel is compelled to act—it will have to do so in the appropriate proportions so that it does not lose control of the war.

This kind of political war creates ironic situations which no one would have even thought of. Examples of this include: the fact that Saudi Arabia is playing a role, albeit indirect, in defending Israel from Iraqi missiles; that Syria is prepared to recognize the right of Israel to defend itself and respond to missile attacks on its population. This is of course the case with regard to Egypt. Tehran, on the other hand, has stated that if Israel gets involved in the war, it will return the Iraqi planes which found haven in Iran.

In order to wage this type of war from the Israeli side, it is not enough to know the rules of the battlefield; it is not enough to be a general with a military background. This

is foremost a strategic handling of the war at whose margins we are placed—but from which we are liable to be severely hurt. We have been pleasantly surprised by the Shamir-Arens-Levi team in handling things with restraint and with the proper tactics. So far, this is the situation, and we can only hope that it continues this way in the future. Israel is lucky that its senior military command is not pressing for an operation at any cost.

Although there are commanders who were positively termed by Moshe Dayan as knights who need to be restrained, the main group views things correctly and is influencing the political echelons in a positive way. Among these are Chief of Staff Dan Shomron, his deputy, Ehud Barak, and chief of military intelligence, Amnon Shahaq. A unique role is being filled by the director-general of the defense ministry, David 'Ivri, whose influence has been great and positive.

This does not mean that there are no arguments at the top. As was expected, after a prolonged silence, Ari'el Sharon began expressing public criticism and casting doubts. One must be extremely cautious about the stand which he advocates, which would result in the following: the destruction of Jordan, expanding the war in the first stage, a premature ceasefire in the second stage, and of course subsequent American accusations pointed at us for disrupting the war against Iraq. Fortunately, Prime Minister Shamir has a majority which enables him to neutralize this approach.

This war will not end for us when the shooting stops. Those who today demand that Israel maintain a low profile will demand that Israel maintain a very high profile after the war. Even before the first stage of the aerial attack had been completed, the need for an international conference, to which Israel would be invited, was already mentioned. What is needed is a completely different international conference—one which will investigate the role of many European countries in building Iraq's war machine and especially its chemical, missile, nuclear, and biological capabilities. Those responsible for this have no right to place Israel on trial at an international conference. It is they who should be placed on trial. They have lost their moral right to determine the image of peace in the Middle East.

#### **Economic Restructuring Complicated by Aliyah**

91AE0225C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Dec 90  
p 1B

[Article by Avraham Tal]

[Text] Preparations were completed in the Finance Ministry to activate a five-year program to expose Israeli industry to competing imports from all over the world. "All over the world" should be qualified: Industry has been exposed, or is in the advanced process of being exposed to two regions of world trade: Western Europe, pursuant to agreements with the common market, and the United States, pursuant to the Free Trade Agreement. Practically speaking, this is actually a matter of

industry's exposure to the "rest of the world," i.e., to imports from Far Eastern countries, including Southeast Asian countries, and from Eastern Europe. Significant customs—albeit mainly administrative—limitations are imposed on imports from "the rest of the world."

Those who would require exposure correctly say that efficiency is best created in industry by exposing it to competing imports. When inexpensive goods of reasonable quality from abroad appear in Israeli stores, local producers are compelled to become more efficient. In some cases, factories or entire branches will be unable to compete with imports because of the relative, unequivocal advantages enjoyed by factories abroad. In those cases, factories or branches will inevitably be closed. That would not be terrible. It would be benefit the economy. Production elements would shift to factories or branches where we have an advantage, thus increasing society's prosperity. During the structural change process, we would also save foreign currency, because cheap imports, in terms of foreign currency, would make it possible to save expensive dollars that would otherwise be spent in more expensive domestic production. Industrialists of course oppose exposure. Every normal industrialist prefers to continue operating in a cozy atmosphere that provides administrative customs protection. Protection makes it possible to maintain, in the long term, inefficient factories that are worthwhile for their owners, but damaging to the national economy and to the consumer, who, lacking a choice, must pay for inefficiency by having to settle for a lower living standard. Industrialists whose factories are exposed to imports or protected from competition (those which enjoy "natural protection") do not customarily favor exposure, although they are indirectly damaged by a protectionist policy, because the consumer's real purchasing power under such a policy is lower than it could be.

Industrialists will always find arguments against exposure (just as importers will always favor exposure under any circumstances). Industrialists say they favor exposure in principle, for reasons listed in the economics textbooks. However, they would prefer it not now, but in other, better times. Exposure at present would mean dismissals, reductions, the closure of factories, an increase in unemployment, the destruction of industry, and what not. There must be no agreement to a process that would lead to such results precisely at this time, which... (and here the industrialists would supply the appropriate periodical data).

Because industrialists are forever opposed to exposure, one must always treat their arguments with suspicion. For example, they are now arguing that exposure must be postponed for two reasons. First, it would entail imports from parts of the world where wages are extremely low and the exploitation of the workers is shameful; industrial states in the West, without exception, are concerned about protecting their employment from "the importation of unemployment" from these parts of the world. Second, in a period of large immigration, the first task is

to create new jobs. Exposing the economy at present would not only preclude the absorption of new workers, but would also lead to large-scale dismissals in branches that would be hit hard by foreign competition (especially textiles, clothes, and shoes).

How are we to decide between the different views put forth by economists of the Finance Ministry and the Bank of Israel, and by other economists and industrialists? It is difficult (and somewhat uncomfortable) to identify with the industrialists's traditional position. However, a sober view of reality leaves no other alternative.

Last week, at a textiles factory—not a large one—in the central part of the country, these matters were demonstrated to the visitor. The factory, which maintains a modest profit margin thanks to energetic activities to create efficiency and economize, employs about 160 workers, including about ten new immigrants, and it can absorb additional workers. Through great efforts, the factory has managed to increase its exports to about 50 percent of its production. However, it needs the domestic market in order to market the balance of its production. The average wage is around 1,300 shekels [per month]. The development of a domestic market for imports from Southeast Asia, where monthly wages are measured in tens of dollars, would mean a sharp reduction in production, dismissals, and the danger of the factory's closure according to the general manager, a salaried worker of the factory (there are grounds for accepting his appraisal as reliable).

Under normal circumstances, it would be worthwhile to become reconciled with such a difficult process as exposure, under the heading of "structural change in the economy." Can we allow ourselves such luxuries as we head into a period in which thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of new immigrants will be seeking employment? It is not at all clear whether, and where, investments and markets could be found for the alternate factories that would supposedly be established in the economic restructuring process to take advantage of Israel's relative advantages. In the coming years, we will come to be grateful for every work place, including factories that are more marginal than the one described above, when the alternative is widespread unemployment.

Structural change and the creation of efficiency in the economy are important. However, there is no escaping the difficult choice between structural change and efficiency on the one hand, and the mass absorption of immigrants on the other hand. An economy flooded with waves of emergency immigration cannot permit itself to liquidate existing factories before it becomes clear whether and when new factories will be established. Therefore, the danger which industrialists are warning about must be taken seriously. Should we not expose ourselves to reason?

### Schiff Says IDF Becoming Police Army

91AE0225D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Dec 90  
p 1B

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff]

[Text] At the end of the intifadah's third year, we are again being told that the Palestinian uprising in the territories is fading. The prophets of falsehood are again claiming that only force can solve the Palestinian problem. [According to them] it is only necessary to learn to be brutal and deny employment and a livelihood to the Palestinian masses, who will then put pressure on the intifadah's leaders, because the silent majority of Palestinians does not actually want the uprising. Whoever searches through old newspapers will find that such predictions were made two weeks after the intifadah began. Whoever—whether a politician, member of the Army, or a settler—rehashes such promises, does not understand that Israel cannot solve the problem of the intifadah by military means alone. The Palestinians cannot defeat Israel through the intifadah. However, neither can Israel defeat the Palestinians.

We repeatedly present the damages incurred by the Palestinians, but we ignore the damages incurred by Israel. This damage is extending and spreading like a plague. Even the elimination of the submarine project is related indirectly to the intifadah. Were it not for large expenditures due to the uprising, which have overloaded the defense budget, it would have been easy to continue this project. If the uprising continues, it is liable to eat away the flesh of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] like gangrene. A junior officer in the Golani Brigade described this well; after standing for hours next to a roadblock checking the masses of Palestinian workers on their way from Gaza to Israel, he said "this is dull." The intifadah is indeed dulling the IDF.

The intifadah is diverting the IDF from its main task. It has transformed many units into a large security police force. The IDF's soldiers have indeed become professional policemen. However, this is not their function. The IDF is not intended to be a gendarmerie that contends with civilians for a long period. Many in the senior officers' cadre, such as the commanders of the southern and central commands, and personnel in their commands, are devoting a substantial part of their time and thought to the intifadah, which preoccupies them more than other military matters. About a year ago, it was decided to post outstanding officers in key positions in the territories. But, these officers, fearing complications, are not happy.

Despite denials to the contrary, training in the IDF has clearly been damaged by the intifadah. Soldiers dispatched to positions in the Jordan Valley who were surprised by a young terrorist claimed that they had not been trained. Because of the intifadah, rear echelons of the Army are finding themselves on the front line without being properly prepared. Reserve units are being posted to control a certain street in a refugee camp in a

state of alert against youths returning from school. Is this the function of an army considered to have a superb operational capability? Who is so foolish to believe that the Army's operational capability will not be eroded and its self-image damaged if this situation continues? In different areas of the IDF, worrisome signs of weakness, indecision, inferior soldiery, and defective discipline have recently been detected. It is difficult to find a primary cause for this, save for the intifadah's penetrating effect.

The intifadah has also seriously damaged the IDF by causing it to be dragged into a difficult political debate. Many on the right maintain that the intifadah is not being suppressed because the IDF does not wish to do so. In other words, as it were, there are senior officers who are interested in the uprising succeeding for political reasons. Recently, Knesset Member 'Uzi Landau expressed this sentiment in his wayward call to purge the IDF and the Security Service of certain officers. Derisive remarks regarding the IDF's soldiers have never been heard as they have been heard from Jews, mainly settlers, during the intifadah. During the previous government's tenure, they placed the blame on the defense minister from the Labor Alignment, Rabin, and on officers such as 'Amram Mitzna' [the former commander of the central command] and Dan Shomron [the outgoing chief of general staff]. Now, they are already aiming arrows at [Defense Minister] Arens, and tomorrow, they will also certainly do so against Ehud Baraq [the incoming chief of general staff].

The future does not bode well for the IDF in its struggle against the intifadah. Extremists are in control of the Arab scene, as appraisers predicted. The fundamentalist elements are setting the tone, which Israel is abetting by arresting the more moderate leaders and with stupid acts that will result in unemployment and hunger in the territories. The intifadah's causes remain as they were three years ago, and the socioeconomic factor has also intensified. If the green line is closed without appropriate arrangements, we will see an intifadah wave from the desperate.

Since the Palestinians have expressed their support for Saddam Husayn, and following the wave of knifings, a tendency toward extremism has begun in Israel as well. This process will ultimately weaken the Likud or strengthen the extremists, headed by Rehav'am Ze'evi, who is actually calling for the expulsion of the Arabs. Calls for a transfer reflect our despair. Practically speaking, they are vain talk, because, if Israel ever dared to carry out a transfer, we would find the IDF disintegrating in the face of an international force that would forcefully prevent mass expulsions from being carried out.

The IDF faithfully, and rightly, upholds the principle of not intervening in the political echelon's decisions. However, there are times when the IDF is obliged to speak up more resolutely. It seems that we are in such a time, which has been created by the approaching appointment

of a new IDF chief of general staff, Ehud Baraq, by the intifadah's entry into its fourth year, and by preparations for a new era in the Middle East after the Persian Gulf crisis is over. The new IDF command must frankly apprise the politicians of the dangers facing the Army if it continues to be a gendarmerie of the Palestinians in the seized territories.

### Islamic Leaders Seek To Impose Their Methods

91AE0225B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 Dec 90  
p 1B

[Article by 'Oded Zar'i]

[Text] "Whoever murders a human being with premeditation, it is as if he murdered all of humanity," states a verse in the Koran to explain to you in another verse that "all people are equal before God, may His name be exalted." Shaykh As'ad Bayyud al-Tamimi in Jordan, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin in Gaza, Shaykh 'Abbas Madani in Algeria, and others who head the Islamic Jihad organizations, called Hamas [Islamic resistance movement] in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank, disavow these verses. However, they themselves do not acknowledge as much, maintaining that the Koran's verses must "be understood and interpreted correctly and truly." According to them, "human being" in these verses means "one who believes and fulfills Islamic law beyond reproach [le-lo 'orerin]."

Hence, the prohibition against killing applies to a person whose affiliation to Islam is insufficient, but who should believe and fulfill Islamic law. It thus applies, all the more, to non-Muslims, who, in the shaykhs' view, are classified as "disbelievers," but who, nonetheless, belong to one of the three divine religions mentioned in the Koran and recognized by it. However, according to the same shaykhs, it is possible to relate "with mercy" to Jews and Christians in Islamic states, who are under Islam's "protection." This "mercy" would not apply to "disbelieving Jews who subjugate Islam's land and establish an independent entity of disbelief in Palestine."

Shaykh al-Tamimi and his supporters in the Islamic movement, who enjoy freedom of action and the protection of the Hashemite rule in Amman, state these matters openly in the media: "It is a sacred duty to eliminate the Jews." It should be recalled that, prior to the open declarations of recent weeks, "futwas" (formal legal opinions in Islam) were published with the same wording in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These futwas included the famous call to "let the sword speak," and they paralleled the waves of open incitement in mosque sermons and most of the Arab media, especially the Jordanian media. They are thus finding their way into the hearts of the same youths who have perpetrated murders in recent weeks inside the green line.

Shaykh al-Tamimi, Shaykh Yasin, and others, who are considered "direct, concerned parties" to the Palestinian problem, also disavow the "stages plan" adopted by the PLO in the Palestine National Council. According to

them, the entire land of Palestine, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, is a Muslim religious endowment" and no one, neither 'Arafat nor others, has the right to bargain, compromise, or concede any part of it. These basic views are being successfully imparted to bearded youths, who avidly listen to preachers, not only in the mosques of the strip and the West Bank, but also in those of Jordan and other Arab states. 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Rantisi, a leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, has stated to the AL-HAYAT newspaper, which is published in London, among other things, that the uprising's main gain on the eve of its fourth year is the collapse of the principle of coexistence.

Al-Rantisi and his leaders smile broadly whenever they hear Israelis say that "the knifings will not end unless peace efforts are renewed." After all, these "knives" have been active in the Jordan Valley, Yafo, and elsewhere, not because of Israel's refusal to recognize the PLO's demand for self-determination for Palestinians or the establishment of a state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Rather, according to the leaders of Jihad-Hamas, the knives are part of a comprehensive war of attrition that aims, according to al-Rantisi to negatively affect the Israeli soldier, cause him to flee before the stones, "frighten the common Israeli," and cause human and material victims.

The leaders and activists of Jihad-Hamas in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, who apparently refrain from taking part directly in murder and sabotage actions, enjoy greater confidence and freedom to maneuver and act than their counterparts in Syria for example. To date, the Hamas leadership has had no reason to fear a drastic, comprehensive response on the part of the Israeli authorities, despite the recent murders. This encourages the leadership and its activists, as well as the perpetrators, to continue to realize the call to "allow the sword to speak." It also encourages the same leadership, which has obtained considerable assistance in the Arab world, to continue its efforts to gain control of the scene and set the tone for the uprising's fourth year.

### Demographic Figures Said Distorted by Politics

91AE0225A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Dec 90  
p 3B

[Article by Dani Rubenstien]

[Text] After the intifadah's third year, the festive headline in the settlers' mouthpiece, NEQUDA, cites an up-to-date figure: 100,000 settlers in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. Beni Qatzover, the head of the Samaria Regional Council, in that same issue of NEQUDA, writes, in an article entitled "The Jews Are Coming, the Arabs Are Leaving," that, in contrast to a 20-percent increase in the Jewish population in the territories in the three years of the intifadah, Arab emigration from the territories is now marked. Regarding the dimensions of Arab immigration, Yisra'el Har'el, the chairman of the Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza Council, states (HA'ARETZ,

7 December) that he heard from a senior state employee, who is well versed in the matter, that between 20,000 and 40,000 Arabs have left the territories during this period.

The Central Statistics Bureau and the offices of the administration in the territories have differing data. Regarding the number of Jews in the territories, the Bureau has a clear figure that has borne scrutiny. At the end of 1989, there were 73,000 Israelis in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. It is said in the Bureau's administration that this figure is not an estimate, but the result of a fundamental examination based on different sources, including the security system. The Bureau does not have a final figure on the number of Israelis who joined the Israeli population in the territories in 1990. However, according to its estimates, there are apparently about 7,000 more persons, i.e., about 80,000 Israelis are in the territories now, with the majority of the increase having occurred at Ma'ale Adumim and Giv'at Ze'ev, which are actually neighborhoods of Jerusalem, and the minority in western Samaria.

The situation is more complex regarding the demographic findings on Arabs in the territories. No official Israeli institution has data on the emigration of Arabs. However, there are sufficiently clear estimates regarding that population's continued, substantial growth due to natural increase. Nonetheless, the demographic situation is liable to be distorted by the political objectives of Jews and Arabs. Both groups usually inflate the number of Arabs leaving and the number of Israeli settlers in the territories. Thus, not only are the settlers exaggerating in this direction, but so are the PLO and Jordan.

The settlers are exaggerating to inspire their sympathizers with success and victory, in the spirit of a headline in NEQUDA, which reads "Jewish Settlement Defeating the Intifadah." The PLO and Jordan, on the other hand, are exaggerating to frighten the Arab states and to mobilize financial and political support in view of what appears to be mass Jewish settlement to supplant the Arabs who are leaving. King Husayn reiterates, in every one of his speeches, the danger posed to Jordan by the emigration (or expulsion) of masses of Palestinians from the territories into his territory. For years, the PLO has collected money based on the argument that it has to strengthen Palestinian "steadfastness" in the territories. Both the PLO and Jordan are therefore partners of the Israeli settlers in inflating the population figures in the same direction.

What is the truth? In contrast to the sufficiently precise figure of about 80,000 Israelis currently living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, it is impossible to obtain clear information on the number of Arabs in the territories. Moreover, different bodies of the administration have amazingly different estimates of the number of Arabs in Judaea and Samaria. The Central Statistics Bureau estimates that 915,000 Arabs actually live in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem, which is part of

Israel, where about 150,000 Arabs live). The administration in the territories has a figure based on the Interior Ministry's estimate of more than 1.3 million Arabs in the territories, i.e., 400,000 more than the figure of the Central Statistics Bureau.

Everyone agrees that the Interior Ministry's figure is inclined upward for one clear reason: The registration of deaths is incomplete. When someone dies in the state of Israel, the family of the deceased must obtain a burial permit, the National Insurance Institution bears the funeral costs, a death certificate is issued, and the identification card of the deceased is returned to the Interior Ministry. This is not the case in the territories. In many cases, deaths are not reported. Some prefer to retain the identification card of the deceased, for example, to continue receiving food subsidies in the name of the deceased from UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency]. Sometimes they simply do not take the trouble to inform the administration.

Another problem is how to define who is a permanent resident in the territories. Is an Arab who exits to work in Saudi Arabia, leaves his wife and children here, and returns to visit them from time to time considered a resident? Computing methods also differ. Someone who leaves the West Bank via the Jordan bridges deposits his Israeli identification card at the bridge and reclaims it upon returning. Once a year, the Central Statistics Bureau counts the number of Arabs who have left, subtracting from it the number of Arabs who have entered during the same year. Thus, through a simple mathematical calculation, a picture of immigration to and from the country is obtained. The Interior Ministry, on the other hand, performs the same calculation only once every six years. Therefore, only someone absent from here within that census period is removed from the column of residents of the territories.

The large number of residents of the territories (mainly the West Bank) who pass each year back and forth over the Jordan bridges also complicates record keeping. Before the intifadah, the annual number of such persons was about a million. Thousands got married abroad and brought their spouses here. There are no clear data on their registration or that of their children. I heard a view in the administration to the effect that many persons in the territories have not been registered anywhere. Suddenly, a girl from some village appears, saying that her family's registration stub has been lost. She claims, and the entire village testifies of course, that she was born in the village and did not leave it her entire life. The Interior Ministry sometimes issues such a person an identity card (designated a "new registration") and sometimes refuses to do so.

Could the problem be solved by conducting a population census? Such a census was conducted in the West Bank and Gaza only once before, in 1967, amid difficulties and at great monetary cost. In the state of Israel, there have since been three population census, which were conducted with relative ease, given that Israeli families

are usually small and live in well-defined housing units. This is not the case in Arab villages in the territories, refugee camps, and crowded neighborhoods. Large families live together, intermingled. Whoever comes to count them cannot enter a one-room apartment, stand everyone in a line, identify each child, and then move on to count those in the next room. It is estimated that a census in the territories would cost tens of millions and would be impossible under current security conditions.

The only certain information regarding the trend of emigration from the territories pertains to Christians. A research organization called "Meeting" (Liqa' in Arabic), under the directorship of Dr. Jurays Hawri, an Arab Israeli from the Christian village of Fasutah in the Galilee, conducted a series of investigations and discovered that the number of Christian Arabs concentrated around Jerusalem, in the subdistricts of Bethlehem and Ramallah, has been declining continuously. Many Christians are emigrating abroad, joining family members who left the country decades ago. If this trend continues, there will be no more Christian Arabs in the area within one or two generations. However, the number of Christians in the territories is marginal, about 40,000, and their influence on the general demographic situation is slight. While a Christian Arab can be absorbed relatively easily among members of his community abroad, it is almost impossible for Muslim Arabs to be absorbed easily abroad. The lifestyles in Western states, which are imbued with the Christian-secular culture, the consumption of alcoholic beverages, sexual permissiveness, and so on, restrain the emigration of Muslims to them, inasmuch as Muslims almost never make the transition to a secular culture.

In contrast to the registrations and estimation difficulties regarding the West Bank, the situation is much clearer in the Gaza Strip. The strip is a small area, surrounded by a fence with only three accesses, in which field surveys and samples can be conducted with greater ease. In recent years, the administration in Gaza has exchanged the Israeli identity cards [of Arab residents] three times. It also recently issued magnetic cards to persons employed in Israel. The findings of the Central Statistics Bureau regarding the Gaza Strip are not much different from those of the Interior Ministry: About 620,000 residents according to the Bureau and about 680,000 according to the Interior Ministry.

If we adopt the premise accepted by professionals, i.e., that the demographic trends known to us from the Gaza Strip also apply to the West Bank, we can obtain sufficiently good estimates regarding all of the territories. The interesting question of course is: What has been happening during the intifadah years? Initial data from Gaza indicate virtually no emigration. If many left the territories in the seventies to work in the Arab oil states, the exodus to work abroad stopped almost completely as of the early eighties, when oil prices dropped. Data on emigration from Gaza between 1987 and the end of 1989 (the two years of the intifadah) show that about 2,000 persons left Gaza and did not return. In other words, in



these two difficult years, there was hardly any immigration at all from Gaza, almost certainly for the simple reason that no destination offered a livelihood.

By contrast, the birth rate continued and even increased. In 1989, 32,000 births were recorded in Gaza, compared to 28,500 in 1988. When this figure was published in Gaza several months ago, it was said there that the increase in the birth rate stemmed from the protracted curfew periods, or perhaps it is intended to sharpen perceptions in Israel of the demographic danger [posed by the Arab birth rate]. Either way, it is now clear that there is no immigration from the territories and the rate of natural increase has grown. The number of Arabs in the territories at the end of 1990 (excluding East Jerusalem) is about 1.65 million. Together with the Arabs of East Jerusalem, who are not citizens of Israel, they will number 2 million in about two to three years.

## KUWAIT

### Official Discusses National Liberation, Future

91AE0184B London SAWT AL-KUWAYT  
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 8 Dec 90 p 6

[Remarks by Ahmad al-Fahd, the chairman of the Kuwaiti Olympic Committee, by Jasim al-Shamari]

[Text] Shaykh Ahmad al-Fahd called for the building of a new Kuwaiti society after liberation and stressed that efforts must be directed at building Kuwaiti society and abandoning personal interests.

He added that the resisters in Kuwait have portrayed to the world a handsome image of the Kuwaiti, and that we must preserve that image and not aid in its distortion.

He stated that the word "sorrow" hardly expresses the feelings of one who sees his country being trodden underfoot by persons whom he once thought were his brothers, to whom he extended aid and support, for whom his heart called, and whom his arms opened to embrace more than once and in more than one place.

He added: My sorrow pours out over the loss of the homeland, which is everything in life in my opinion. It is the first and last love. All other sorrows pale by comparison to our sorrow over losing our homeland.

He mentioned that the decision to go to war will not be made by the allied countries, but by confrontational obstinacy, which will be the first spark, clearly indicating that Saddam Husayn has no concern for his people's interest, his country's culture, or Iraq's history.

He stated: We were forced to leave our land without having committed any wrongdoing. We used to deal with Iraq based on good intentions, neighborliness, and brotherhood. All of these international initiatives and consecutive resolutions by the Security Council have come about solely because we are right and have a case.

The solution is not a decision by the Kuwaiti Government alone, but an international decision by consensus, because of the justness of our cause, the legitimacy of our right, and the clarity of our demand, which is called for by Kuwaiti children before adults. That demand is to return to the homeland and to restore Kuwaiti legitimacy under the leadership of Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah.

He added: Fate has chosen us for the most difficult test in ancient or contemporary history. In this crisis, the Kuwaiti people has been tried by an historical test—to be or not to be. A people that does not benefit from the lessons of any trial, even if it is small, does not read history well. History has placed many countries before a test, countries that were in a much weaker position than Kuwait is today. However, they benefitted from the lessons of their trials so much that had it not been for the those severe tests which they experienced, they would not have reached their level of technological and cultural advancement. They were able to do so, because they stood united and picked themselves up after falling, to be stronger and more vigorous.

He continued: National action is divided into a number of parts. Some have taken up arms, reentered Kuwait, and given their lives to redeem their homeland. Some have volunteered for the Kuwaiti Army in expectation of zero hour. Some have joined the popular committees, which specialize in different areas, to serve the people of their nation with a smile radiating love for their compatriots. Another role, no less important than sacrificing one's life for the homeland, is for each one of us to treat our fellow Kuwaitis more dearly than our families, to act in unison, and to promote this feeling among everyone in our community. All that is beautiful in our souls must be strengthened, because the homeland is beautiful and is large enough for everyone. We must renounce all ugly and erroneous practices or personal interests. Let us all join in loving the homeland, because the homeland needs every heart that beats with the love of Kuwait. Kuwait has given many martyrs. The blood of those martyrs must sow the country with the roses of love, and the hills with harmony, love, and cooperation.

He added: Kuwait needs to be rebuilt. However, let us first build our hearts with love for each other, because that is the first seed in building the Kuwait of the future and the Kuwait of love and peace. He said: After liberation, Kuwait will not need procrastinators [munzirin] or talk to the extent that it will urgently need action by people who believe their soil to be more precious than gold.

He stated: The Iraqi invasion has proven that the Kuwaiti possesses an enormous amount of loyalty and love for his homeland, and that every Kuwaiti child is brought up to be a nationalist to the marrow. Why has there been internecine fighting and the awakening of doubt? Why has there been mutual hatred? He added: I am certain that there was manipulation behind the scenes to split Kuwaiti society and to introduce to it customs that have never been part of our legacy. Such

manipulation applauds whenever a new act of selfishness, jealousy, envy, and mutual hatred comes over us.

He pointed to other behind the scenes manipulation that is attempting to help widen the rift to terminate Kuwaiti society. He stated: We must benefit from the Iraqi invasion to build a homeland that is ruled by love and the love of good for all. Let us be judged only by our deeds. Let us abandon talk and roll up our sleeves, loving one another and cooperating as our grandfathers did before us. He added: In my opinion, your freedom ends when others' freedom begins. However, freedom gets to the point of distortion and the sowing of doubt by word or deed. We know that not all that is known is said, and that not all that is said is published or written. Bravery is not criticizing some official for some act. Rather, bravery and love of the homeland is telling someone who errs that he is erring, and to do so directly, not behind his back.

He stated: We, as Kuwaiti society, have done much talking and awakening of doubts. We have moved away from being loyal and sincere toward each other and consulting with each other, which is the height of democracy.

He added: We want the Kuwaiti press to rise to the occasion, help build Kuwait after liberation, and sow mutual love in Kuwaitis and the seed of armed struggle and the sacrifice of one's life for the homeland. We also want our press to prepare the way for the process of building and writing about the sweat, effort, and sacrifice that await Kuwaitis inside Kuwait, and to help eliminate mental blocks in some individuals. The homeland is for everyone. Love must accumulate in all hearts and souls. He continued: I direct my call from SAWT AL-KUWAYT to our press, our writers, and distinguished Arab writers to help build Kuwait's future. This is the true role of the loyal Kuwaiti media, which, we can say, has benefitted from the experience. This mission is not limited to the media. Our intellectuals, politicians, unionists, and leaders, have a prominent role. I entrust them to build the Kuwait of the future through their ideas, so that we can be ready to implement after arriving in our homeland, because Kuwait is for everyone. It is not for one individual to the exclusion of others. He stated: I also call on all intellectuals, politicians, and clerics loyal to Kuwait to be psychologically prepared to help and to call everyone around them to build the Kuwait of the future. As for talk of legitimacy, the Kuwaiti people has said in a single voice that it supports legitimacy, despite the machineguns aimed at it from the first day. The last remark deals with the democracy that was officially established at the Jeddah conference. That matter has been decided. The third matter concerns international initiatives, Kuwait's fate, and whether Kuwait will return through a military strike or a peaceful solution. This matter is in the hands of international decisionmaking. The discussion has not dealt with the building of Kuwait, how to help build it, the difficulties that will face us, and how to surmount them. The discussion is about the role of each one of us

in building a cohesive, loving, cooperative society. He added: Social action is needed on the part of each one of those leaders—social action with a single heart and a single common goal. This action is needed to explain the destruction that exists in every inch of my country's territory. Whoever thinks that Kuwait will return on the first day as the bridegroom of the Gulf and a shining pearl on the banks of the Arab Gulf is mistaken. Whoever enters Kuwait now would not recognize it. It has become a ghost city. We must prepare Kuwaiti society to accept this bitter reality.

He added: When we have discussed "loyalty" and "nationalism," there has been no criterion or measure to gauge these words. However, the matter is different now. The criteria of these words is the extent to which one strives for society's solidarity, strongly, persistently, and far from any concepts alien to a small society that lives in security and must be stronger than those behind the scene manipulators who have played some role in recent years.

Shaykh Ahmad was stern with Kuwaiti society regarding erroneous concepts. He stated that it is [now] the era of each Kuwaiti individual, and, first and foremost, it is the era of the media, clerics, unionists, political leaders, and tribal leaders, because history omits neither the big nor the small. The ball is in our court now, as a people and as individuals. It is necessary to blend into the melting pot of the homeland and to strive to elevate it.

He added: Kuwait greatly needs technical manpower and closed ranks, like one straight line—a single heart devoid of personal interests.

He stated that the resisters in the homeland under Iraqi occupation have painted a beautifully colored, radiant picture. That picture's theme is loyalty and nationalism in its purest form. These resisters have proven that Kuwaiti society, when it is in danger, is cohesive, cooperative, and mutually loving. This shining picture portrayed by these resisters through their many sacrifices is a source of pride for every Kuwaiti throughout the entire world. The fine picture portrayed by the resisters has increased the world's pride in us. We abroad must be a support for them to complete that picture. We must act in unity and love each other. The door to sacrifice is open. Whoever wants to sacrifice does not need anyone's permission. Whoever wants to volunteer can do so with willingness to give his life to redeem the homeland. Whoever wants to contribute his effort to administering his society's affairs abroad in the working committees may do so. Those whose circumstances do not allow them to knock on these doors are better suited to foster Kuwaiti unity abroad, serve as ambassadors for their country, and observe the customs and traditions of the countries in which they reside.

He added: We have a history. Our land will return God willing. We have the technical personnel, abilities, credentials, and capabilities to build a new, strong society comparable to other societies. We must return more

strongly by transcending some concepts that aroused sensitivity. We must work tirelessly and not become sidetracked for anything. Kuwait needs cooperative people who love each other and place the homeland's interests above personal interests, so that we can say that we have risen to the occasion.

Shaykh Ahmad al-Fahd touched on the role of the Kuwaiti embassies abroad, saying that, following the Iraqi occupation, the embassies have been performing the work of four ministries combined. There have thus been many complaints, because the role required of these embassies has exceeded their capabilities. After four months, we can say that the Kuwaiti embassies have risen to the occasion and have performed transactions requiring an entire army of employees.

Ahmad al-Fahd, the chairman of the Kuwaiti Olympic committee, called for maximum, constructive Gulf cooperation. He stated: The crisis has proven that the Gulf states are a large state with common hopes, common concerns, and a common fate. He added that if danger threatens one state, it threatens all [Gulf Cooperation Council] member states. Therefore, the leaders must exploit this crisis and the good spirit that typifies all peoples of the region to achieve maximum unity, taking into account that their states are a single state which must know its friend from its enemy.

He stated: This crisis has indicated that the brotherhood demonstrated by the six states truly exists and is not words or slogans. We are one cohesive people, acting together like a single body. If a member of the body complains, all of the members rally to protect and watch over it.

### **Ambassador Discusses GATT, Economic Impact of Crisis**

91AE0184A London SAWT AL-KUWAYT  
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 9 Dec 90 p 9

[Text] London—The ambassador of Kuwait in Brussels, Ahmad al-Ibrahim, delivered an important speech in the framework of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] talks held recently in Belgium, which he devoted to discussing the dimensions of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and its effects on the entire world.

Kuwait, in addition to Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria has been a member of GATT since 1964.

At the beginning of his address, al-Ibrahim pointed to the date of Kuwait's entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its adherence to resolutions arising from it. He also spoke about Kuwait's full commitment regarding its annual budget.

He stated: Kuwait and the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council have pursued a liberal trade policy based on low duties (about 5 percent on average). In addition, it applies almost no nontariff measures. Kuwait's trade volume during the past three years

totalled about \$14 billion, of which more than \$6 billion was for imports, which makes Kuwait's per capita imports among the highest in the world (about \$3,000).

He added: We have witnessed important historical events in 1990: The end of the cold war and the coming down of the Berlin Wall, which is another step toward the establishment of a new, international, political order. However, we have also witnessed a new danger in our region that threatens the stability and civilization of the world. The international economic system which we seek cannot be achieved if political stability is not available. As we know, politics and economics are connected.

He stated: Thus, while my country was earnestly and very actively engaged in promoting the Uruguay Round negotiations, it was suddenly subjected to aggression on the part of a country which is not a member of the agreement. On 2 August, while we were naively believing that Iraq would commence peace negotiations, as many heads of states had promised us, we were suddenly confronted by blatant, savage aggression which attempted to erase Kuwait from the world map in violation of all international laws and all Arab and Islamic traditions.

He added: No country in our modern history has been subjected to the acts of comprehensive pillage and illegal seizure, the killing of innocent people of all ages, and the mass arrests without cause to which Kuwait has been subjected. More than 20,000 Kuwaitis have been deported and imprisoned, and 7,000 of them have been placed at strategic Iraqi sites. In addition, our economy has been completely destroyed, and our people has been subjected to all types of barbaric violence, including the forced deportation of Kuwaitis.

Al-Ibrahim continued: What is inconceivable in our contemporary history is happening now in Kuwait: The Iraqi regime has erased the Kuwaiti identity. It started to do so on 1 December by prohibiting Kuwaiti citizens from using anything (food, medicine, etc.) if they do not bear Iraqi identity cards. This led to the exodus of many Kuwaiti families from Kuwait. In addition, there are large-scale immigration operations to settle many Iraqi families in Kuwait, including 3,000 Kurds, who are inhabiting the Kuwaiti coast. All of these measures violate Article 49 of the Geneva Convention.

He continued: The Gulf crisis' economic effects on the world cannot be determined precisely at present. To give some examples, Kuwait, as economists in our region have confirmed, has so far lost more than \$50 billion. Jordan is facing a severe economic crisis, its gross national product having declined by 50 percent and its rate of employment having risen by 40 percent. To compare, it can be said that what has been happening in Jordan during this crisis has exceeded what happened in the United States during the economic depression in 1930. The losses of Palestinians living in Kuwait have surpassed \$4 million. In addition, Egypt has lost more than \$7 billion and it faces the problem of reemploying

hundreds of thousands of Egyptians who have returned from Baghdad and Kuwait. Emigres who had been living and working in Kuwait also suffered losses. Because of this aggression, oil prices, which have doubled, will have destructive effects on the world economy, resulting in economic stagnation in the future in a number of countries, which will have serious effects on international trade.

He stated: Even if the Gulf crisis continues in our hearts and minds, it is our duty to achieve success in this historical meeting in Brussels in order to protect and improve the international trade system, which is based on GATT regulations and principles.

It might be premature at present to evaluate the results of the Uruguay Round. However, two basic areas can be noted regarding the results of this meeting: freedom to enter markets and the improvement of current GATT regulations. Regarding the first issue, little progress has been made toward realizing the hopes of developing countries in particular. Regarding the second issue, namely new areas of negotiations and the improvement of GATT regulations, the general feeling is that new regulations do not take into account the interests of the less developed member countries and do not meet their trade and financial needs. If we move from generalities to particulars, my country's delegation would like to comment on the current circumstances regarding the GATT dispute settlement system. Aside from GATT activities related to lowering tariffs and nontariff barriers, GATT is most known in public opinion for its activities regarding international trade disputes. The dispute settlement system in GATT solves disputes when they arise and pressures governments to stand by their commitments as GATT members. The dispute settlement system in GATT is contained in Articles 22 and 23 of the General Agreement. These two articles place weight on bilateral contacts and consultations. If a dispute cannot be solved on a bilateral level, recourse can be had to the GATT arbitration system as a last resort. Members of GATT have implemented these provisions and have been able to solve many disputes and avoid the outbreak of trade wars.

He added: As a result of the Tokyo Round, a decision has been adopted to expand existing GATT provisions. New improvements were incorporated in dispute settlement procedures during the Uruguay Round. Nevertheless, there is a general feeling that it is in the interests of members, especially developing countries, to further strengthen the disputes settlement system and for it to be respected by all member countries.

Despite this call for reform and the hope for an improvement in the system, my country's delegation would like to state a general observation regarding this matter. This system has achieved success in remedying many conflicts. The pressure arising from the GATT countries' need for credibility in a multi-lateral system has proven to be the most effective means for reaching settlements and preserving order.

Finally, he called on the international community in the GATT organization and in other spheres in the world to stand firmly and strongly against any violation by any country of the sovereignty of other countries and the rights of their citizens. He stated: If we leave the situation in the Gulf to remain as it is now, the world of tomorrow will be in doubt. Therefore, paying a very low price now to preserve peace and international order is better than paying an exorbitant prices in the future.

### Post-Invasion Activities of Central Bank Reported

91AE0210A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
26 Dec 90 pp 29, 30

[Article by Mandra al-Murr: "1990 Economic Personality of the Year: Governor of the Central Bank of Kuwait. Shaykh Salim 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Sabah: Fast Action Saved Kuwaiti Banks From Economic Disaster"]

[Text] The 1990 Economic Personality of the year, Shaykh Salim 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Sabah, was born 1 November 1951; has a B.A. in economics from The American University in Beirut, class of 1977; joined the Central Bank of Kuwait on 1 October 1977 as an analyst in the foreign operations research department; rose through the ranks to become governor and chairman of the board in October 1986; and is chairman and member of the boards of several leading economic institutions such as the Institute of Banking Studies, the Kuwait Investment System, and the Supreme Planning Council.

Shaykh Salim 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Sabah, governor of the Central Bank of Kuwait, left Kuwait during the first week of the Iraqi invasion for London where he asked Kuwaiti banks with branches in Britain—such as National Bank, Gulf Bank, National Commercial Bank—to augment their presence and gather data to delineate their positions and involvements with other foreign banks in order to untie the bonds Kuwaiti banks have with others by retrieving their deposits and assets with other banks and repaying deposits and assets of other banks. The action was prompted by discussions between the Central Bank of Kuwait and officials of Kuwaiti banks. A committee was formed of all Kuwaiti banks which set about acting in unison. Credit for this initiative goes to central bank governor Shaykh Salim who is known for his patient and unobtrusive crisis management such as his action in 1987 to restructure Kuwaiti banks and resolve the nonperforming-debt problem. His success could perhaps be attributed to his experience with the Kuwaiti banking system and with the central bank which he joined in 1977 and where he rose to different positions until he became governor in 1986. Shaykh Salim, 40, is dynamic and can pursue a goal with strength and steadfastness supported by long and solid experience in the banking industry.

A few days into the invasion, Shaykh Salim had a quick meeting in London with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) central bank governors to discuss the impact of

the crisis on banks [in the region] in general, but particularly to chart the relationships between Kuwaiti banks and their GCC counterparts in light of prevailing conditions. The meeting discussed the convertibility of the Kuwaiti dinar in GCC countries and agreed to act in defense of Kuwaiti banking institutions. Arrangements were made for the technicalities needed to facilitate exchanging the Kuwaiti dinar in order to preserve its value while allowing Kuwaitis to exchange their Kuwaiti holdings for GCC currencies at an appropriate rate. [The meeting] was able to arrive at a fixed exchange rate for the Kuwaiti dinar against GCC currencies. The arrangement was to allow each Kuwaiti to exchange 500 Kuwaiti dinars a month until Kuwaiti government aid reaches its citizens abroad. As the program went into effect, the Central Bank of Kuwait adopted further measures in that respect. Certain dinar denominations were recently declared nonconvertible because they were stolen from the central bank by Iraqi occupation forces rendering them, in the words of the [central bank] governor, "merely pieces of paper without value or cover which have never been circulated and have no corresponding foreign exchange value." The central bank disclaimed legal responsibility for those notes and publicized their serial numbers once it became aware of them. It is to be pointed out here that the latest information available to [central] bank governor Shaykh Salim before the invasion indicates that the precirculation value of coins in circulation amounted to 400 Kuwaiti dinars, making it easy for the central bank and its governor to determine the numbers currently in circulation or which have been accessed since the invasion began.

Shaykh Salim al-Sabah, in his first meeting with GCC central bank governors, succeeded in allaying the confusion resulting from the invasion. No one had previously acted to fix an exchange rate for the [Kuwaiti] dinar since the rate was usually announced by the Central Bank of Kuwait. Confusion set in, and the dinar lost value for the week following the cessation of those announcements. Its rate in Saudi Arabia, for instance, swung between two and five riyals until a fixed rate of 10 Saudi riyals was arrived at. The dinar was also fixed at a certain exchange value vis-a-vis the other GCC currencies.

#### New Currency

As usual in such circumstances, new currency had to replace the Kuwaiti dinar, and the [central] bank's governor and officials began working on this early in the invasion. Such an undertaking is of vital importance so that "the currency issue could be decided and ready for immediate implementation once the situation stabilizes and Kuwait returns."

Kuwaiti financial institutions, and the banking system in general, suffered huge undeterminable losses generally estimated at a few million dollars. The central bank and its governors played an important role here also by aiding those institutions since the very beginning. [Kuwaiti] banks continued to receive liquidity support

on a temporary basis until they terminate relationships with foreign banks and are able to concentrate on inter-bank foreign exchange deposits. When this is over, Kuwaiti banks will be able once again to look after their internal affairs.

It is of value to mention here that the Central Bank of Kuwait has succeeded in consolidating the financial positions of Kuwaiti banks vis-a-vis the outside world. It was able to ascertain what funds, deposits, and other assets Kuwaiti banks have with other banks and vice versa—one of the most difficult and most outstanding central bank accomplishments under present conditions. Its actions were economically enlightened and critical as a response to foreign banks that ceased dealings with Kuwaiti banks and institutions, refusing their deposits and demanding repayment of their debts. Instead of refusing to pay because all Kuwaiti funds were frozen everywhere, the central bank did not use that as a pretext for nonpayment. Rather, the governor wanted to prove to all that the Kuwaiti banking system was capable of fulfilling its obligations despite the difficult conditions it has encountered and is still encountering. Shaykh Salim was able to correct the situation, thanks to his personal contacts and friends in the central banks of major industrial nations. All of them demonstrated understanding accompanied with willingness to cooperate towards preserving the Kuwaiti banking system. Systematic payments of interest due on foreign banking deposits with Kuwaiti banks began a few weeks ago even though those foreign banks were not asked to reciprocate by paying the interest they owed Kuwaiti banks. With the completion of this operation two weeks from now, Kuwaiti bank fiscal relationships with foreign banks, based on foreign bank deposits, would have been concluded by repaying those funds in full and collecting receivables owed by foreign banks.

#### Unfreezing Requested

During the postinvasion period the central bank has also succeeded in requesting the unfreezing of the assets of the Kuwaiti banks that were originally tied to the National Bank now that the central bank has been provided the necessary data, especially data on the remaining banks. We learned that the governor will formally petition various authorities in the countries concerned to unfreeze bank assets, including their books, in order that they may be used to fulfill Kuwaiti banking obligations to other banks. The Kuwaiti Central Bank governor was also astute in posting several of his staff as representatives to various financial institutions in certain Arab and foreign countries in order to look after the financial interests of Kuwaiti citizens. The bank, for example, has a representative at the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency because Saudi Arabia is the first stop for departing Kuwaitis who would need to exchange their Kuwaiti dinar holdings. That representative is also charged with maintaining daily contact with all branches of banks that agreed to exchange the dinar in order to facilitate any obstacles Kuwaitis might encounter in

exchanging their allotted sums. He also acts as coordinator with other GCC central banks.

The Kuwait Central Bank has also opened an office in Cairo to undertake needed position analyses and studies of other banks and financial institutions under its jurisdiction.

## LEBANON

### Deputy Auguste Bakhus on Elections

91AE0195B Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic 3 Dec 90 p 24

[Interview with Auguste Bakhus, deputy in the Lebanese Parliament, by H. al-Husayni; place and date not given: "Chairman of Parliamentary Committee on Management and Justice, August Bakhus: 'Appointment of Deputies Lesser of Two Evils; As a Maronite, I Hope a Non-Maronite Is Nominated to the Presidency'"]

[Text] The principle of appointing deputies for a single term until such time as the government could conduct elections was sanctioned in the al-Ta'if Accord. One of the conditions in the National Reconciliation Pact was the promulgation of a new law for elections according to province. A variety of views have been surfacing regarding the new election law, including that of Deputy Auguste Bakhus, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Management and Justice, which is expressed in this interview conducted with him by al-Shira'.

[al-Husayni] Recently there has been a lot of talk about the election law. How do you view it?

[Bakhus] Under the al-Ta'if Accord there are two phases for the next election law. The first phase is to delimit new precincts to serve as the basis for appointing deputies in the very near future—perhaps within a month or two—for as we know, the number of deputies has risen to 108, and some deputies have died. Empty seats and those which have been added need to be filled. One of the conditions of the al-Ta'if Accord was that new deputies would be appointed to fill seats vacated by death. I believe the government has prepared a bill delimiting the precincts of the nine new deputies who are to be added to the Parliament, bringing the number to 108. The second phase requires the promulgation of a new law for the election of deputies on the basis of provinces. In all likelihood, the present six provinces will be retained, but there is a possibility they could become 12 or 13. The ground rules to be adopted by the state for conducting the elections are still under negotiation.

[al-Husayni] Has any specific legal formulation been agreed upon?

[Bakhus] Various approaches are being passed around and discussed at present. One of these, which I personally proposed, runs as follows: Each provincial district would become a province, thereby dividing Lebanon into 24 provinces on which elections would be based. This would allow us to retain the spirit of the al-Ta'if

Accord, with the districts becoming provinces, and to achieve greater decentralization since the province is a decentralized unit. Since the al-Ta'if Accord specifically states that an election law must be promulgated, we must use its provisions to avoid sectarianism. Elections must not be conducted on the basis of gerrymandered districts wherein Christians elect Christian deputies and Muslims do likewise. That has to be eliminated. I feel that elections will always be sectarian in nature, even were they to be conducted on the basis of the province, but [this is needed] to reduce sectarian fanaticism so a Muslim will elect a Christian and vice versa. Consider the situation of candidates were we to adopt the province scheme in al-Matn, for example, where there are three precincts spread among the Maronites, the Orthodox, and the Armenians. The sectarian factor will certainly surface in this case. For this reason, I believe the elections should take place in the form of a primary round in which six candidates would win, not three; i.e., two for each category. We would then submit for election their names and those of winners in the other provinces for election. Thus, all Lebanese would have participated in the election; a deputy would be the deputy of the nation. To make this clearer, if Sidon required one Sunni deputy, the two candidates receiving the most votes in Sidon would be selected, whereupon all of Lebanon would choose one of them, and he would go to the parliament.

[al-Husayni] You mean voting would take place in two stages?

[Bakhus] In principle, yes, but it could be limited to a single round. We have 108 deputies. Each voter could come and select 108 names, letting the computer determine who the winners are. Whoever gets the most votes wins, thus we avoid wearing people out with two rounds of voting.

[al-Husayni] And if both receive the same number of votes?

[Bakhus] That is not a problem. All of Lebanon will elect and endorse one of them who will be the winner. We will also have observed the principle of local representation. Were we to complicate the issue, and say it will be whoever takes the most votes on a Lebanon-wide basis, it will not work. Someone from al-Matn who failed to get even one percent in his district might come and win in the general election. This is not right. He must have the distinction of being a representative of his district. I emphasize his being a local representative so he can carry out his responsibility vis-a-vis his constituents and promote their interests. Everyone will have to be divided according to three alliances: right, center, and left. They will be distributed among three slates, with the majority represented in the council and governing for a four-year period. The government will be comprised of Lebanon's strongest team, and when that is done, we limit sectarian fanaticism. The stubborn Maronite from al-Matn will know that all of Lebanon will intervene between him and his local opponent, so he will not continue to practice



sectarian fanaticism as previously happened in Beirut before its division into three sections, when Sa'ib Salam had to ally with Maronite George Thabit.

The deputy will belong to the nation in the real sense. We will not have the head of a slate followed by a retinue, because there are people I do not wish to name who came in on the coattails of others. That is, no longer will there be chieftains pulling seven or eight others in behind them. No one in the council can be a feudalist. This is a rational proposal, because the al-Ta'if [Accord] is not limited to constitutional amendments. There are other incomplete areas, including the Election Law, a court to consider the constitutionality of laws and election appeals, and the Economic Council.

[al-Husayni] You are a deputy selected by your constituents, i.e., your supporters wanted you to represent them. Now deputies will be appointed. How do you perceive the difference between yourself and those who are appointed?

[Bakhus] We have chosen the lesser of two evils. Either we retain the present number of deputies while they die off one after the other, perhaps down to half the number they were, or we have maximum one-year appointments as part of compulsory elections. Two years would be too long in my view. The government can hold elections if it approves the voting card. Even if some continue to be uprooted, every voter will receive a card giving him the right to elect a candidate. Those who have fled their areas will receive cards allowing them to vote in precincts made secure for them in the areas where they reside. This can be implemented immediately, once there is a government.

[al-Husayni] Do you think it is democratic?

[Bakhus] One hundred percent democratic, and it has happened before. We had more than one experience with it during the mandate in Lebanon when part of the deputies were elected and others appointed.

[al-Husayni] But appointments were made by the senior French mandatory official.

[Bakhus] Of course, but we have to say that these deputies were of good stock. Emile Iddeh and other deputies appointed at that time were outstanding men.

[al-Husayni] Emile Iddeh was calling for a permanent French protectorate in Lebanon.

[Bakhus] Of course, but his son became a nationalist leader.

[al-Husayni] What will the situation be if new deputies are appointed, conditions do not permit holding elections, and their terms are renewed as usual?

[Bakhus] We have to be optimistic or there is no way out. Some areas and sects are totally without deputy representation. Our Druse brothers had six deputies, and only one is left—"May God keep Shaykh Tawfiq 'Assaf

healthy." In Zghartah and al-Kurah all of the deputies have died. Who is looking after [those constituents] when things are bad? We have to accept a solution, even if it is bad. As I said, when there are two evils, "What are we going to do?" During the time of Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil I begged him to approve the voting card. I told him, "Hold elections; you are the government; remove this disgrace of reappointment." But, unfortunately, they did not do it, fell out among themselves, and the trial Lebanon suffered is virtually unsurpassed in any other country in the world. Soon there will be a government of national unity. I think it will be able to hold elections, possibly within month from now, if we get a government as we hope and it finds that the security situation allows it to do away with appointment, since it is not compulsory. Then we could hold elections within six months and do away with the idea of appointments.

[al-Husayni] Will the election law be suited to the nature of the regime and the people after years of strife?

[Bakhus] The law I have proposed will eliminate about 90 percent of sectarianism. Once the law is put into effect, sectarianism will simply die out. I should add that I am a secularist and a founder of the Democratic Party. I proposed the Unified Social Status Law, and recently distributed copies of it to President al-Harawi and to the state of President al-Husayni. I say that if we adopt the principle of elections restricting sectarianism and a unified personal status law base on choice, sectarianism will be totally eliminated from all areas. As a Maronite I say to you that I hope it will be possible for a non-Maronite to be nominated for the Presidency of the Republic.

### Filling of Parliamentary Seats Discussed

91AE0228A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic  
17, 24 Dec 90, 7 Jan 91

[Article by Huda al-Husayni, Amin Sha'lan, et al: "Parliamentary Appointments: Hot Dossier That Is Creating Problems; Large Bazaar and War Against Feudalism in 'Akkar; Bint Jubayl: Clans Compete and Politicians Are in Agreement; Western al-Biqa': Consensus on Murad," refer to JPRS NEA-90-075 dated 24 Dec 90]

### [17 Dec pp 20-21]

[Text] The hot problems which the dossier of the proposed parliamentary appointments—appointments to fill the vacant parliamentary seats in more than one province—threatens to create are casting their cruel shadows on 'Akkar District, the area forgotten and dispossessed since Lebanon was born.

The presence of these problems is reflected in the competition, rather the struggle, between the many candidates who belong to the 'Akkar clans with their various affiliations and aspirations.

Despite the large number of candidates, the struggle is centered around two lines: The first is a feudal line represented by the late deputy Sulayman al-'Ali. Zaynah,

Sulayman al-'Ali's daughter, is trying to represent this line currently. The second line is a change-oriented and developmental line which was represented by martyr Khalid Saghiyah. A number of party notables and figures, or of figures who speak in the name of the leaderships, try to represent this line.

Even though there is only one vacant seat, 'Akkar District is nowadays witnessing a large parliamentary bazaar which offers a large number of names, some of whom believe that they are entitled to appointment by inheritance and some who believe that the feudal era has ended and that the time has come for the peasants who constitute the majority to embody their hardship and their demands in a candidate who will represent them after correcting the misrepresentation which 'Akkar has experienced throughout the previous eras because the elections held previously were very much akin to appointments.

Who are the candidates and what do they say?

### Three From al-'Ali Clan

Within the al-'Ali clan, the candidate list includes three names put forward and mentioned in Lebanon in general and in 'Akkar in particular. The three names are those of Zaynah al-'Ali, the daughter of the late deputy Sulayman al-'Ali, Fawwaz Malik al-'Ali, and Fu'ad Ghalib al-'Ali.

As for Zaynah, she has been living and acting as a deputy for some time. She has added al-Mar'ibi to her name, thus making it Zaynah al-'Ali al-Mari'ibi (instead of Zaynah al-'Ali Shahin, in reference to the clan of her husband, Deputy Rafiq Shahin). She has changed her "domicile" from al-Nabatiyah District (which is her husband's "domicile") to 'Akkar District. As for the surname of al-Mar'ibi which she has added to her name, it is intended to underline her 'Akkari identity, especially since the al-'Ali clan originally descends from the al-Mari'ibi clan.

What is interesting is that in the joint visits she makes with Rafiq Shahin, her husband, Zaynah al-'Ali insists on traveling in her father's car which carries the parliamentary license plate which her late father used during his parliamentary life.

These days, Zaynah al-'Ali makes numerous visits, openly and behind the scenes, to official figures and to national and Islamic political and partisan forces and circles so that they may forgive her for her past positions of support for "political Maronism" and for General Michel Aoun. Zaynah al-'Ali is still working industriously to eliminate any obstacle that may crop up. She is "determined" to fill the vacant parliamentary seat, and she insists that she is a "deputy as of this moment" because she "alone" is "entitled to this deputyship" and that nobody should vie with her for it because she is the daughter of Sulayman al-'Ali and she is the one "most entitled to inherit him."

But on the other hand, there is Fawwaz al-'Ali, Zaynah's cousin, who puts forward his name, but only behind the scenes so that he does not put himself in an "embarrassing" position vis-a-vis Zaynah or, as he says, because "it is still early for this nomination. But what concerns me is to unite the clan and not to cause it any problem. I am very conservative where these issues are concerned."

As to his opinion on appointments, Fawwaz has said: "This does not at all honor Lebanon, and it is not what is required. Appointment does not represent our lowest aspirations. But we will accept it temporarily because it has been dictated by the al-Ta'if accord. However, those who have waited for 15 years could wait for one more year. I also exclude the idea of imminent appointment, and I believe that the issue needs time." Fawwaz has demanded change, saying: "We, the generation that has experienced the war, know that the feudal era has ended. We must think of a new phase for the new Lebanon."

Fu'ad Ghalib al-'Ali, another cousin of Zaynah's, is a third name that has been put forward for appointment. Fu'ad holds a prominent position in the Arab Democratic Party which supports Fu'ad's endeavor to win the vacant seat.

### Peasants and Deprivation

'Akkar's peasants believe that the best means to liberate themselves from deprivation and poverty is to see to it that a peasant gets to the parliamentary assembly. This is why all the peasants, numbering nearly 10,000 people, have supported Ghazi Wannus, secretary general of the peasants federation in the northern area.

Wannus has said: "I am a peasant who comes from this land. I have not had an education because there have been no schools." As to why he puts himself forward for appointment, he has said: "The Lebanese Government has come up with the appointment decision, and people have said that Zaynah, Fawwaz, or Fu'ad al-'Ali will nominate themselves. So we have found that after long years of struggle to get rid of feudalism, this feudalism will be revived overnight. Nobody in 'Akkar knows Zaynah al-'Ali. If she engages in her father's policy, we will not attain what we aspire for. I have presented myself for this vacant seat like everybody else who has presented himself for it. I am the secretary general of the peasants federation in the northern district. All my relations with the peasants are good, and we have a good organization. The government should take all this into consideration. If the government embraces the inheritance principle, it will oppress the people of this land. The people's son should represent the people. Things should not be as they were in 1972 when helicopters took the ballot boxes and counted the votes in the air so that martyr Khalid Saghiyah would lose and the feudalist Sulayman al-'Ali would get to the parliamentary assembly. If we accept anybody from the al-'Ali clan now, we will have returned to the same era."

As to the appointment principle, Wannus has said: I wish the government would appoint on a basis of election, meaning that I wish it would try to poll the people through a committee. I believe that the conclusion such a committee comes to will be against the al-'Ali clan. I prefer to have elections because all those nominating themselves now will not be present then. Those who will be present are the people's sons and the peasants.

On the possibility that problems may develop in 'Akkar, Wannus has said: There will be numerous problems, especially between the al-'Ali clan and the other clans because Zaynah al-'Ali is married to Rafiq Shahin and her domicile is no longer 'Akkar. Through illegal papers, Zaynah is now trying to reestablish her domicile in 'Akkar so that she may become the deputy. Inheritance will intensify the problems. With inheritance, we will have returned to the era of ignorance. We are opposed to Zaynah al-'Ali coming from Beirut to 'Akkar to nominate herself as our deputy. We reject her, and none of us supports her. I say that he who has not lived in 'Akkar must not represent it. I have lived on this land with the peasants. I was a tractor driver. When Khalid Saghiyah came, I marched with him and learned his principles. I continue to follow his line, and I have been nursing the wish to become deputy for some time.

Regarding his popular base, he said: "If you wish, I can call for a rally now, and you will see as many people as there are grains of sand. My popular base emanates from the soil, and there are 10,000 peasants who support me because I am the one who can secure their needs and achieve their aspirations.

#### **Mulhim Clan**

Two names from the Mulhim clan are also put forward. They are those of Ma'an Mulhim whose name is circulated at the highest levels and Ghazi Mulhim who is prepared to abandon his candidacy in case Ma'an's name is put forward clearly. Therefore, it is not likely that any problem will develop within the Mulhim clan because Ghazi Mulhim acknowledges the capability of Ma'an, his cousin.

Regarding the appointment principle, Ghazi Mulhim has said: I am opposed to the appointment principle and to the line that was followed by Sulayman al-'Ali. We want the deputyship to be gained by people who followed Khalid Saghiyah's line. The National Front embraces my appointment. But I am opposed to appointment as a principle. However, considering that the al-Ta'if accord calls for appointment, then such appointment must be closer to an election so that it may demonstrate the importance of the individual that we want and so that the deputyship may be gained by somebody who has good qualifications, whether in terms of his national history and his popular base or in terms of experiencing the hardship experienced by the dispossessed people of 'Akkar.

Ghazi Mulhim added: Deputyship is a gift now, and it is offered as a (reward). Deputyship must be given to the

capable, not to an individual who has no popular base and nothing to do with the people. Moreover, the fruits of our effort may not be devoured by unpatriotic people.

On the possible emergence of problems, Mulhim has said: Strong differences will develop among the inhabitants because we are opposed to feudalism and classism and we support the good citizen. Regrettably, there are now individuals living their parliamentary life as if they are deputies already, just because they have heard some circles congratulating them and assuring them of the likelihood of their attaining the deputyship.

Regarding his popular base, Mulhim has said: I have been able to form this base through my ceaseless efforts to serve the citizens. I have never turned a request by anybody, and I have striven industriously to secure the requests of those who need my assistance. This effort has enabled me to form a popular base which rallies behind me and which supports my candidacy.

#### **Loan Rejection**

Wajih al-Ba'rini is another figure who puts forward his name for appointment and who acknowledges only Zaynah al-'Ali as a rival.

Regarding the appointment principle, he has said: I prefer the election process so that we do not make the mistakes that occur between clans and districts, especially the loaning mistake, as in the case when the name of Michel al-Murr and others were put forward. We prefer that a person proceed from his reality and his area. We are for election in all its forms. But if the reality dictates appointment, then let the appointment be made while preserving the citizen's rights, because we want to attain the better. We are for change because change is what can lead us to our rights. 'Akkar's condition is no longer as it used to be. 'Akkar now has great capabilities that can serve its country. This is why the routine "into which we have fallen" must be changed. 'Akkar must attain its rights. But these areas are not given their rights, whether in terms of deputyship, of cabinet positions, or of appointment to top-level positions, of which these areas should have their share.

Regarding the possibility of the emergence of problems, al-Ba'rini has said: We have begun to notice this as of this moment. But if the names are imposed by higher powers, then everything will change. The people specialized in and entrusted with this issue are more knowledgeable of the names put forward. For this reason, we want a democracy that can prevent problems between the clans.

Regarding his popular base, al-Ba'rini has said: I am the heir to the peasants, the poor, and the dispossessed. I am one of them. We spread our caring efforts equally in this district. There are people who march with me and who accompany me without receiving a single piaster from me as recompense because they are convinced of me and of my line. I do not have a militia and I am not a party chairman. I am the son of this soil. It is from here that I

have marched forth, and it is from here that I exercise my power. I cannot talk about myself but I know that a certain percentage of the area's inhabitants are sympathetic to me. To be modest, I will say that 2 percent [as published] of the people support me.

As to his rivals, he has said: The only rival I have is Zaynah al-'Ali. I have no objection to Zaynah because she is entitled to perform her role, preserve her father's base, and struggle to achieve. This is a very important gain to her. When she struggles against me and fights me, it is because I have taken this position away from her. However, the popular bases are the circles that determine what Zaynah al-'Ali has done and what her father's history is.

#### [Box on page 20] 'Akkar's History

'Akkar al-'Atiqah [ancient] was the capital of the Sayfa clan. After an earthquake which leveled the area in the middle of the 13th century, 'Akkar's capital was moved from 'Araqah to a mountainous area and 'Akkar al-'Atiqah, a town which is still known by this name and which contains the remains and ruins of the Sayfa clan, was chosen for the purpose. This clan supported the Ottoman state and fought Fakhr-al-Din al-Mu'anni II. In that period, the name spread from the area to cover the entire district of 'Akkar which stretches over an area that comprises one tenth of Lebanon and which includes one tenth of Lebanon's population. The area is currently living in a state of Christian-Islamic coexistence. 'Akkar is divided into three basic axes, each stretching from sea to mountaintop. There is an axis that is called al-Qabtar, and that extends from the sea between Nahr al-Barid [al-Barid River] and 'Araqah to the hilltops of al-Qammu'ah.

The second axis extends from the sea between the 'Araqah and Istifan, or 'Akkar, Rivers to the highest hilltop in al-Qammu'ah on the borders of al-Hirmil. The third axis extends from Nahr Istifan and Nahr al-Kabir al-Janubi to the top of Wadi Khalid on the Lebanese-Syrian border. However, this area has never gotten its dues throughout the past eras.

'Akkar is an underprivileged area. Most of its inhabitants are engaged in agriculture and in simple manual crafts. A large number of them are volunteers in the Lebanese Army because this army has been the sole outlet for them to earn a livelihood. Even though 'Akkar has sacrificed both sons and soil for the sake of the homeland, it has been given nothing but deprivation in return. In 'Akkar, the only military garrison is a small garrison built in the town of 'Andaqit in 1937 during the French era. This garrison can accommodate no more than one battalion. In this agricultural area, there is no agricultural cold storage, no agricultural cooperative, and no agricultural loan bank. The sole agricultural school in al-'Abdah has been idle for a long time even though 'Akkar's plain is most fertile by virtue of the abundance of water available to it.

The area was used for military routes extending between the Arab East, Palestine, and the Arab Peninsula. This is why the area did not experience stability and did not see major population centers. 'Araqah continued to be the capital of 'Akkar even after the Islamic Arab conquest. When the earthquake hit, the capital was moved to 'Akkar which continued to be the capital until the 17th century. Through the Ottomans, the al-Mar'ibi clan arrived at a later time in an area called al-Birah. Nowadays, 'Akkar people call it Birat al-Hukm [seat of government] because they wrested the capital from 'Akkar al-Qadimah and moved it to al-Birah. 'Akkar was then divided into three axes and al-Birah continued to be the capital of the area which people call Durayb Wadi Khalid. 'Akkar became the capital of the al-Jubi area. Barqayil and (Yabnin) became the capitals of the Qabtar al-Jard area. In the late 19th century, the town of Halba, located centrally among the three capitals, was chosen to become the capital of 'Akkar. Halba is 15 km from Barqayil, 20 km from al-Birah, and 20 km from al-Burj.

'Akkar, one of Lebanon's largest districts, has been subjected to large-scale emigration. 'Akkar's traditional political leadership has been in the hands of the al-Mar'ibi clan from which several sub-clans have branched, including the al-'Ali clan which has settled in the Asma al-Zayn area, the al-'Uthman clan, and the al-Qaddur clan.

#### [Box on page 21] Names Put Forward for Appointment in 'Akkar

Ghazi Mulhim: Born in 1941, from town of Barqayil, has junior high school certificate, and his political line is Khalid Saghiyah's line. He is considered a clan representative and one of the political figures in 'Akkar. He has played a fundamental role in every reconciliation among 'Akkar people. He represents the National Front in all meetings and represents the front chairman in a number of meetings. He has distinguished relations with all parties, especially with the inhabitants of the Christian villages which continue to laud Ghazi's efforts during the war.

Ghazi Wannus: He is the secretary general of the 'Akkar Peasants Federation. He is a common man who has experienced the common people's hardship. He acknowledges that he has not received his education at a school and that he has been schooled by life, as he says. He is spontaneous and frank. His wish is to attain the highest position that permits him to convey the concerns of 'Akkar's peasants because he is most keenly aware of his people's hardship. This is what has caused him to find himself engaged in a severe and wounding argument with a number of the province deputies.

Ahmad Hadharah, 35, comes from a big family in 'Akkar. It is his wish to become a 'Akkar notable. At times he nominates himself, and at others he stops doing it. He owns a gas station and vast areas of land.

Akram al-Murad, 50, is the official in charge of the agricultural nursery. He is also the brother of 'Abd-al-Karim al-Murad, a 'Akkar leader and candidate. Akram has asked his brother to step aside in his favor and to support him.

Ma'an Mulhim: A former candidate on Khalid Saghiyah's list for the 1972 election. Ma'an, 50, is a school principal and a director at the Ministry of Education in the north.

Fawwaz al-'Ali, 38, is the son of Malik al-'Ali who is the brother of Sulayman al-'Ali. He has not yet actually nominated himself forward in order to not put himself in an embarrassing position vis-a-vis Zaynah al-'Ali who is determined to wage the battle. Fawwaz is prepared to withdraw if Zaynah insists on being appointed herself.

Fu'ad Ghalib al-'Ali, 35, is the nephew of Sulayman al-'Ali and an official of the Arab Democratic Party. He is the first feudalist to join a party in 'Akkar District.

'Ali Jud al-Ibrahim, 50, is the cousin of Muhammad 'Abbud 'Abd-al-Razzaq, the prominent feudal leader in 'Akkar. Because he is a son of this clan, he believes that he himself is entitled to the appointment.

'Uthman Bashir al-'Uthman, 50, is distinguished by his education. He is an engineer, and he has never lived in 'Akkar. He has lived most of his life in Saudi Arabia where he owns a contracting company. He is the son of deputy Bashir al-'Uthman, and he believes that this great legacy must produce a major leadership that does not die.

#### [24 Dec pp 22-23]

The contagion of the parliamentary appointments issue has arrived in Bint Jubayl District late, perhaps because the distance between the capital and the said district is long or perhaps because the area, straining under the yoke of Israeli occupation, is sensitive. Whatever the reason, the contagion has arrived so acutely that it has invaded members of the same clan. Signs of the contagion have surfaced among young men from the Baydun clan, considering that the seat has been vacated by the death of deputy 'Abd-al-Latif Baydun. This does not mean that the competition is confined to this clan. Rather, this competition goes beyond to the bounds of the historical competition between most clans in the town of Bint Jubayl, and it has been renewed between the Bazzi clan and the Baydun clan, each of which constitutes a point of polarization for the smaller clans. With the opening of the dossier of parliamentary appointments to fill the vacant seats, this is what has resurfaced these days.

#### Al-As'ad's Return

In addition to this existing reality, there are two new elements that have further heated the competition, even though the two elements have not clearly surfaced. The first is embodied in the return of Kamil al-As'ad. His

return has been coupled with the nomination of a figure who is close to him. The second element is an obvious split between members of the Baydun clan over several names. These include the names of Dr. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Latif Baydun, the son of the deceased deputy who nominates himself not just on the basis of inheritance but also on the basis of his ability and capability which have been the reason behind the inhabitants' initiative which has put forward his name. They also include the name of Husayn Baydun, member of Political Bureau of the SSNP [Syrian Social Nationalist Party]-Emergencies, and Husayn Yusuf Baydun, the principal of Bint Jubayl Vocational School who is currently in the United States.

Regarding the principle of appointment by inheritance, Dr. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Latif Baydun has said: This principle is incompatible with the spirit of democracy. The rule in this kind of democratic regime is that citizens should be equal in rights and duties, including the right to vote and to deputyship. But the Lebanese citizens are enjoined in relations which include the sectarian, the familial, and the provincial and which enable these citizens to produce conventional leaderships which are often overwhelmed by the principle of inheritance. In the past and at present, sons have inherited their fathers' political roles. However, I do not see that the inheritance principle gives heirs an absolute right. Rather, I understand that factions should consider this principle a means for avoiding the division and fragmentation of their ranks. On the other hand, added the son of the deceased deputy, I believe that despite the eagerness to reduce the value of the inheritance principle as much as possible, politicians' children may not be deprived of their political rights. They, too, are citizens, and they are distinguished by the fact that they are raised in the workshop of politics. This enables them to gain political experience and capability like other craftsmen who inherit a craft from their parents. On this basis, I consider myself a candidate in accordance with the wish of the citizens and on the basis of my awareness of their support for this candidacy.

[Sha'lan] Do you think that you have competitors to fill the vacant seat?

[Baydun] The presence of such competition is normal. The vast voting public in a given province cannot be as clear as a milk dish. I have no doubt that there are individuals who wish to enter the parliamentary representation arena. But the weight of any candidacy depends on the candidate's credibility which is founded on his capability and ability and on what support he may have attracted from the citizens who have the final say.

[Sha'lan] What is your opinion of the appointment principle?

[Baydun] During the [French] mandate period, a part of the deputies was appointed and another part was elected. It is obvious that the appointing is done when certain perils emanate from implementing the democratic process. This is the situation in the current phase. Moreover,

the representative character of the current Chamber of Deputies has become truncated in more than one case because there are districts and sects that have lost their deputies. When the living deputies renewed their own term, it was as if they appointed themselves. This is why as a result of appointment, we will not swerve from the existing condition. Within this context, it must be said that in the appointment process it is a duty to take the citizens' opinion into account, especially in the Bint Jubayl area because it is straining under occupation. The area inhabitants want to be represented by an individual from among them whom they know and who knows them. They consider any representation on the basis of a different principle to be tantamount to isolating them from participation in the resurrection of this homeland and, consequently, tantamount to their doubting the continuation of their relationship with this homeland. They also believe that their representation by one who is not from among them is tantamount to isolating them from the course of developments at a delicate phase in which their future and the future of their district will be determined. They are the people most entitled to make their future with their own hands because they are not immature and thus subject them to our custodianship, even though they need the assistance of Lebanon's friends and brothers to liberate their land. In any case, I have no knowledge to date of the presence of rivals, even though there is absolutely no objection to anybody declaring himself a candidate, if such a person finds himself to be capable.

#### People's Will

As for the member of the Political Bureau of the SSNP-Emergencies, he [Husayn Baydun] believes that the principle of appointment is in conflict with the fundamental concept stipulated in the deputy's duties. But the current phase dictates such appointment, especially since embracing all aspects of the al-Ta'if accord also dictates it. Nevertheless, appointment is supposed to be made on the basis of selecting symbols who have left their imprints in the political and social spheres. On the inheritance principle, Baydun has not concealed his opposition, saying: A parliamentary seat is not a piece of furniture or a farm which son, or others, inherit from father. This particular seat in Bint Jubayl, with the particular character that Bint Jubayl signifies, represents the people's will for liberation, especially since the province is straining under occupation.

Husayn Mansur has not forgotten to slander the surfacing clannish blocs which seem to be making an "entry as smooth as glass." It is illogical to consider a person the representative of his clan just because he represents a social or cultural position. What is required is to consider everybody's opinion because the representation concerns them as it concerns others.

It is obvious that competition within the Baydun clan has reached the limit where it can be said that the clan is divided into three wings. The first supports the son of the deceased deputy. The second demands the national

tendency through Husayn Baydun, whereas the third wing calls for choosing either Dr. Ahmad Baydun or Husayn Yusuf Baydun, the principal of Bint Jubayl Vocational School.

#### In Other Clans

This condition of the Baydun clan does not please the heart, according to a clan member. It is countered on the other side by a similar condition within the Bazzi clan, the historical rival of the first clan. The Bazzi clan has been known for a long time to cooperate with the Shararah clan to counter the influence of the Baydun clan. A fact told by 'Awn al-Amin, a man who is knowledgeable of the province's historical conditions, is that the Bazzi clan, represented by Muhammad Habib Bazzi, is the clan that led deputy 'Ali Bazzi to the parliamentary seat in 1964. This is why with the rising fever of parliamentary appointments, the members of the said clan called each other to a series of meetings to choose their representative in order to proceed to nominate him in the same sphere in which the name of the rival from the other clan is put forward. In this regard, the same source has asserted that the clan decided to nominate Tarif Bazzi, the son of former deputy 'Ali Bazzi. But the individual concerned declined because he is not inclined toward political activity in the province or in Lebanon in general. This has compelled the family to nominate 'Ali Nadi Bazzi to be the clan representative in the currently projected parliamentary bazaar. But this nomination has not pleased all the clan members. Those displeased have asked Dr. Talal Muhammad Habib Bazzi to take over this position [of candidate].

Dr. Bazzi believes that raising the parliamentary appointment issue has created a wave of "confusion" among the area's clans. But this wave has not and will not reach the limit of conflict between the clans, especially since the principle of competition has existed for a long time and has never surpassed the limits of competition. As for him, Dr. Bazzi confirms that he has declined to accept what his clan members have asked him, especially since he is not inclined to enter the political arena from this door. Meanwhile, he has no objection to entering the political arena from its real door, i.e., through democratic support from the people, when the opportunity for such an entry arises.

Regarding the existing clannish blocs, Dr. Bazzi has said: These are normal in Lebanon, particularly in the South and especially if the issue raised is an issue like the one raised currently. But "I reaffirm what I have said, namely that the competition will not lose its democratic character."

[Sha'lan] What is your opinion of the presence of rivals from the other clans?

[Bazzi] I don't believe I have rivals because, as I have said, I am not nominating myself. Rather, I call for coordinating the positions, not only between members of the same clan but between the various clans in the

province and in the town in particular. This coordination is dictated by the special character that distinguishes our district by virtue of its being under occupation and by virtue of its chronic and difficult hardship.

#### Competition of Different Kind

Amidst this rivalry, rather rivalries, which will, however, remain within their legitimate framework, there is another sphere of competition that is totally different from the clannish framework, especially since the district includes allied political forces that are represented by Minister Nabih Birri, Amal chairman and a citizen of the district, considering that he is from Tibnin which is within Bint Jubayl's administrative jurisdiction, and by 'Abdallah al-Amin, the regional secretary of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party organization. This competition has not surfaced at all. In the course of their comment on the climate of the existing rivalries, Amal sources have asserted that the issue of Bint Jubayl cannot be dealt with in a simple manner, as some people imagine, especially since Bint Jubayl is under occupation and especially since it constitutes Mount Hermon's historical base. This is why, the same sources add, one may not tamper with Bint Jubayl's future insofar as this issue is concerned. What must be considered is that the national concept must predominate in the appointment issue as it has predominated in Bint Jubayl's arenas for many years since the 1936 uprising, known as the "uprising against the French regime."

In this regard, to underline the absence of competition between the two political forces over Bint Jubayl's seat, 'Awn al-Amin himself, who is very close to 'Abdallah al-Amin, has said that Birri and 'Abdallah al-Amin ask each other to attend to this issue.

#### [Top box on page 22] Denial

The name of Dr. Ahmad Amin Baydun has been circulated in the context of the rivalries within the Baydun clan over the issue of filling the vacant seat for Bint Jubayl District. Dr. Baydun himself has contacted AL-SHIRA' to deny these rumors and to say that he is beyond this issue which does not interest him at all because the question of appointment itself is incompatible with his ideas and concepts. Therefore, he finds it surprising that his name is involved. He stresses that he will not cross this door and that he is content with the love and appreciation he harbors for all the citizens of his district.

#### [Bottom box on page 22] Tradition

One thing that has become some sort of a tradition observed in the representation of Bint Jubayl District is that one of the two deputies who represent the province must ordinarily come from the town of Tibnin and the other from the town of Bint Jubayl. This tradition continues to exist to the present day, considering that deputy Hamid Dakrub is from Tibnin and deputy 'Abd-al-Latif Baydun is from Bint Jubayl. This reality has greatly curtailed the entry of notables from Tibnin into

the line of [the current] competition, considering that the vacant seat belongs to Bint Jubayl's citizens.

#### [Box on page 23] History and Deputies

The parliamentary history of Bint Jubayl District dates back to 1953 when a decree was issued at the time to separate the districts from each other in the parliamentary representation process and when this district came to be represented by two deputies after it had been represented by a single deputy when the system of governorate lists was in force. The district has been represented successively by former deputies Ahmad al-As'ad, Sa'id Fawwaz, 'Ali Bazzi, Muhammad 'Ali al-Ghutaymi, and Ibrahim Shu'aytu. The vacant seat is the result of the death of 'Abd-al-Latif Baydun. The Fawwaz clan has been absent from the political arena since former deputy Sa'id Fawwaz succeeded in defeating Ahmad al-As'ad.

The town of Bint Jubayl and its environs are distinguished by the concerted activity in which the national parties have engaged for years, even during election campaigns. The area has witnessed the candidacy of a number of party men throughout various phases. Of these candidates, the most prominent are: 'Ali Yusuf, a veteran Ba'thist; Ghassan Shararah, the son of the late poet Musa al-Zayn Shararah; and Dr. Ahmad Murad on behalf of the Lebanese Communist Party. In the latest election campaign, the same party nominated Dr. Husayn Muruwah as a candidate.

#### [7 Jan pp 18-19]

Unlike other candidates, Adib al-Farzali, an ex-deputy who held the [Greek] Orthodox seat representing Western al-Biqā', refused to have his pictures pasted on the walls of villages in the said province. This is why the citizens never saw his picture, keeping in mind that he held the position of deputy speaker of the Chamber of Deputies repeatedly and that he was nicknamed at one time the chamber thrush. In this regard, Adib al-Farzali's logic was a simple logic which he summed up, saying: I depend on those who will not elect my opponent, not on those who will elect me.

Adib al-Farzali's words reflect very truthfully the election reality that has prevailed in Western al-Biqā' District and in all of Lebanon, especially since the electoral lists system permitted even more than just not pasting one's pictures on walls.

As an electoral district, Western al-Biqā' District dates back to 1953. Prior to this date, it was a part of the Zahlah District. When Western al-Biqā' became an independent district, its deputies were unable to rid themselves of the Zahlah leadership, embodied in Joseph Skaf who always had the list with the greatest chance of winning in Western al-Biqā', except for the 1968 election when deputy Nazim al-Qadiri tried to form his own list—a list which included al-Qadiri himself, Shibli al-'Aryan, and Adib al-Farzali. In that 1968 election, Adib al-Farzali lost and ex-deputy Camille Dahruj, considered



a Joseph Skaf supporter, won the seat. But in the 1972 election, Hazim al-Qadiri rejoined Joseph Skaf's list which included Michel al-Ma'luli and Salim al-Dawud. All the candidates on this list won. At the time, Joseph Skaf's parliamentary asset was great. The Zahlah list which included five deputies, namely Joseph Skaf, Ilyas al-Harawi, Husayn Mansur, Salim al-Ma'luf, and Hasan Zahmul al-Mays, plus the winning Western al-Biq'a' list which consisted of Nazim al-Qadiri, Michel al-Ma'luli, and Salim al-Dawud, in addition to a number of other deputies, including current Speaker Husayn al-Husayni and Defense Minister Albert Mansur, gave Joseph Skaf the bloc with the largest number of deputies at the outset of the 1972 chamber.

### Backtracking

The feudal reality imposed itself on the parliamentary reality. Therefore, Joseph Skaf's leadership, even over Western al-Biq'a, was an extension of his father's leadership over the farmers of this district by virtue of the vast tracts of land, exceeding tens of thousands of donums, which Turkey gave Skaf's father in the al-'Amiq area which falls within the jurisdiction of Western al-Biq'a'. Rif'at Qaz'awn tried to be Joseph Skaf's political rival and to compete with him for the leadership of Western al-Biq'a', but he failed. In the 1968 election, Qaz'awn won the deputyship as a candidate on Joseph Skaf's list for Zahlah, not on the Western al-Biq'a' list.

Since 1951, i.e., when Western al-Biq'a' and Zahlah were a single district, the Sunni seat for Western al-Biq'a' always fell to Nazim al-Qadiri who never lost in any parliamentary election. When he died in the summer of 1989, he was still the deputy holding the Sunni seat for Western al-Biq'a'.

The Orthodox seat has alternated between Adib al-Farzali, Michel Skaf (Joseph Skaf's brother), Camille Dahruj, and Michel al-Ma'luli who is now the chamber deputy speaker.

To a degree, the Druze seat has alternated between Shibli al-'Aryan and Salim al-Dawud. In the latest election, held in 1972, the seat was won by Salim al-Dawud who died in 1987.

Though a parliamentary seat is ultimately a parliamentary seat, there is, by virtue of the sectarian system, in each governorate and, at times in each district, a seat which has special influence and which is distinguished from the seats of the other sects. In Zahlah, for example, the influence is inclined toward the Catholic seat. In Ba'labakk-al-Hirmil, the influence is inclined toward the Shi'ite seat. In Western al-Biq'a', the influence is inclined toward the Sunni seat. This is why the citizens have rarely paid attention to the deputies holding the other two seats when these citizens have sought to obtain public or private services, excluding the citizens of the subdistricts from which the two other deputies come. The Druze deputy devotes his attention to the Rashaya area, and the Orthodox deputy may not be concerned with anything, as evidenced by a statement made by the

said Adib al-Farzali. The Sunni deputy's influence is obvious. Perhaps this is connected with the sectarian electoral influence itself.

If Nazim al-Qadiri has managed to retain the seat for himself throughout the past elections and has not lost in any election, then his opponents have not tried throughout these years to develop their own electoral bases. It seems that the matter is the same throughout Lebanon. The voters get to know their candidate only during electoral visits. Afterward, narrow services become such a symbol of the relationship with the deputy that the biggest service a deputy offered the citizen over a period of years was to get him a license to carry arms from the Deuxieme Bureau. Such services were focused on election keys and amounted to no more than providing a minor job, such as that of a municipal clerk, water inspector, or, rarely, a government school teacher. One of the means to develop the electoral bases was to focus on attracting village troublemakers (thugs) by virtue of their being election keys with guaranteed effectiveness when push comes to shove. Otherwise, it is difficult to find the fingerprints of social, health, humanitarian, or developmental services secured by any Western al-Biq'a' deputies. As a result of their extreme naivete, the citizens thought it a major concession if the deputy received them at his home. Should they happen to have a cup of coffee at the deputy's home, then their utmost wish is fulfilled. Should the deputy allow one of them to talk to him separately, which usually happens with an electoral key, then their rights are preserved, though not delivered.

This kind of electoral reality was extremely bitter. It is now even more bitter by virtue of the reality of the candidates, especially for the Sunni seat. The issue of the Druze seat has already been decided in favor of Faysal al-Dawud, the son of the late Salim al-Dawud, unless some unexpected surprises crop up. As for the candidates for the Sunni seat, it can be said that most of them consider themselves candidates not by virtue of the electoral base that they have but by virtue of the ongoing game concerning the expected dark horses in the appointments race.

Candidate Dr. 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Qadiri, a pediatrician, ran for election three successive times in 1964, 1968, and 1972. He got a reasonable percentage amounting to nearly one half the votes by virtue of the rule applied by Adib al-Farzali, i.e., not all the votes were his votes but the votes of his rival's opponents. This is why Dr. al-Qadiri calls today for adopting the principle of appointing the candidate who won the second highest percentage of the votes in 1972 to fill the vacant seat. This is also why he has issued a statement criticizing an article published by AL-DIYAR on the candidate most likely to succeed, namely 'Abd-al-Rahim Murad, chairman of the Social and Cultural Development Association.

Dr. 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Qadiri is from al-Qar'awn village. He lives permanently in Beirut. When he leaves Beirut at

weekends in the summer, it is only to go to his home in al-Qar'awn where he does not engage even in minimal medical activity.

There is also the other candidate, namely Major General Sami al-Khatib, the minister of interior. Dr. al-Huss objected to al-Khatib's nomination to the post of commander of the internal security forces. Major General al-Khatib tried to attain an advanced position during Amin al-Jumayyil's administration, especially in its initial phase. His relations with al-Jumayyils, both father and son, continued to be good.

Minister Sami al-Khatib is from Jubb Janin village, and his permanent residence is in Beirut. He has a rival in his village, namely Salih Dasuqi who works currently as adviser to Minister Walid Junblat and as principal of an al-Maqasid school in Beirut. Salih Dasuqi is more of a poet than a politician. He has some good poetry at the technical level. He has held a number of administrative government positions. Dasuqi was director of the Western al-Biqā' Vital Statistics Bureau and was then the Ba'labakk-al-Hirmil administrative officer. In 1983, he became the administrative officer of 'Alayh District. He is a permanent resident of Beirut, and he rarely visits his village.

The candidates also include Nuhad al-Qadiri, wife of the late deputy Nazim al-Qadiri, and Muna al-Qadiri, the late deputy's daughter. It seems that their candidacy emanates more from a feeling of continuity than from anything else.

#### 'Abd-al-Rahim Murad

'Abd-al-Rahim Murad, chairman of the Social and Cultural Development Association, is considered in political, official, party, and popular circles the candidate with the biggest chance not only because of his role at the national and pan-Arab level but also because of his accomplishments at the general developmental level in Lebanon in general and in Western al-Biqā' in particular.

Murad is from the town of Ghazzah. He has a degree in administration and a law degree. He is now a prominent and influential political figure by virtue of the orientation he charted for himself when he engaged in political action. He has established in the area a developmental base through the projects that he has accomplished, such as the 'Umar al-Mukhtar Educational Center project which includes a complete school from kindergarten through high school. It can accommodate 3,000 students and is called the 'Umar al-Mukhtar Educational Center School. The project also includes a vocational school called the al-Biqā' Vocational and Technical School. It can accommodate 1,000 students, and it incorporates three phases: Intermediate vocational school, vocational high school, and advanced vocational school. The project further includes al-Suhul [Plains] Club which incorporates a complete sports city that fully meets olympic specifications, a children's park, and a social club. This project accommodates tens of various artistic, cultural, and social activities annually, and it has helped

introduce qualitative change into the area's population and development. This project is located in the al-Khiyarah area.

The second project is Dar al-Hanan Orphanage which can absorb 750 orphans and provide them with permanent residence and education from the kindergarten phase through high school, as well as housing, clothing, and all means of comfort and recreation. This project is located in the Satti area close to the towns of al-Suwayrah, al-Manarah, and Majdal 'Anjar.

The third project is the Salah-al-Din Educational Center in the town of (Mudawakha)-Rashaya. It is organized as a school from kindergarten through intermediate school to serve the villages of Rashaya District. It is similar to the 'Umar al-Mukhtar Educational Center, and it accommodates social, cultural, and artistic activities.

The fourth completed project is the al-Manar Educational Center in the town of Qabb Ilyas. It has been set up to be a model high school containing all the equipment that serves this educational phase.

The fifth accomplished project is the Arab Renaissance School in Beirut (al-Jinah). This school started operating in 1978, and it extends from kindergarten through high school.

The sixth completed project is the 'Uqbah Ibn Nafi' Educational Center in the al-Hirmil al-Fakihah area. It is similar to the 'Umar al-Mukhtar Center.

These developmental educational projects are the practical embodiment of 'Abd-al-Rahim Murad's political thinking. These projects are coupled with other daily field efforts provided by an enormous mechanical scoop that belongs to the Social and Cultural Development Association and that has contributed to repairing roads to most of the mountain villages in al-Biqā'. Moreover, the association, in the person of Murad, its chairman, has contributed to other projects, such as building bridges (al-Mansurah bridge), drilling artesian wells, and building central water tanks, in addition to almost constantly supplying the electricity network with cable because of the cable thefts to which the network is subjected and because of the limited resources of the Lebanon Electricity Company in the area.

These developmental projects are 'Abd-al-Rahim Murad's political platform. It is his ambition to extend them to Lebanon in its entirety. There is the 'Ali Ibn-Talib educational project in al-Nabatiyah and Khalid Ibn-al-Walid educational project in Shuhaym. There are also the projects of the home for the disabled and the home for the rehabilitation of the retarded in al-Biqā'. Through these projects, Murad considers himself the originator of a new platform, new thinking, and a new political action plan. The gist of this plan is that a periodic inventory should be taken by the citizens of anybody who runs for political and public office so that he may be asked: What have you done and when will things be accomplished? Murad's developmental field

action has preceded his political position because his constant logic is: Don't tell me things. Let me see with my eyes. Seeing or witnessing a project is part of his program of integration between the individual initiative which he undertakes and promotes and the concept of institutional action which requires accountability as a precaution against laxity and loss of control. All the accomplished projects have achieved considerable success under the umbrella of Murad's tendency to be firm with himself and with those who manage these projects. There has been an evident change in the developmental thinking of those concerned with public affairs as a result of the impact of the Developmental Association and of its chairman. This change will apply to the reality in al-Biqa' which has been subjected to chronic deprivation.

'Abd-al-Rahim Murad lives in Shutura, al-Biqa', and constantly visits all of the district villages. He has an appointment with prayer congregations every Friday—a different village every week. This is a custom on which he is keen and which he observes.

This is the electoral reality of Western al-Biqa' which extends on the right side of the Beirut-Damascus highway and which includes more than 45 villages which have been waiting for the government for 45 years. But the government has not arrived yet.

#### Murad and al-Jumayyil

During Amin al-Jumayyil's administration and while al-Jumayyil was preparing to declare the 17 May accord, he opened up to the national movement factions and figures and invited them to the republican palace. Most of those figures, excluding 'Abd-al-Rahim Murad, answered the invitation and were heard making statements encouraging the president's policy in front of the presidential palace. Murad was invited twice, and every time he said: Why climb up to the republican palace? Amin al-Jumayyil is more dangerous than al-Sadat whereas Lebanon is weaker than Egypt. Considering that Amin al-Jumayyil has negotiated with Israel and reached agreement with it, then climbing up to the republican palace can mean one thing only, namely: Capitulation through the official gate. This will not happen.

## MOROCCO

### AL-'ALAM Comments on 1991 Draft Budget

91AA0117B Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 23 Nov 90 p 1

[Editorial: "1991 Prospects of the Financial Law"]

[Text] Finally the financial bill has reached the Parliament after having covered the distance between the Ministry of Finance in the ministries' compound and the Parliament in Muhammad V street, taking at least 21 days to do so. The Parliament will have to complete the

budget debate within one month, in which there are three working days a week (the fourth day being devoted to verbal questions)

If the public is interested in the budget it must follow it up during this brief period of time, before it is passed by a great majority probably without any changes or alterations. A preliminary look allows making the following observations:

1. The next year's budget is summed up in two figures: expenditures, which are about 70.6 billion and (expected) revenues totalling about 70.1 billion dirhams, representing a small deficit. This may not be small if there are emergency expenditures. The treasury is often surprised by emergency expenditures that have not been provided for, and so it is compelled to take them into account even if only on paper.

2. We find that administrative expenditures (including employee, equipment, and various other expenses) total about 33.1 billion dirhams. As for investment expenditures (agricultural development, materials, building of schools, and domestic and information materials etc...etc..) total about 12.8 billion dirhams. Then comes the problem that worries us day and night, namely foreign debts whose expenditures total 24.6 billion dirhams.

Here we notice that investment in the budget, on which we depend for economic, construction, cultural, social, and labor development, does not exceed half of debts and is about two thirds less than administrative expenses.

From these three figures, we can perceive the crisis that the country will face next year. The public, which will pay more than 70 billion dirhams [in taxes], will benefit from no more than 18 percent of this amount in investments and materials, which form the budgetary base of all countries.

This constitutes a danger to the future of economic and construction development to be added to the danger the country has experienced since the emergence of the policy of "assessment [taqwim]".

3. According to the draft, the investment policy has been placed within the framework of the continuous effort to assess public financing. We are aware that it was the IMF that coined the word "assessment" by which it means reducing expenditure on social and basic needs for fear of deficit and of increasing demand for loans (many were the times we have forgone our needs).

Nevertheless, the draft brings us the good news that budget resources will be reallocated to the ministries that are active in the social fields, such as education, health, and justice. It also brings us the good news that the increase in the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health's budgets will be 29.74 and 30.09 percent respectively.

We suppose that this is good news, despite the fact that the draft budget tells us that implementation of elementary school projects has been entrusted to local groups. We know how local groups' funds are spent. Therefore, these groups and their trustees must submit their accounts showing what they spent on building elementary schools, so that funds allocated to these bodies to build schools will not be spent on parties, barbecues, caviar, and salmon... The same thing can be said to all the local councils regarding contributions to the public health sector.

4. It is also noted that the budget relies on foreign borrowing, which totals about 21.8 billion dirhams—double the amount of the administrative budget. If this loan is added to what Morocco already owes in domestic and foreign debts, it will amount to a tremendous figure.

The borrowing that is supposed to be sought is twofold: long-term domestic borrowing of 3 billion dirhams and foreign borrowing of 17.84 billion dirhams.

From this quick look at the budget we can perceive the prospects of the coming year, prospects that we need not describe. This is only an assumption, and often assumptions are not reality. This is particularly true in view of the clouds casting their shadows over the coming year, foremost of which is the drought crisis, the Gulf crisis, the recession, the increase in prices, and the reduction in revenues from tourism, expatriate workers, and trade with Europe.

#### **Port Activity Rises Attributed to Phosphates, Petroleum**

91AA0117C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
26 Nov 90 p 10

[Text] Rabat—Goods shipment traffic through Moroccan ports has increased by 7.8 percent during the first 10 months of this year, totalling 12.9 million tons. The increase is basically attributed to an increase in phosphoric acid and petroleum exports. Phosphoric acid exports reached a record 1.7 million tons and oil shipments increased by 8 percent, totalling 6.34 million tons.

On the other hand, the Spanish government agreed to grant Morocco two loans from the economic development fund, totalling 15.263 billion pesetas. This financing will cover the purchase of phosphate equipment for the al-Jurf al-Asfar area.

### **SAUDI ARABIA**

#### **Religious Authorities on Saddam's Islamic Credentials**

91AE0205A Jeddah 'UKAZ in Arabic 5 Dec 90 p 10

[Article by 'Abd-al-Muhsin al-Zahrani: "Between Masks of Piety and Pools of Blood Saddam Has Departed From Islam"]

[Text] Saddam Husayn has violated the sanctity of persons, plundered property, raped the country, stolen

the smile from the lips of innocent children, slain kindly hearts, uprooted families, and scattered the dreams of young people. He has shown no mercy to the years of old men, the weakness of old women, the modesty of girls, or the motherhood of mothers—and now he appears before the world every day wearing the cloak of Islam in order to put forward another of his lies and slanders. First he asserts that he is a Muslim descended from the family of the Prophet; then he calls for Holy War, and claims that his goal is to liberate Jerusalem; finally his ambassador to the United States comes out and solemnly swears that his leader is a Muslim and prays three times a day.

Between what he claims and what he does, young people stand in confusion and look for the Muslim leader amid the pools of blood he has spilled. They search for the Muslim personality contained in a bloodthirsty soul. They wonder about a liberator of Jerusalem who has occupied the land of Kuwait. They ask whether Saddam is still a Muslim.

We took their questions to Dr. Ahmad Sa'd Hamdan al-Ghamidi, associate professor at the Islamic University in Medina, for him to clarify the things they find confusing and set matters straight.

#### **What a Muslim Is**

Brother Hasan Ahmad al-Dihyah, an employee of the Organization for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice in Mecca, began the conversation by saying: "I think we know much about Islam because of our belonging to it and our training in the benevolent ethics of Islam. But we see some members of this community, among them Saddam Husayn, hurting Islam when he claims affiliation with it while committing crimes contrary to its values. Yet he and his comrades can call him a Muslim. So we have really become confused. We would like you to define for us the traits of a Muslim personality. What should such a personality be?"

Dr. al-Ghamidi answered simply and quietly: "A Muslim is someone who adheres to Islam as a creed and religious law. He declares lawful what God has declared lawful and forbids what God has forbidden. Thus, he is an outstanding person in his belief and conduct. He is a visible element that loves goodness, spreads virtue, hates evil, and combats vice. He is mindful of God in his inward thoughts and outward acts. This is a summary of the traits of a Muslim. These must be present in him for him to be a Muslim who is a member of this religion."

#### **Obvious Ploy**

Brother Sa'id Ibn-Nasir al-Ghamidi, a teacher at al-Aqsa Secondary School in Jeddah, took up the conversation, asking: "Saddam Husayn has lately assumed the cloak of a pious, godfearing, militant Muslim descended from the Prophet's family. Indeed, his spokesmen continually assert that he is the model Muslim. His ambassador to the United States recently announced that his president

is a religious man who prays three times a day. Without asking what kind of Islam obliges its adherent to pray only three times [rather than five], the intent is to stress Saddam's Islamic identity. On the other hand, we find that he has brought Muslims in particular and the international community in general into this crisis from which I pray that God will give us a way out. Furthermore, he has violated the sanctity of persons, raped women, and transgressed things that should be held sacred.

"We are really baffled. Is Saddam the Muslim personality as it ought to be, is he suffering from a split personality, or is he a criminal? Or do we not understand how a Muslim ought to be?"

Dr. al-Ghamidi answered him with a scholar's calm: "Don't get excited, brother. Saddam and others like him have long been known to the ulema of the community, its scholars, and its preachers. His fight against Islam and its ulema is well known. Iraqi prisons remain full of upright young people. Saddam's claim now to belong to Islam and his making himself out to belong to it are an obvious matter that cannot be hidden from Muslims who know their religion and the traits that must be present in a person for him to be a Muslim. We do not think these traits are unknown to many of those members of Islam who have shown their support for Saddam Husayn—if not to all of them—but passions and sicknesses of heart are often fatal to those whom they affect. History is full of personalities who feigned Islam in order to strike at Islam.

"There was the Jew 'Abdallah Ibn-Saba', who feigned Islam in order to combat it and from whose ideas was formed a [words missing in source] to positions belonging to Islam. There was the leader of the Batiniyah sect, Maymun al-Qaddah, who feigned Islam and whose ideas gave rise to the 'Ubaydi [i.e., Fatimid] dynasty that ruled Egypt and North Africa for nearly two centuries.

"There was Ataturk, who feigned Islam and then destroyed the Islamic caliphate. These bad elements go unrecognized by the community only when it is ignorant of its religion and creed, so that impostors can deceive it and corrupt its creed and religion.

"The president of Iraq is one of these elements who have put on this guise and who have claimed to be fighters for the sake of God. Not content with this, they have claimed descent from the family of the prophet—may God bless him and grant him peace! There can be no doubt that the character traits so visible in Saddam Husayn do not represent Islam."

#### Base Deception

Dr. Ahmad Abu-Khaffas, pediatrician in Riyadh Central Hospital, asked: "Saddam has raised an impassioned voice, saying that he will liberate Jerusalem. Although we realized his terrible lie and his bitter deceit when his armies marched south toward Kuwait to wreak havoc,

we wonder about the traits of a liberator of Jerusalem. Could these apply to the likes of Saddam?"

Dr. al-Ghamidi: "The liberation of Jerusalem can be accomplished only by a Muslim leader and Muslim armies; it cannot be accomplished by the likes of Saddam Husayn. We know that this claim of his is a propaganda ploy that we have seen from every leader who wants to combat Islam. He comes to the community from a direction that it likes. However, anyone who violates persons, sheds innocent blood, and stirs up strife does not even deserve to be described by the name of Islam. How then can he be described as leading a holy war?

"If the Muslim community were truly Muslim, impostors would not be able to deceive it. Saddam Husayn would be at the end of the line, if not in a house of custody and observation. God has told how a pharaoh was able to deceive his people and followers—as God has said: 'He made his people unsteady, and they obeyed him.'" [Koran 43:54]

#### Saddam a Criminal

Professor Bakhit Muhammad Hasan, a teacher in an intermediate school in Jeddah, closed the conversation with a straightforward question: "What would Islam's final judgment concerning Saddam be, if we in fact deal with him as being a Muslim?"

Dr. al-Ghamidi: "After all these things, we should not describe Saddam Husayn as being a Muslim individual. But if we assume that his Islam is valid, then the crimes he has committed are sufficient for him to be condemned as a criminal to whom God-appointed punishment applies. He has murdered, plundered, stolen, and violated the sanctity of persons. These are the traits of those who fight against God and His messenger—those to whom the rules concerning apostasy and spreading universal corruption must be applied."

## SYRIA

#### New Industrial Projects Reported

91AE0191B London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic  
23 Nov 90 p 39

[Article by Haytham Bashir]

[Text] The measures continually being taken by the Syrian government to stimulate economic activity are beginning to show results. The most important factor is to link annual production plans of companies, factories, and economic establishments with an obligation to provide all of their agricultural and industrial production requirements by using the foreign currency received as export revenue from selling some of their products abroad.

Syrian Prime Minister Mahmud al-Zu'bi stressed that adoption of this measure is an effective way to make producers address the complementary tasks of producing

large quantities and upgrading products to international standards competitive in foreign markets.

Consequently, if senior economists and managers in Syrian establishments are to keep their jobs, they have no choice but to implement this policy and to make economic and commercial profitability the decisive factor in determining whether an industrial establishment is a success or failure. Economic accountability for production, over and above export and the provision of industrial requirements, now dominates these establishments as they embark on a new path, the results of which are becoming clear.

Figures for 1989 show that profits of public sector industrial companies reached 1,126 million Syrian lira [SL] following losses in 1988 of SL 222 million. Total financial transfers received from industrial companies and establishments rose to SL 4,599 million in 1989, whereas previously they had been no higher than SL 2,281 million. Positive economic indicators for profitable companies are showing noticeable increase and improvement.

In the area of industrial exports, the percentage of imported goods covered by exported products from the various industrial sectors rose to 140 percent in 1989. The line on a graph depicting financial and economic balance in overall commercial, industrial, and agricultural economic activity is clearly on the rise for 1990.

The measures and decrees adopted by the Import, Export, and Consumption Rationalization Committee operating under the immediate supervision of the prime minister have achieved positive results inspiring confidence that Syria is approaching the point where exports will become a major factor in financing its food, production, and commodity imports needs. Decrees allowing exporters to retain 75 percent of their export earnings to import whatever primary materials or food, commodity or production requirements they desire have created abundance in Syria's domestic market with the result that prices [word illegible] for sugar, tea, rice, and other items have dropped. Foreign trade figures also show a surplus in Syria's trade balance at the end of the first half of 1990 of SL 8,989 million.

Beyond this, the private sector has engaged in a broad range of activity employing private capital in various national industries, especially in those where primary materials are plentiful in the local market. The Ministry of Industry has conducted a comprehensive survey of this country's existing industrial establishments to create conditions suitable for establishing export industries acceptable to the private sector.

The number of industrial projects licensed in 1989 rose to 6,186, while capital invested in private industry rose to SL 11 billion, compared to no more than SL 2 billion in 1987. This figure shows that the private and mixed

sectors are moving energetically, reaffirming the economy's vitality and confident investor ambitions in agriculture and industry, and indicates that Syrian industry will grow in the years ahead with promise of a strong, stable national economy.

## REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

### Muslim Brotherhood-Socialist Party Disputes Described

91AE0201A Aden SAWT AL-'UMMAL in Arabic  
15 Nov 90 p 4

[Article by 'Abd-al-Habib Salim Muqbil: "To Reasonable People in the Socialist and Reform Parties"]

[Text] It was our hope as citizens that harmony would prevail in the political street—the same harmony that exists in the government, for God's greatest blessing to Yemenis is His having united them under a single government. Yemenis differ in opinions and ideas, but do not fight each other; their views of reality are many, but without mutual vilification or disparagement.

No country is without conflicting political currents. But this gives us no justification to create conflict or widen the gulf of disagreements in order to prove that we are democrats. The great opportunity felt in popular circles after the proclamation of the Yemeni republic was followed by a feeling of satisfaction and brotherly love when this was accompanied in the northern governorates by the opening of branches of the Socialist Party and the establishment of other parties and in the southern and eastern governorates by the opening of branches of the People's General Conference.

However, what accompanied the merger of authority between the Socialist and People's [parties]—namely, a concentrated attack on the Socialist Party—has not relieved us from worries. We thought that a new age would begin in which special interests would be overcome for the sake of the interest of the country, its stability, and its resurgence. While some members of the Muslim Brotherhood conscientiously performed their religious duty from mosque pulpits or through the newspaper AL-SAHWAH, whose editor-in-chief was forced to point out that not everything written in it expressed the paper's own opinion, other preachers and homilists turned to fomenting hatred. As long as their party was in confrontation with the Socialist Party, some writers in AL-SAHWAH went so far as to defame prominent figures whose ability, honesty, and patriotism are known to every citizen. The speaker of parliament was attacked on the charge of being a "socialist." Government ministers were put under the microscope in a way suggesting the extent to which the Reform Party was deficient in the method of critical discourse and good journalism. This mirrored itself in the street, where we find the debate based generally on exploiting religious feeling and on mobilizing citizens' memory against patriots whose role

in achieving unification and choosing democracy should not be disparaged, despite whatever mistakes they may have made.

Conversely, all should recognize that even before 22 May 1990 members of the Socialist Party were mobilized against the Muslim Brotherhood in a way suggesting extremism and perhaps fear of this current that had been the unannounced opponent of Socialist Party rule in the past. This was because party intellectuals profoundly understood that socialism or Marxism meant atheism, abolition of religion, and disrespect for Islamic feelings. Many old ideas have changed, but some members of the religious current continue to doubt that the Socialists have abandoned their ideological hostility. As proof, they point out that the newspapers AL-MUSTAQBAL and AL-THAWRI and the magazine QADAYA AL-'ASR, despite their excellence, do not hesitate to present all sorts of "insult" in the form of "malicious" criticism in a generalized fashion that offends even religious moderates who harbor no hostility to the Socialist Party.

Although the points of disagreement between the two parties are many, what is being openly discussed and what represents the main disagreement is that the Socialists do not acknowledge the connection of policy with religion. The other secular parties agree with them in this. For Muslim Brothers—the Reform Party—this constitutes a dangerous sign. The latter insist on the thesis that Islam is "both a religion and a state." The Socialists believe that the Brotherhood is exploiting Islam to strengthen its presence by exploiting religious feeling in a society more than half of which is illiterate. This has created resentment over the possibility that the alliance between the Brotherhood and the sheikhs may triumph in gaining supporters. Events in Algeria and Jordan have not gone unnoticed, despite the fact that the political and cultural possibilities and social differences allow no room for comparison—at least in the short term.

While mulling over the past, with its incidents and strife, represents a major difficulty to achieving even a minimum of concord, the speed with which the political parties law was issued and the creation of an exit from the wisdom of silence that the official information media maintain toward general political indoctrination and unification of education may reduce the sharpness of the disagreement or narrow its scope. Citizens will thus be enabled to exercise a better role in political life. What some Socialist and Reform elements are raising focuses on the credibility of the two parties' acceptance of the practice of honest democracy. Muslim Brothers, according to AL-THAWRI, AL-MUSTAQBAL, and even SAWT AL-'UMMAL, are preparing militarily for a battle they imagine is imminent. We find it strange that the government, even through the interior minister, has neither denied nor affirmed rumors about the existence of camps in the Sudan to train members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Not only does the truth or falsehood of what three or more newspapers are publishing raise the

fears of Socialists, it raises the fear of every citizen and political party. Citizens have the right to feel secure about their lives and the stability of their country. In order for the government and political leaders not to be partners in imposing an atmosphere of anxiety and fear, matters such as this should not escape their notice on the ground that they are a journalistic debate between two parties.

Notwithstanding the responsibility to reveal the facts, it will be difficult for any citizen to find a justification for using journalism to defame the honor of any citizen or to slander any political party and turn a multiplicity of opinions into a multiplicity of bickerings, especially in the face of the economic and social situation in the country.

The united country does not want any journalist, intellectual, preacher, or Islamic jurist to deepen hatred against a group in the country considered to be a part of this people. Hatred leads only to violence. Violence means instability, followed by a military coup against democracy.

If citizens cannot determine clearly who are those who are wrapping themselves in mantles of religion, they will be even less able to understand who are the "atheistic infidels, enemies of religion." All Yemenis are Muslims. The habit of polite, calm discussion is the best way to the heart of citizens.

Although we trust that there are many reasonable people in the Socialist and Reform parties—people who can at least weigh what is extremism and steer toward exercising criticism that does not deepen hatred—the question still remains: In whose interest is it to deepen disagreements and for each party to lie in ambush for the other?

#### **Gun Smuggling, Sales in Aden, Lahij Reported**

*91P40141A Aden SAWT AL-'UMMAL in Arabic  
10 Jan 91 p 1*

[Text] Aden—SAWT AL-'UMMAL has learned that an investigation is currently under way regarding some individuals attempting to smuggle guns and ammunition into the governorate of Aden. The case involves dozens of guns manufactured in Czechoslovakia and large quantities of ammunition.

SAWT AL-'UMMAL has also learned that the Aden governorate court is expected to try this case soon. It is clear from the information that 100 guns were seized. In addition, there is an ongoing investigation in the Lahij governorate into the involvement of some individuals in weapons sales from special stockpiles. In a previous issue, SAWT AL-'UMMAL published information indicating that these sales were made to individuals in various governorates, and included a variety of weapons and ammunition.



## INDIA

**Deputy Finance Minister's Offer to NRI's Viewed**

91P40098A New Delhi DINMAN TIMES in Hindi  
16-22 Dec 90 p 10

[Economic Commentary by Ramsevak Srivastav:  
"Deputy Finance Minister Digvijay Singh's Offer: Non-resident Indians Should Come Forward, Invest Capital"]

[Text] The Chandra Shekhar government has given top priority to inciting the assistance of NRIs [Nonresident Indians] in the matter of controlling a growing budget deficit and balance of payments, and have initiated efforts in this matter. If assurances are any indication, many millions of dollars can be obtained from this resource. In an interview, the deputy finance minister, Mr. Digvijay Singh, said that he had met with the directors of Indian banks, working in foreign countries. In that meeting, the possibility and shape or form of capital investment by NRI's was discussed. Their calculations were very optimistic. We have received thousands of telephone and telegraphic messages from NRI's. They have made known their desire to invest capital in this country.

Mr. Singh opined that the greatest problem was one of faith. We will have to assure our nonresident brothers that they will benefit from the investment and reap profits regularly. They should also be assured that in the matter of loans from IMF [International Monetary Fund], they will not be sought unless there was no other way. In the course of telling about budget deficits, in mentioning that the sum was already 20 thousand 5 hundred crore rupees by October 90 itself, and not only would it have increased even more as the fiscal year came to an end, but also the cost of fertilizers, the subsidy given for export-promotion programs, and the funds necessitated by the proposed second-phase construction of the Vishakapatnam Steel Factory will all together come down as a heavy burden on the government. Mr. Singh admitted that because of the communal tension, collection work could not be conducted on a full scale. There were lots of impediments to collecting both the excise tax and revenues. The general lack of law and order and the specific situation created by the Mandal Commission made it impossible for our officers to function effectively. Our balance of payment situation is also very disorderly. Customs may levy duty only on imported goods and imports have not been to the extent that substantial income could be realized from this source. Expenditure was also great. Two Lakh 70 thousand Indians had to be rescued from Kuwait.

Mr. Singh believes that the nonresident Indians are wealthy, they want to come to India, but they want to leave their money saved in banks in places like London. The prime minister himself took an initiative and has said that the nonresident Indian is as patriotic as any Indian living here. Their legitimate concerns should be answered for our objective to be achieved.

It was felt also during these talks with Mr. Singh that the government will not allow any kind of slack in the matter of collecting the excise tax. This same paper had published earlier the news about a comprehensive and thorough investigation of the entire matter. It had been followed with the report that ordinances were being promulgated on the return of the amount owed.

Now, it looks as though the government has become more careful. Talks are being held with the Ministry of Law on this matter. The government is unwilling to take any steps in this matter which might become invalid in course of time. There are many excise-related litigations being fought presently in courts ranging from the smallest Village Assembly to the Supreme Court. It is possible that even the act of promulgating ordinances on any legal issue may be declared illegal. The government wants to have these points reviewed thoroughly. The deputy finance minister says that, if after consultation with the Ministry of Law, it looks like the step being taken is weak, then we would introduce a bill to amend the existing laws.

Mr. Singh also said that we were determined to prosecute unscrupulous financial offenders like those trying to engage in unseemly activities for personal material gains. He said, "Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha and I had already clarified in the first interview that we have no special personal love or hate for any individual or household of the government. We have also instructed our officers to act in the most professional manner and in adherence to the law."

Mr. Singh also said that there were only a few more months left in this fiscal year, and that the government did not have much time, and yet we do not believe in being discarded in the wastebasket of history.

**Developments in Problems of 'Communalism'****Notice to Political Parties**

91AS0390A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA  
in English 5 Dec 90 p 13

[Text] New Delhi, 4 Dec (The Times of India News Service)—The supreme court today issued notices to the election commission and six political parties, including the Congress and the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party], on a petition seeking de-recognition of these political parties for having joined hands with communal forces.

Mr Justice M.H. Kania and Mr Justice K.L.M. Sharma, after hearing the petitioner's counsel, Mr K.K. Venugopal, issued fresh notices to the Union of India, the election commission, the Congress, the BJP, various factions of the Akali Dal, the Shiv Sena, the Muslim League and the factions of the Kerala Congress.

A public interest petitioner, Dr P. Nalla Thampy there, has sought de-recognition of these political parties for violating the mandatory provision of the Representation

of the People Act by which any recognised political party is constitutionally bound to give an undertaking owing allegiance to secularism.

Mr Venugopal sought an early hearing of the petition because it involved vital issues related to the secular character of the political parties in the country.

He drew the court's attention towards the 10,000-km "rath yatra" by the BJP to demolish a mosque and construct a temple at Ayodhya. He said the chariot carrying the party leader prominently exhibited the BJP's election symbol.

Mr Venugopal also charged the Vishwa Hindu Parishad with being communal in nature. This had joined hands with the BJP. Similarly, another organisation, the Shiv Sena, was also in league with the BJP.

The "rath yatra" tried to exploit the religious sentiments of the majority community. The counsel said such an attempt by a duly recognised political party was in violation of the Constitution and section 29(A) of the Representation of the People Act.

The petition sought de-recognition of the Congress for its alliance with the Kerala Congress, a political party having 90 percent of its constituents as Christians. Second, the Congress was also in alliance with the Muslim League, he said.

The Shiv Sena and the Akali Dals were openly propagating anti-secularism. The petition said despite the constitutional provision to owe allegiance to secularism, political parties had deviated to gain limited political ends.

Already the Congress and the BJP are locked in a legal battle before the election commission where the Congress has sought de-recognition of the BJP for demonstrating its communal character during the "rath yatra."

The court directed that the next hearing would be held in February next year.

### Inflammatory Cassettes

91AS0390B Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA  
in English 29 Nov 90 p 9

[Article by Kuldeep Kumar]

[Text] New Delhi, 28 Nov (The Times of India News Service)—Two audio cassettes containing inflammatory communal propaganda are being openly sold in the capital's music shops with the police blissfully unaware of their existence.

One of them, which blares out Hindu chauvinistic speeches inciting violence against Muslims, was brought out clandestinely sometime before the 30 October incidents in Ayodhya. The jacket of this cassette shows Lord Ram with his bow and arrow and bears the following inscription: "Ramjanambhoomi, 'Jai Shri Ram', Bharat

Mata Ki Jai." There is no clue as to who has manufactured this cassette and whose speeches it contains. This should *prima facie* make this an illegal entity.

However, the police do not seem to be even aware of the existence of any such cassette. When contacted, the deputy commissioner of police (crime), Mr R. Tiwari, pleaded ignorance and so did the additional commissioner of police, Mr K.K. Paul.

The second cassette has been legally brought out but this fact alone does not mitigate the impact of its explosive, communal content. Narendra Chanchal, the star of all-night *Bhagwati jagarans*, who was catapulted into national fame with his song in Raj Kapoor's film "Bobby," has packed it with his incendiary musical tribute to the "martyrs of Ayodhya."

The jacket of this cassette too shows Lord Ram, armed with his bow and arrow, standing over the proposed temple. "Mandir wahin banayenge" (We shall build the temple on the very spot) is the title and refrain of this cassette.

### Vitriolic Trade

The first cassette, which has been produced illegally, begins with cries of "Bharat Mata Ki Jai" and "Har Har Mahadev." Apparently, this cassette is a recording of a meeting held somewhere in Jagadhari town in Haryana because an anonymous male voice, while addressing the gathering, specifically mentions *Jagadhari ke Rambhaktan* (Ram worshippers of Jagadhari). Immediately after this, a female voice takes over with a vitriolic tirade against the Muslims and all secular the Hindus.

As this meeting in Jagadhari took place before the 30 October deadline, the woman speaker exhorts those present to sacrifice their lives for the cause of building the Ram temple on the very site where the Babri Masjid stands.

The woman speaker digresses into poetry in her message to *Rambhaktas*, asking them to follow the example set by Hanuman, the supreme devotee of Ram. She exclaims: "Hanuman ne banayee, jab raakh sarva Lanka to Ramjanambhoomi ko, kya soch aur shanka. Ho Ram ka mukhalif, aur Bharatiya bhi ho, sambhav nahin kabhi bhi, kah do bajake danka." (When Hanuman could reduce Lanka to ashes, then what can come in the way of constructing the Ramjanambhoomi temple? Announce to the whole world without fear that whosoever opposes Ram cannot be considered an Indian).

### Ominous Call

Having repeatedly told the audience that for the last 44 years, Hindus have been discriminated against in their own country and have suffered untold miseries and injustices, the woman recites a longish poem which ends with an ominous call: "Jo hamari roti matribhoomi ko sukoon de, our deshdrohiyon ko goliyon se bhoon de, aise sarfarosh ka hamen prakash chahiye, desh ke liye

hamen Patel ya Subhash chahiye." (We need people like Patel or Subhash who are willing to sacrifice their lives for the motherland, who can wipe away her tears and who can gun down the traitors).

The female speaker extolls people like Rahim and Raskhan who "looked for the dust from Ram's feet in the dust of this land" and castigates those Muslims who, instead of identifying themselves with Rahim and Raskhan, have a sense of belonging with Babar.

Then suddenly, the voice assumes menacingly threatening overtones declaring that "Babari auladon ko ab hum bardasht nahin karenge" (We shall no longer tolerate the progeny of Babar). This brings to mind the slogan written on the walls of Ayodhya by the Bajrang Dal in 1986: "Babar ki santanon se, khoon ki holi khelenge."

The plan of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) for 30 October becomes amply clear when the speaker praises the PAC [Political Affairs Committee] for being avowedly pro-Hindu. Not only that, she gives out an ominous warning: "Jab ek-ek Ali ki chhati par das-das Bajrangbali chadhe honge, tab pata chal jayega ki yeh sthan Ramjanambhoomi hai ya Babri Masjid. Tab pata chal jayega ki yeh desh Prabhu Ram ka hai." (When ten Bajrangbali i.e., members of the Bajrang Dal will sit on the chest of an Ali, i.e., a Muslim, then it will be decided whether the place is Ramjanambhoomi or Babri Masjid.)

#### Call for Bloodbath

The female speaker lambasts those Hindus who are afraid of a bloodbath in Ayodhya, asking them how long they could avoid it. And then, she gives a call for precisely this: "Aao sab mil chalen Ram ka mandir bhayya banane ko, khoon kharaba hota hai to ek bar ho jane do... Samjh na paye baaton se ab laaton se samjhane do, khoon kharaba hota hai to ek bar ho jane do." (Let us all go to build a magnificent Ram temple and if there is bloodbath, let it take place once and for all. Since others are refusing to be persuaded, let us kick them and then they will understand. Don't worry if a bloodbath takes place.)

She also incites those devotees who are ever willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause of the Ram temple, saying that before laying down their lives, they should first kill thousands of others who oppose it. The fiery orator warns the Hindus that 30 October will decide whether they or the Muslims will live in this country. Not only that, she informs them that on the magic date, the start of the *kar seva* would in reality mean laying the foundation of a Hindu *Rashtra*.

Who is this female speaker, full of venom and hatred? Those who have met the BJP MP, Ms Uma Bharati, or have heard her address meetings believe it is her. When this correspondent contacted Ms Bharati, she said the cassette contained more or less her speech but somehow, another voice similar to hers had been mixed at a few places, mainly where explicit abuses have been used.

"You," she said, "know this is how I speak and the speech is more or less mine."

The CPM [Marxist Communist Party] has demanded the arrest of Ms Uma Bharati for whipping up communal hatred and seizure of these cassettes. However, so far, the administration has failed to act. This is quite surprising considering the occurrence of communal violence in the walled city. These cassettes are easily available in bulk at the Lala Lajpat Rai market and from reputed music shops all over the city. Also, there is no reason to believe that they are confined to the capital.

#### University Election Problems

91AS0390C Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA  
in English 27 Nov 90 p 5

[Article by Manjula Sen]

[Excerpts] Bombay, 25 Nov—Undertones of communal influences appear to have affected campus politics at Bombay University. This is borne out by events such as the recent campus elections, both for students and teachers, which reveal a steady breakdown of "cosmopolitan" defences.

In the elections for the Students Council (SC), the Bharatiya Vidyarthi Sena (BVS), the students' wing of the Shiv Sena, dominated. Having played ducks and drakes with the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (perceived to be the auxiliary of the RSS-BJP) for several years, the two contested separately after the NSUI [expansion unknown] announced its boycott for a second consecutive year.

Immediately after the results, the BVS quite typically attributed its victory to its espousal of "Hindutva." A crestfallen ABVP [expansion unknown], which sailed into the SC [scheduled castes] of last year when both the NSUI and the BVS eschewed the elections, felt their rivals had won due to the support of the university representatives (URs) belonging to the NSUI.

In what is after all an indirectly-fought election, with 150-odd URs casting their votes for the SC on behalf of nearly two lakh students, it is difficult to discern a pattern of allegiance towards various student organisations. What is clear, however, is that party politics has entered the campus in a marked manner with the manoeuvre and negotiations uncannily mirroring those at the national level.

Although elections to the gilded SC of Bombay University may not yield much in the way of power, they are regarded as invaluable stepping stones for future political careers. Moreover, the lowering of the voting age to 18 years, taken together with the need for boosting the strength of various old and new political parties, has led these elections to often fought on non-student related issues.

Consequently, Mr Ramesh Kale, ABVP leader, comments that "our position is strong due to our stand on

Kashmir and we have more URs." He goes on to add that theirs is still a "secular party and we have Christians, Muslims, etc. Students *ko yeh nahi keh sakete ki hum Hindutvavaad hain* (You cannot tell students you are Hindutvavaad). We are cosmopolitan in Bombay."

But Mr Chandrakant Bhojgar, secretary of the CPM-led Student Federation of India, disagreed. He felt that communal forces were gaining ground in society and students were being influenced by what happens in their environs.

The president of the Congress-backed NSUI, Mr Narendra Verma, dismisses any hint of communalism among Bombay University students. Teachers, too, were impeccably secular, he felt and cited as proof that preliminary reports indicated that the Bombay University and College Teachers' Union had bagged four of the six seats scanned till then.

BUCTU's challengers included the ABVP-supported Vidyapeeth Vikas Manch and the Sena panel, Mumbai Vidyapeeth Shikshak Sanghatana.

Although the NSUI claimed a non-partisan secular identity, its leaders were unable to convincingly explain why they had not contested the students elections for two years. Last year's boycott followed the murder of an NSUI vice-president, whose underworld links were later revealed. This year, too, the chairperson of the newly-elected SC in Nagpur University was made a co-accused in a murder case. [passage omitted]

If formerly, teachers were wary of being identified with the Shiv Sena, now it is a case of convenience. "Most of us are not Sena members, for us it is a case of Chandra Shekhar being supported by the Congress," says Dr Manisha Sen, from the department of applied psychology. "For my own candidacy, I have asked for support as an individual. If I am elected, I have nothing to do with the Shiv Sena but will decide on the issue concerned." [passage omitted]

Perhaps the last word belonged to Mr M.P. Vashi, senate member, "People are not distinguishing between fanaticism and militancy. The leftists are losing their militancy but ultimately people will become disillusioned with party leanings. It is a phase we have to pass through and I don't believe communalism is here to stay."

### Tension in Patna

91AS0390D New Delhi PATRIOT in English  
1 Dec 90 p 5

[Text] Patna, 30 Nov—Sporadic incidents of caste and communal violence have so far claimed no less than 15 lives in Bihar including the state capital, Patna, the eastern part of which has been disturbed for four days now.

In Patna alone 14 persons have been killed including two deaths in the hospital and recovery of three bodies from

different parts of Patna city. One person was killed at Muzaffarpur on Wednesday night in what is called a caste riot.

Communal tension flared up in Patna city on Tuesday following a shooting incident in which a BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] worker and PDS [expansion unknown] shop owner was killed on the spot. The next day two persons were killed and five injured in bomb explosions.

Of the five injured, two succumbed to their injuries in the hospital a day later. Yesterday four persons were killed and two seriously injured in the Patna city from where one person was reported missing.

The city police also recovered three unidentified bodies from different areas of Patna city including that of an 18-year-old girl who was wearing only a night gown.

The person reported missing from Rani Ki Khidkima-halla of Patna city is believed killed by the police who earlier had registered a case in this connection. The other two bodies recovered from chowk police station area have not yet been identified.

The police believe these killings to be of general nature but local inhabitants link them with continuing communal clashes in the city area.

Three separate incidents of shooting and bomb blasts were reported from Patna city area yesterday. Two other persons were reported killed in Khusrupur area, 30 kms east of Patna, last night.

The Patna city area known as the mercantile centre of the State capital experienced a fortnight long trauma of communal violence early this month and remained curfew bound for over a week.

The shooting incidents and bomb explosions in city area besides caste clashes in south Patna came to an abrupt end after strong rumours spread about imposition of President's Rule in Bihar following unabated caste and communal violences.

It seemed as though peace had returned to the State but attack on V.P. Singh rally at Sitamarhi on 26 November once again ignited violence.

On 28 November a local tuff of Muzaffarpur Shekhar Singh was killed while trying to rob a local college teacher of his gun and other belongings.

The gangmates of Shekhar Singh have reorganised their group and unleashed a terror campaign lending caste colour to it. The district administration of Muzaffarpur remains a mute witness to these developments, reports percolating from Muzaffarpur said.

About three days earlier police had to resort to firing at Lakhisarai, in Munger to avert a caste clash. Several vehicles were burnt and passenger trains on the main line were attacked. Similar incidents have been reported from Dhanbad and Sindhri also.

Like Patna city the communal sensitive town of Ranchi, too, has been experiencing bomb explosions during night hours. The district administration has reportedly been informed about fund collection drive by anti-social elements there.

Reports carried by Patna newspapers say that situation in the summer capital of Bihar continues to be volatile. It is important to note that the Governor Mohammad Yunus Saleem is camping Ranchi.

### Traditional View of Secularism Reexamined

91AS0266A New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi  
20 Nov 90 p 7

[Article by Nanaji Deshmukh: "Rethinking Secularism"]

[Text] While actively taking part in the present political system of votes and power for nearly 28 years, I have viewed and experienced at close range the current destructive and corrupt tendencies in this political system. It was the desire to look for an alternative to these destructive politics that attracted me to Loknayak Jay Prakash Narayan's Total Revolution movement. That revolution indeed performed the miracle of a change of power at the center, but it failed to achieve its main objective. I, retiring from politics, decided to devote myself solely to the task of socioeconomic reconstruction and made a public announcement of my resolve in Patna on 8 October 1978 in the presence of Jayprakashji. Since then I have been fully involved in socioeconomic reconstruction projects in certain very backward districts of my country.

But the events of the last few months have disturbed my concentration. Another hastily announced New Caste Reservation policy has pushed society to the verge of caste division and every day we hear heartrending reports of suicide by promising youth, in opposition to this policy. On the other hand, artificially created communal tension is spreading everywhere. In particular, the terrible communal massacre that occurred in Gonda district shook me completely. For the past 12 years, Gonda district has been the theatre of my activities. According to reports reaching me, this massacre was systematically enacted by certain top level local and state-level politicians in keeping with their vote calculations. I was especially hurt when I, a creative worker, found myself a helpless spectator to an inhuman dance on the bodies of innocent citizens.

For a long time, a question has been bothering me that even though, since obtaining independence, we have been talking at length about national unity, secularism, communal harmony, casteless society, and social justice, etc., why do we appear to be heading in the opposite direction? Definitely, there has been an omission somewhere. Either we are not completely honest about these objectives, or we have become prisoners of certain false and erroneous beliefs regarding the essence of these high-sounding words. So far as honesty to these ideals is concerned, I, having been a part of this political system

for a long time, can say with full confidence that our leadership has become a complete slave to its electoral politics and vote count. Under cover of this heavy barrage of verbosity, its every political and administrative decision is aimed at securing certain selfish political ends. All the time, their abiding concern is how to organize favorable vote banks. They have accepted the belief that only Muslim community can form the basis of the biggest and most effective vote block because the Muslim voters generally vote on a religious basis whereas the Hindu mind gets splintered on the basis of caste, language, and region. Therefore, on the one hand, these political leaders try to inflame communal feelings of Muslims by raising the bogey of "majority communalism" and "Hindu aggression" under cover of slogans of secularism, and, on the other hand, they try to incite casteism, linguism, and regionalism in order to rally Hindu votes.

In fact, their secularism does not mean anything more than "Hindu denunciation" and its result has always been bad, whereas they are never ashamed of their alliances with casteist, linguistic, religious, and regional parties. To sum it up, these politicians have acquired a vested interest in communal disunity and casteist fragmentation and, to cover up their vile power politics, they misuse these high-sounding words.

While cursing "majority communalism" and "Hindu aggression," these extremely zealot champions of "fake secularism" forget that it was this "majority community," which even in the most heartrending conditions resulting from the motherland's partition and in the most inflammatory atmosphere, not only permitted the minority Muslims responsible for the country's partition to stay in its reviled home but also gave secularism a place of honor in the constitution of independent India. It is a deplorable fact of history that Muslims residing in the region, which after partition was named "India That Is Bharat," were foremost in the "Pakistan movement" and it is they who, against the firm determination and constant efforts of their Hindu brethren, colluded with British imperialists to effect the unkindest cut of partitioning the motherland on the basis of religion.

It is this very "Hindu aggression" which, having suffered recent wounds, bestowed on its Muslim brethren even more rights than for itself in the constitution of independent India. There was no compulsion behind this conduct of majority Hindu society, nor can the microscopic group of English-educated Western worshipers be considered a factor in this. This unusual decision was a gentle manifestation of Hindu society's age-old philosophical faith which has been expressed by Vedic sages in "Ekum Sad Vipra" and because of which Hindu psyche has always been committed to the ideals of freedom of worship and equal reverence for all places of worship.

These fake secularists also forget that if, despite all kind of inflammatory happenings within and outside India, India is still firm on the ideals of secularism, it is due to

"Hindu tradition" and "Hindu psyche" which they keep cursing day in and day out. Have they ever wondered why Pakistan, ignoring its founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah's announcement in constitution assembly and Bangladesh disdaining its liberator Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, have become Islamic states?

If we consider the vast differences in conduct of these three parts of the same historical region, we can also receive answer to the question why, even after chanting of secularism mantra for the last 43 years, most of the voices of secularism are still heard in Hindu society, whereas the number of secularists within Islamic society can be counted on the fingers of one hand. There is no doubt that there are a few high-minded Muslim brethren whose speech and conduct reflect their true secularism. But they find themselves insignificant and isolated within their own society. This is because their society is under the influence of those who do not want to let them proceed on the path of self-criticism and progress. This thing becomes clear from the notorious "Shahbano case" and from Iran's announcement of death sentence for the famous writer Salman Rushdie.

Religious neutrality cannot be a one-way street. We should not forget the fact that ever since the foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1885, our national leadership has been wrestling with the formidable problem of how to persuade the Muslim public to join their Hindu brethren in the struggle for the country's freedom. The Lucknow agreement of 1916, blessed by Lokmaniye Tilak, and support of Khilafat movement by Gandhiji and Lala Lajpat Rai in 1920, were part of the unending series of steps in this direction. But even highly influential and powerful leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru were unable to receive the support of Muslim public; only a handful of Muslims were by their side. The elections of 1946 were fought on this very central question whether India will remain united or whether it will be partitioned. But it is clear from the results of this election that 99 percent of Hindu voters supported the Congress stand of a united India while over 95 percent of Muslim voters, disregarding nationalist leaders like Maulana Azad, cast their votes for Jinnah's demand for "Pakistan."

We had convinced ourselves that this Muslim separatist tendency was the result of the British "Divide and Rule" policy; in other words, it was a creation of the British. Therefore, we were hopeful that following departure of the British and with the partition of the country on a Hindu-Muslim basis, we will be able to change this Muslim inclination within Free India and that we will be able to create a national society dedicated to the ideals of democracy and secularism. It is because we were overcome by this idealism that we did not try to study and analyze those historical events and ideologies which, despite all our efforts, pushed us into the ruinous tragedy of the country's partition. On the contrary, having become a slave to the compulsions of vote politics adopted by free India, our political leadership resorted to

encouragement and protection of fanatics and fundamentalists in Muslim society, in the name of "secularism" and "identity of minorities." It was determined to put this opportunistic play for power into the garb of secularism ideology. This (was done) by that Hindu intellectual group the thinking of which has become a prisoner of those unnatural ideologies introduced into Indian thinking by the British education system and which continues to be fascinated with former Marxist ideology which has been discarded by most of the communist countries.

After obtaining independence, it was imperative to find out how, in their attempt to lay intellectual foundations for their "Divide and Rule" policy, the British imperialists had removed the "Hindu" word from its basic geographical and cultural connotation and given it the form of a "religion" and brought it into the class of centralized and expansionist religions like Islam and Christianity. From their long study of Indian history, they had known that now the word "Hinduism" stood for that long and unbroken process which, by bringing into a cultural mainstream all human groups residing in the geographical region known as India, along with all their diversities, had accorded them the same cultural identity and had bound them in their reverence for the motherland. It was clear to the British, in the light of modern interpretations of "nationalism," that only this historical process known as "Hindu or Hinduism" is the basis of nationalism in India. They also knew very well that the historical progress of the vast human society known by the name of "Hindu," has been on the basis of "Unity in Diversity" rather than on a religious basis. Despite this, they tried to set up Islam and Christianity against "Hindu" or "Hinduism" by giving it the form of a religion and by representing it as a rival to Islam and Christianity. Everywhere, in census reports, gazetteers, and government documents, the word "Hindu" was used as coeval with Islam and Christian religion. In order to create religious rivalry, the entire historical period before the advent of Islam into India was labeled as "Indian History's Hindu Period." Mahatma Buddha's reform movement and Emperor Ashoka's inclination were described as religious conversions from "Hindu religion" into Buddhism. In fact, they depicted all of India's ancient civilization's holy men in religious colors. Indian Muslims were given to understand that on religious grounds they should break off their ties with Hindu holy men and instead treat as their own foreign invaders like Mohammed Bin Kasim, Mahmud Ghaznavi, Mohammad Ghauri, Taimur, and Babur.

Everyone knows that national unity cannot be established so long as each countryman does not feel in his heart oneness and pride for the same cultural heritage received from the ancestors and patriotism for the motherland. Only then can we take a life and death resolve for the protection of our cultural heritage treasure and defense of our motherland. I feel that the vote-hungry politicians and secularistic intellectuals have not taken any vigilant steps in this direction. If secularism means

feeling of equal respect for all places of worship and "goodwill toward all religions," in that case, why is it that this question is never raised, are believers in "Islam" prepared to accept this condition? What do we learn from the manner in which Muslims all over the world recently gave a rousing welcome to the pronouncement of the death sentence for Salman Rushdie? Is there not a need to ponder why, even when approaching the 21st century, there is absence of religious freedom and there are discriminatory laws for non-Muslims in many Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia? Why is it that long-standing attempts by Russia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, China, etc., communist countries to solve Muslim issue on the basis of their respective Marxist secular economic ideology have ended in failure? Why is it that Muslims, settled in a liberal country like England, have demanded that, being a religious community, there should be a separate parliament for them.

Had these questions received deep thought, perhaps our intellectuals too may have felt the need for reexamination of secularism in the Indian context. Then they would have tried anew to find an answer to the Indian question why only the Muslim problem continued to remain a hurdle in our long struggle for independence and why, even after the country's partition, free India's politics continues to revolve around this issue? It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole Muslim vote block has taken the entire Indian politics hostage and, under cover of fake secularism, there has begun a mad race among various political parties in order to court this vote block. Despite dripping with patriotism for the motherland, Hindus, being fragmented on the basis of caste, language, and region, cannot attract vote-getters to themselves vis-a-vis intact Muslim votes, in this market of power politics. That is why the old question of "protection of Muslim identity," which before independence, having taken the form of nationalist ideology, had pushed the country into the chasm of partition, has once again emerged before Hindu society in a menacing form. Now it cannot be denied that the fundamentalist movement going on in Kashmir valley is the next chapter of Indian partition. Many of our politicians and intellectuals, instead of openly accepting the stark fact that their secularism has completely failed in Kashmir, are trying to hide their heads in the sand of equivocation.

The result of this error or view is that whenever nationalism tries to take a firm stand against this religious fundamentalism, it is denounced as "majority communalism" and "Hindu aggression." In fact, the movement and the controversy that have been raging over construction of Ram's birth place, should be viewed against this background. I cannot understand why this issue is being depicted in the form of "Hindu versus Muslim" or "Mandir versus Masjid." In the fact of solid traditional and historical evidence, who can deny that construction of this so-called masjid was undertaken by a Mir Baqi on orders of the foreign invader Babur? What other objective can there be behind this action except humiliation of the vanquished? Was this humiliation not the humiliation of present day Indian Muslims? So why are these

fake secularists inciting the present generation of Indian Muslims to oppose the national demand for reconstruction of Ram mandir on that site? Why are they being inflamed that they should connect their identity with foreign invader Babur and not with India's great national soul Ram who, according to the socialist leader Ram Manohar Lohia, is the foremost representative of India's national conscience and not merely the Hindus' religious leader and god? Do these secularists really believe that destruction of thousands of monuments spread all over the country, which is a living symbol of destruction wreaked by foreign Muslim invaders in the name of religion, are creating conducive atmosphere for communal harmony, nationalism, and secularism? Is it not imperative in the interests of development of genuine secularism and feeling of national unity that the present day Muslims should publicly disassociate themselves from the evil doings of foreign invaders of the middle ages and take a step in this direction in the form of an announcement of this disassociation?

It is unfortunate that Muslim leadership did not correctly appreciate the message implicit in independent India's first cabinet's decision to reconstruct Somnath's destroyed mandir. Our fake secularists too, instead of persuading Muslim brethren to think on these lines and join in the mainstream, used all their power to give a religious color to these national aspirations and to incite Muslims to oppose any such demands.

Leftist intellectuals used all their intellectual prowess to prove that Ram was not a human, Ayodhya is not Ram's birth place, there is no contemporary evidence to prove that the structure which is called Baburi masjid has been built by demolishing a centuries old mandir, and if this structure is removed, it will be an attack on "Muslim identity" and it will mean demise of Indian secularism and an end to broadmindedness. Even if it is granted for a while that the structure known as "Baburi masjid" should not be removed merely because there is no contemporary evidence available in support of it, what to do about the thousands of monuments regarding which there is incontrovertible historical evidence available? Did these secularists ever take any initiative regarding these monuments? On the contrary, they have been engaged in digging into India's long history to look for some isolated incidents of destruction of places of worship, by highlighting which, they may justify middle age foreign invaders' destructiveness.

If these fake secularists believe that removal of these monuments has nothing to do with the nation's self-respect and identity, in that case, they have to answer what was the need, after independence, to remove British symbols, statues of British rulers and their names from streets? Why, following the Bolshevik revolution, huge statues of Lenin and Stalin were erected everywhere, several cities and roads named after them, their bodies embalmed, their mausoleums made into pilgrimages, and why placing wreaths of reverence at Lenin's mausoleum became almost compulsory? And why, following failure of Marxism in their country and their



announcement of their break with it, different communist countries are removing these statues? Clearly, every nation, following a great political or ideological change, finds it necessary to set up physical symbols to mark such changes. It makes me really sad to find that our Indian communist friends are neither prepared to learn from the experience of other communist countries, nor are they trying to rid themselves of the Marxist shibboleth of their young days.

I feel it in my heart that now the time has come for the start of an openhearted discussion on definition and spirit of words like "nationalism," "communalism," and "secularism" in the Indian context. I know full well that some Indian Muslims are patriots through and through and committed liberals and I am personally acquainted with some of them. I am also aware how unhappy they are now that, on the one hand, they have been completely isolated in their community and, on the other hand, fake secularists, ignoring them, are engaged in flattering bigoted leaders in their community. I appeal to my wise friends that they should come forward and provide their society with the right kind of leadership. They should rest assured that our support is always with them.

I believe that, so long as the vast Indian society remains divided on the basis of religion and caste, till then it cannot concentrate on the basic task of creating a modern society. That is why, in this hour of dire national crisis, I am picking up courage to entreat you to rethink basic beliefs like "nationalism," "communalism," and "secularism," so that, by stepping out of confusion that has reigned so far, the nation may move forward on the road to unity and progress.

## PAKISTAN

### Kashmiri Leader Interviewed

91AS0343B Peshawar MASHRIQ in Urdu  
17 Nov 90 Supplement (iii)

[Interview with Ghulam Mohammad Safi, amir (leader) of Zarbul-Mujahidin, the Kashmiri freedom movement, in Peshawar, by Itaul-Haq; first paragraph is MASHRIQ introduction; date not specified]

[Text] Ghulam Mohammad Safi is the leader of Zarbul-Mujahidin, the largest organization busy in jihad (holy war) for Kashmir. He was born in Bara Mola and received his BS degree from a college there. He served as the headmaster at a school run by the Islamic movement, where he taught young men about the spirit of jihad. His trained young men are now fighting Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir. Safi's wife and children were abducted by the Indian army and are still missing. But even this incident has not deterred him from his mission. A few days back, he visited Peshawar, where this interview took place.

[Itaul-Haq] When did the current independence movement for Kashmir begin and please shed some light on its background?

[Safi] This is not a new movement. It began in 1947. Kashmir has been a disputed territory since 1947. We have never wasted any occasion to protest whether it was during a cricket match between India and the West Indies or observing black day on India's independence day, or Ziaul Haq's martyrdom. We have always sacrificed our lives. From 1953 to 1975, the movement for self-determination struggled for the independence of Kashmir. But, our latest inspiration came from Afghanistan. We noticed that if empty-handed mujahidins can fight Russian tanks, then why couldn't we fight Indians? And India is in no way equivalent to the Soviet Union. We exhausted all peaceful means before deciding to embark on the road to armed struggle.

[Itaul-Haq] How do you prepare young people for the current movement?

[Safi] We try to educate people politically. We tell them that, although our rights have been recognized at the international level, in reality we have achieved nothing. The Islamic Movement is playing an important role in our struggle. We have shown people the difference between Islam and infidelity. We use academic institutions, religious gatherings, and political rallies to lift people's spirits and instill hatred in their hearts towards India. The Islamic Movement organized an International Sirat (Prophet's character) Conference in which representatives from other Islamic countries as well as the Imam (religious leader) of holy places (Mecca and Medina) also participated. In addition to discussing Prophet's character, we also explained the problem of Kashmir to its participants. Also, Maulana Maudodi's book, *The Kashmir Issue*, played an important role in preparing our minds for jihad. In his book, he had clearly stated that the only solution to the Kashmir issue is jihad.

[Itaul-Haq] Which stages is jihad going through now?

[Safi] Currently, we are fighting three types of battles: on the military front, political front, and at international level. All freedom-loving organizations are participating in the war of independence. The largest organization, Zarbul-Mujahidin, is playing a special role. All young men are ready and anyone who is capable of carrying a weapon has already done so. On the political front, all those organizations who love and support Pakistan have gathered on a single platform the banner of Kashmir Independence Movement. Political activities are being carried out in the form of rallies and strikes. At the international level, in the United States, England, Saudi Arabia, and other countries, young Kashmiris are busy informing people of the Kashmir issue. The World Jammu and Kashmir Movement has been established. This movement is trying to keep the international community abreast of the Kashmir issue and Indian atrocities. Drs. Ayub Thakar, Nazir Ahmad Quershi, and

Muhammad Akram Dar are its chief organizers. We have decided that we will not compromise on the independence of Kashmir and will not accept anything less than full independence. India tried to tempt us with limited autonomy within the Indian framework, but we have rejected its offer. Our destination is clear, it is independence or martyrdom.

[Itaul-Haq] What is the current situation in the Kashmir Valley?

[Safi] Kashmir has no civilian government and is being governed under the direct Presidential rule. Jammu and Kashmir have been declared as the disturbed area. Any policeman is free to shoot anyone to death. There is no accountability or respect for privacy. Behind the flimsy excuse of conspiracy, Indian army conducts raids on homes and burns down the villages. Homes are looted and rapes are commonplace. India has practically failed. Rajiv Gandhi has admitted it and India's minister for the Kashmir affairs, George Fernandez, has stated that India is no longer in control of the situation in Kashmir. India has committed unbelievable atrocities to defeat freedom fighters. Young men are being detained and murdered by the security forces. Even children and women are not safe. People are starved to death. Patients are deprived of medicine. But our aims are high. We have been suffering since 1947 and have reached the conclusion not to lay down our arms until the final victory. We are ready for the final war.

[Itaul-Haq] Is independence the only objective of your armed struggle?

[Safi] The Subcontinent was divided on the basis of a two-nation theory and thus two countries came into being. However, the issue of Kashmir has never been resolved. We would like to be separated from an infidel Indian system and would like to join Pakistan on the basis of "there is no God but Allah." Our aim is to join Pakistan and establish an Islamic system. Some people ask us that since Islamic system has not been established in Pakistan, then why do we want to join Pakistan? In our opinion, although Pakistan gained independence on the basis of "there is no God but Allah," the Islamic system was never provided to her. It is possible that once Kashmir joins Pakistan, then an Islamic system will be established. We have already instituted several Islamic traditions in Kashmir. Observance of purdah (veil) is compulsory, alcohol consumption has been banned, and brothels have been eliminated. Islam is an important cause for us and we are fighting on its basis. India is a bigger country than Pakistan. Even the natural beauty of any country doesn't attract us. Our valley is the most beautiful about which emperor Jhangir said that "if there is a paradise on earth, it is Kashmir." The idea of Islam alone is dear to us and on its basis we want independence and to join Pakistan. Kashmiri people liked Mr. Bhutto (late Prime Minister) because he declared Friday as an official holiday and classified Ahmadiys as non-muslims. Kashmiri people loved Ziaul Haq because he represented the Islamic community at the United

Nations General Assembly and implemented the Islamic system. We have not associated ourselves with personalities but rather Islam is the standard for us.

[Itaul-Haq] The Indian army has a tight control on the borders of occupied Kashmir. Supply of arms are very difficult. How long are Mujahidins going to fight under these circumstances?

[Safi] The exact same question was asked by an Indian journalist named Bhabani San Gupta. I told him that there are tons of arms inside Kashmir. Even if we fight for years, some of it will still be left over. He asked, so many arms? I said yes, arms stored by the Indian army are for us. We will take these arms away from them and fight a war. So far, we have taken a lot of arms from them. Besides, nowadays it is not difficult to acquire arms.

[Itaul-Haq] India is committing atrocities in Kashmir. Don't freedom fighters get discouraged?

[Safi] Kashmiri Muslims have been suffering since 1947. God always gives some leniency to a dictator but now India has reached the limit in committing atrocities against the Kashmiri people. Kashmiris have decided that, no matter what, they would not lay down their arms. If we did not win this time then we would cease to live as Muslims. We will have to change our religion and convert to Hinduism. We will fight to the end. India's violence against our people has instilled hatred in their hearts and now people are getting more encouraged.

[Itaul-Haq] Who is participating in jihad?

[Safi] All Kashmiri Muslims are participating in this jihad. Our struggle is for the Kashmiri nation. It is not a work of a single party. Children as well as old people are playing their proper role. However, on the military front, only young people are allowed to participate.

[Itaul-Haq] What are the reasons behind the failure to find a solution for Kashmiri problem at the international level?

[Safi] The main reason is the weakness of our advocate. We chose Pakistan to represent our case, but it fell short of fulfilling its role as an advocate. Our own leaders, especially Sheikh Abdullah, also damaged our cause. But, now Kashmiri people have become involved in this struggle and are more successful than any of our previous advocates. At times, our advocates didn't even understand the Kashmir issue. For instance, in response to Rajiv Gandhi's claim during his visit to Pakistan that several elections have been held in Kashmir, Ms. Benazir Bhutto simply smiled. The Kashmiri people responded in defiance to that claim however, and boycotted the elections. So far, every election in Kashmir has been held under the supervision of Indian Election Commission and not the United Nations. We are thankful to the Pakistani delegation and its leader Gazi Hussein Ahmad for highlighting the Kashmir issue at the international

level and because of his efforts Kashmir was placed on the OIC's (Organization of Islamic Countries) agenda.

[Itaul-Haq] What role should the Islamic community play in resolving the Kashmir issue?

[Safi] As far as the people are concerned, their sympathies are with us and important individuals are helping us. But the real task is for government leaders. They must unite against India and suspend trade with her. Under pressure, India can be forced to grant us our right for self-determination.

[Itaul-Haq] Are you satisfied with the attitude of leaders from the Islamic countries?

[Safi] We are neither disappointed nor satisfied with their attitude. If they did not show any interest, they didn't work against us either. We need to establish a rapport with them and this should be done by the Pakistani Government.

[Itaul-Haq] What effect could the Gulf crisis have on the Kashmir issue?

[Safi] As a consequence of the crisis in the Gulf, the Kashmir issue has been placed on the back burner. This has encouraged India. India is operating under the philosophy of "might is right." Consequently, India is suppressing Kashmiri muslims just as it did in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan. The Gulf crisis should alert those who believe in an independent Kashmir. Kuwait, a rich country and a member of the United Nations, was attacked by its bigger neighbor and is now under occupation. Kashmir is located in the middle of India, China, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union; what would happen to it as an independent country?

[Itaul-Haq] The Kashmir Liberation Front has established an interim government. What effect would it have on the Kashmiri jihad?

[Safi] The establishment of an interim government is a joke and is analogous to discrediting the jihad movement. These people are playing into the hands of the enemy. The enemy wants to distract people's attention from jihad to other things. The slogan for an independent Kashmir is a useful propaganda tool for India. In the event of a plebiscite, Hindus would vote for India and the Muslim vote would split. Therefore, this third option is favorable to India. The interim government is based on a secular philosophy. Participation in it by non-Muslims gives an impression that its founders are not supporters of Islam. Their secular setup is closer to India. The interim government has conflicts within its ranks and some elements have left because of them.

[Itaul-Haq] Could Kashmir problems be solved through talks?

[Safi] The issue of Kashmir will be settled through jihad. Even if talks are held, the Kashmiri representatives must be included in them. Pakistani and Indian leaders should not look at this only as a border dispute. Talks should be

held to decide a date for a plebiscite. Our rights have been recognized at the international level. During any talks, what needs to be discussed is when and how a plebiscite would take place under the auspices of the United Nations.

[Itaul-Haq] Are you satisfied with the internal situation in Pakistan for the Kashmiri cause?

[Safi] Kashmiri people look up to Pakistan. Human lives are being wasted due to instability. Hopefully this will stop. India is responsible for bloodshed in Sind and is using its agents against Pakistan. Pakistan was created by all muslims. Sindhis, Balochis, Punjabis, and Pathans should not be constrained by their ethnic divisions. They should start thinking as Pakistanis and muslims. A stable Pakistan is important for our cause.

[Itaul-Haq] What role should young Pakistanis play in the Kashmiri jihad?

[Safi] Young Pakistanis should create an Islamic atmosphere around them and spend their energies towards the implementation of an Islamic system. They should prepare themselves for jihad. Just as they participated in jihad for Afghanistan, if necessary they should be ready to sacrifice their lives for the Kashmiri jihad.

### Relations With U.S. Reevaluated

91AS0343A Karachi JANG in Urdu 26 Nov 90 p 4

[Article by Nizam Sidiqi: "Pakistan-U.S. Relations Need To Be Realistic"]

[Text] The 43-year history of Pakistan-U.S. relations is full of mutual trust and mistrust. Once again in this old "friendly relationship," new concerns have developed. The most recent development has to do with the sudden suspension of U.S. military and economic assistance to Pakistan. U.S. aid was suspended on 1 October 1990, as a result of the Pressler amendment which requires Mr. Bush to certify to the Congressional Foreign Relations Committees regarding the Pakistani nuclear program. Although U.S. aid to Pakistan had been suspended before by giving the flimsy excuse of the Pakistani nuclear program, this most recent suspension went into effect when an election campaign was under way and there was uncertainty in the country. Some political elements in the country exploited the issue of aid suspension despite being fully aware of the real reasons behind it. Some unwise politicians even "bragged" and gave the impression that the United States can keep its aid to itself. These politicians argued that they wouldn't die without aid and promised to arrange for substitute sources. In other words, in addition to very important military aid, US\$380 million per year in economic assistance didn't mean much to them. They gave the impression that if one door is shut, another will open! But, this is no longer easy.

Pakistan's tragedy is that for decades it has not been able to decrease its dependence on foreign aid and loans. In

fact, this dependence has increased. At various points, the bureaucrats, technocrats and political leaders have made grand promises to rid the country of foreign aid and loans. These people made big claims regarding self-reliance, but on various occasions in the name of internal stability and regional conditions, they accepted foreign aid and loans. Therefore, the economic and security structure of the country not only became dependent but addicted to foreign aid and loans. It is difficult to get rid of an addiction. We have become addicted to living off foreign assistance and loans.

During the last four decades, just like drug addicts, the foreign aid and loan-dependent bureaucracy and rulers have not only spread their hands in front of the United States, but also begged from the international lending institutions, developed countries, and aid agencies. However, they preferred to rely on the American aid for defense and economic development. In addition to military assistance, Pakistan's dependence on American aid is evident from the fact that the country received \$1,612.15 million between 1982-1987 in U.S. aid. After 1987, Pakistan received \$350 million and \$345 million in 1988 and 1989 respectively. In 1990, the United States committed \$380 million. After Israel and Egypt, Pakistan ranked third among the U.S. aid receiving countries. The dependence on U.S. aid makes it clear that it is in Pakistan's own best interests to maintain a good relationship with the United States.

The changes in the international arena (believe it or not) have made the United States a supreme power. Among the traditional five powers, the Soviet Union is facing severe economic crisis and is no longer a super power at the international level. The United States is no longer concerned that one of its allies would fall under the Soviet sphere of influence eroding the balance of power in a particular geographical area. This situation is of serious concern to developing countries, especially those dependent on foreign loans and aid. Sooner or later, these countries will have to accept whatever assistance they can get regardless of the conditions attached to it.

In response to U.S. aid suspension, some emotional and childish remarks were made. The remarks made by the caretaker Interior Minister Mian Zahid Sarifraz were unique in this regard. Pakistan's Foreign Ministry had never faced such a ludicrous situation before. Certain elements in the caretaker government, including those who had no conflict of interest with the United States, were also critical of the United States for political reasons. Surely, President Bush and his administration are not withholding assistance because of their remarks.

The reason behind U.S. aid suspension is the Pressler amendment. President Bush has not signed the certification required by this amendment yet. Until U.S. aid is resumed, the chill in Pakistan-U.S. relations will remain. Although the Pressler amendment is unpopular in Pakistan, nevertheless, it is a part of the United States law. This law may be discriminatory towards Pakistan, but it requires President Bush and his administration to fulfill

its conditions each year before aid can be disbursed. Pakistan's nuclear program, a necessity, has always been subject to a U.S. campaign of suspicion, objections, and restrictions. This campaign began with the arrival of U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in Lahore in 1976. During his visit, Mr. Kissinger threatened Prime Minister Bhutto of "dire consequences" (which later became true). This campaign resulted in the cancellation of sale to Pakistan of the French reprocessing plant. This was verified from the U.S. Embassy documents published in Teheran, Iran. The last 15 years are full of U.S. legal, political, diplomatic, and economic pressures on Pakistan. The United States has always insisted that Pakistan should unilaterally sign the NPT (Nonproliferation Treaty) and open its Kahota plant to international inspections. Whereas, Pakistan's position is that it would not sign the NPT unless India signs it, too.

India conducted its nuclear test in 1974 in Pokhran and several of its nuclear sites are closed to international inspections. The fact that India, the largest and most powerful regional military power, wants to establish regional hegemony cannot be denied. India's huge nuclear program, capable of producing atomic weapons, is a threat to Pakistan and other neighboring countries. India and Pakistan have fought three wars and the last encounter resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan's defense requirements have increased and are top priority. India and the United States have always tried to spread suspicions about Pakistan's nuclear program. Pakistan has always categorically denied such allegations. Pakistan's position is that the Kahota project is in operation to meet increasing energy demand. It is in Pakistan's national interests and, therefore, restrictions cannot be placed on the acquisition of nuclear technology. Linking Pakistan's nuclear program to atomic weapons is based on self-interests. During the last 15 years, the ups and downs in the "friendly relationship" between Pakistan and the United States are directly related to the Kahota project and Pakistan's nuclear program. The United States has never accepted the goals of the Pakistani nuclear program. But, under the pressure of its own regional self-interests, the United States granted a waiver from its laws to Pakistan from 1979 to 1987 and continued its military and economic assistance.

President Bush will be in position to take the next step when the U.S. Congress reconvenes in January 1991. If he issues the necessary certification and satisfies the Congressional Foreign Relations Committees, then aid will resume. The aforementioned reasons alone were not responsible for creating strains in Pakistan-U.S. relations. The diminishing U.S. interest in Afghanistan and subsequent rush to settle the conflict, and events in the Gulf have also played a critical role in it. During the last 11 years, the United States has used Pakistan to its full extent. As long as Pakistan's help was necessary, the United States overlooked its legal and other constraints and continued to provide assistance. Pakistan's geopolitical situation is no longer as important as it was during

the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, which forced the United States to become Pakistan's biggest benefactor. It wouldn't be wrong to assume that if the situation in the Gulf deteriorates any further, for the sake of U.S. Central Command, the United States once again may change its disposition towards Pakistan and adopt the attitude akin to 1981-1987. However, this scenario cannot be fully relied upon.

Pakistan's economic and defense weaknesses are no secret. We have never learned a lesson from an old saying, "not to place all of your eggs in one basket." Even today, we rely on the United States for all of our important defense needs. It is not difficult to imagine how serious this situation can get in case of a regional conflict or instability. When forced to face a difficult situation, the official rhetoric of self-reliance will crumble. It has happened in the past. However, there is no other alternative but to be optimistic towards the future.

Pakistanis cannot afford to remain ignorant of their unique geographical location and other important requirements. In order to meet the increasing energy demand, nuclear power should be our top priority. However, under the circumstances, the development of nuclear weapons cannot be given a top priority because, for a poor developing country like Pakistan, it is an expensive bargain. It is not a joke to manufacture and safeguard nuclear weapons. The danger of nuclear radiation has become a serious concern for rich countries. That is why the super powers signed agreements for disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation.

We have to accept the fact that, just as the resumption of economic and military aid is important to us, similarly, the U.S. President has to adhere to his country's laws and satisfy the Congress. Undoubtedly, in our view, U.S. laws are discriminatory and we can deplore them in our country. But, as dependents, we are not in a position to cancel or alter any U.S. laws. Therefore, we must find a balance in our position. It is true that as a proud nation we cannot sacrifice our legitimate national interests. We can, however, help find a way to clear current misunderstandings. This is a realistic thing to do.

Whether it is at an individual or national level, dependence is a big problem. In either case, dependence forces us to accept certain unpleasant conditions attached to it. Under the circumstances, there is no other alternative but to find a way to clear our misunderstandings with the United States. Probably, that is why the new Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif has assured U.S. President Bush by stating that "it is the aim of my government to enhance good relations with the United States on the basis of mutual interests and international peace and security. My government will cooperate with your (President Bush) administration to clear misunderstandings in all areas."

If Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif and his government would like to find a way to rebuild trust and

resume good relations, then he will have to take immediate steps. If current "talks" can be completed by December 1990 or the first week of January 1991 to satisfy the U.S. administration and if it shows understanding, then we can expect that when the Congress returns from vacation in January 1991, economic and military assistance will resume.

The most important thing facing Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his administration is to convince the U.S. administration to come up with a way to get rid of this annual uncertainty that is created by the suspension of economic and military aid.

### Census Procedures Criticized

91AS0414B Karachi DAWN in English 31 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by Izharul Hasan Burney: "Census: Mother Tongue, Nationality New Columns"; words in boldface as published; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Karachi, 30 December: Mother tongue and nationality are among the new columns in the questionnaire to be used for the second and final phase of the Population and Housing Census due in March next.

In case of persons of 18 years and above, the census will also try to ascertain whether or not they possessed the National Identity Card—but without producing evidence thereof. The respondent will simply say 'yes' or 'no.'

In 1981, the census enquired from the Muslims whether they could read the Holy Quran or were in the process of learning it. This column has been deleted this time.

In census-81, the literacy column comprised two sections: ability to read the Holy Quran, and ability to read/write letters besides educational standards in elaborate terms, spread over three columns.

This has now been compressed into two parts: one literacy, and the other dealing with details of the educational standard beginning from the basic to the highest.

The column about the mother tongue was last used in the 1961 census, and has been introduced once again this year.

The 12-column form to be used this year begins with the 6 columns which were provided in 1981 also.

The first column would list the name of every member of the household (present or temporarily absent on the dawn of 1 March 1991); the second deals with the marital status of each of these members, followed by their residential status, i.e., guest/visitor or present or absent at the time of the 'big count'; sex, age, and religion.

Then comes the literacy column (for 5 years and above) followed by the new column pertaining to mother tongue, and finally the query about the ID Card.

The form to be used for the Population Census will also be used for the Housing Census. This is being done for the first time since Independence. For this purpose, a separate section is provided on the same page. This includes the number of rooms; status of accommodation, i.e., whether rented or otherwise; completion date; type and stage of construction; source of water supply; electricity or energy source; whether the premises have separate kitchen/toilet/bath room, etc. And finally, there is a column to ascertain if any member of the family watches TV, listens to radio, or reads a newspaper. The form has provision to list up to 10 persons in a family. Where the size of the family is bigger, the enumerator will use a second form and staple it with the first page.

There are certain deficiencies in the form. For example, the missing column about the language (other than the mother tongue) generally spoken in family, or the ability to read the Holy Quran, which for many might not necessarily be the sign of literacy.

It is explained that certain columns had to be left out because of the limitation of space and the requirements of computer processing.

**Nationality:** But the major controversy relates to the determination of the citizenship status of the respondents. Pakistan is often said to be the most open country of the world. Besides the huge influx of Afghans and

Iranians after the political upheavals in these two neighbouring countries, there are also believed to be an unknown number of illegal immigrants from other countries in South Asian region.

The census will rely entirely on the 'yes' or 'no' statement of the respondent to determine whether or not he/she is a Pakistani or foreigner. This may be highly unreliable as no illegal immigrant would tell the truth.

**Flaws:** It would have been wiser to put the existing two columns about nationality and the ID Card together and utilise the space to record the ID Card number of at least the head of the family.

The census exercise is also lacking inasmuch as the respondent will not be required to affix his/her signature/thumb impression on the questionnaire. Reliance will be wholly on the enumerator. Any discrepancy on account of deliberate misstatement on the part of the respondent could thus be attributed to the enumerator making him liable to action under the law. The respondent will be fully absolved.

This is one thing which could perhaps be rectified even at this late stage. Whether or not there is specific column for the purpose, it can be made incumbent on the respondent to sign the statement/entries recorded by the enumerator. This will give greater credence to the exercise and also pin down the odd enumerator who might not do his work diligently.

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